







A Pigouvian tax is a tax that is imposed to correct an externality, which arises when a person engages in behavior that harms others without their consent. Pigouvian taxes are popular among academics—with prominent economists and legal scholars arguing for their imposition on myriad goods and activities that harm third parties, like carbon emissions and alcohol. Policymakers have recently been receptive to at least some of these arguments as evidenced by taxes imposed on or proposed for a variety of externality-generating goods, including guns, plastic bags, and sugary drinks.The conventional economic rationale for Pigouvian taxes assumes that they affect behavior by increasing the prices of taxed goods and not by altering people’s underlying preferences for them. For example, a carbon tax reduces driving by making gasoline more expensive, but it otherwise leaves people’s desire to drive unchanged. This conclusion follows from the standard assumption in economics that people’s tastes and preferences are fixed and determined exogenously to public policy.Contrary to standard analysis, I argue that Pigouvian taxes can in fact shape preferences and that policymakers should consider using them for that purpose. A carbon tax, for instance, would not only make driving more expensive, it might also modify preferences such that people develop a taste for alternative modes of transportation—making driving less desirable, even if we ignore the increase in gas prices.I make an original contribution to the literature on Pigouvian taxes by explaining in detail the psychological mechanisms through which these taxes can alter preferences. I also argue that once we relax the assumption of fixed preferences, the already strong case for Pigouvian taxes often becomes even more compelling. Specifically, preference endogeneity means that the loss in consumer utility resulting from Pigouvian taxes will often be smaller than standard analysis suggests. Moreover, malleable preferences dramatically expand the potential scope for Pigouvian taxes and enhance their impact on behavior through a social multiplier effect that can make taxes more effective in achieving public policy goals than scholars have traditionally assumed. I illustrate these points in a variety of policy-relevant contexts, including environmental law, gun control, and public health policy.
Carbon Tariffs 101
We evaluate the economic and environmental consequences of taxes on imported goods based on their carbon content. The analysis uses the simplest possible partial equilibrium framework, with one small open economy and a global pollution externality. It relies on graphs of supply and demand, rather than equations or formulas, hoping to reach readers familiar with basic economics. Despite its simplicity, the framework imparts numerous lessons. (1) Absent a domestic price on carbon, a carbon tariff imposes the same costs on domestic consumers as a domestic carbon price, but a carbon tariff also subsidizes domestic pollution. (2) If one small country imposes a carbon tariff, with or without a domestic carbon tax, the economic incidence of the tariff falls on its consumers. (3) If a holdout country joins the rest of the world by enacting its own carbon regulation and consequently imports more from other countries, those increased imports are not “leakage.” They are the cessation of leakage from when the holdout country’s policy was lax. And (4) if other countries do not appropriately regulate emissions, no single small country can use a combination of carbon taxes and carbon tariffs to fully correct the problem caused by its consumers or producers.

Putting nudges in perspective
Conventional economic policy focuses on ‘economic’ solutions (e.g. taxes, incentives, regulation) to problems caused by market-level factors such as externalities, misaligned incentives and information asymmetries. By contrast, ‘nudges’ provide behavioural solutions to problems that have generally been assumed to originate from limitations in human decision making, such as present bias. While policy-makers have good reason for exploiting the power of nudges, we argue that these extremes leave open a large space of policy options that have received less attention in the academic literature. First, there is no reason that solution and problem need have the same theoretical basis: there are promising behavioural solutions to problems that have causes that are well explained by traditional economics, and conventional economic solutions often offer the best line of attack on problems of behavioural origin. Second, there is a wide range of hybrid policy actions with both economic and behavioural components (e.g. framing a tax or incentive in a specific way), and there exist many societal problems – perhaps the majority – that arise from both economic and behavioural factors (e.g. firms’ exploitation of consumers’ behavioural biases). This paper aims to remind policy-makers that behavioural economics can influence policy in a variety of ways, of which nudges are the most prominent but not necessarily the most powerful.

The i-frame and the s-frame: How focusing on individual-level solutions has led behavioral public policy astray
An influential line of thinking in behavioral science, to which the two authors have long subscribed, is that many of society's most pressing problems can be addressed cheaply and effectively at the level of the individual, without modifying the system in which the individual operates. We now believe this was a mistake, along with, we suspect, many colleagues in both the academic and policy communities. Results from such interventions have been disappointingly modest. But more importantly, they have guided many (though by no means all) behavioral scientists to frame policy problems in individual, not systemic, terms: To adopt what we call the “i-frame,” rather than the “s-frame.” The difference may be more consequential than i-frame advocates have realized, by deflecting attention and support away from s-frame policies. Indeed, highlighting the i-frame is a long-established objective of corporate opponents of concerted systemic action such as regulation and taxation. We illustrate our argument briefly for six policy problems, and in depth with the examples of climate change, obesity, retirement savings, and pollution from plastic waste. We argue that the most important way in which behavioral scientists can contribute to public policy is by employing their skills to develop and implement value-creating system-level change.

Yeah, We're Going to Have to Tax the Middle Class
Fungibility and Consumer Choice: Evidence from Commodity Price Shocks*
Abstract We formulate a test of the fungibility of money based on parallel shifts in the prices of different quality grades of a commodity. We embed the test in a discrete-choice model of product quality choice and estimate the model using panel microdata on gasoline purchases. We find that when gasoline prices rise, consumers substitute to lower octane gasoline, to an extent that cannot be explained by income effects. Across a wide range of specifications, we consistently reject the null hypothesis that households treat “gas money” as fungible with other income. We compare the empirical fit of three psychological models of decision making. A simple model of category budgeting fits the data well, with models of loss aversion and salience both capturing important features of the time series.

Inducing Peer Pressure to Promote Cooperation
Cooperation in a large society of self-interested individuals is notoriously difficult to achieve when the externality of one individual's action is spread thin and wide on the whole society. This leads to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ in which rational action will ultimately make everyone worse-off. Traditional policies to promote cooperation involve Pigouvian taxation or subsidies that make individuals internalize the externality they incur. We introduce a new approach to achieving global cooperation by localizing externalities to one's peers in a social network, thus leveraging the power of peer-pressure to regulate behavior. The mechanism relies on a joint model of externalities and peer-pressure. Surprisingly, this mechanism can require a lower budget to operate than the Pigouvian mechanism, even when accounting for the social cost of peer pressure. Even when the available budget is very low, the social mechanisms achieve greater improvement in the outcome.

Behavioural economics, consumer behaviour and consumer policy: state of the art
Counter to the traditional assumption of neoclassical economics that individuals are rational Homo oeconomici that always seek to maximize their utility and follow their ‘true’ preferences, research in behavioural economics has demonstrated that people's judgements and decisions are often subject to systematic biases and heuristics, and are strongly dependent on the context of the decision. In this article, we briefly review the transition of research from neoclassical economics to behavioural economics, and discuss how the latter has influenced research in consumer behaviour and consumer policy. In particular, we discuss the impacts of key principles such as status quo bias, the endowment effect, mental accounting and the sunk-cost effect, other heuristics and biases related to availability, salience, the anchoring effect and simplicity rules, as well as the effects of other supposedly irrelevant factors such as music, temperature and physical markers on consumers’ decisions. These principles not only add significantly to research on consumer behaviour – they also offer readily available practical implications for consumer policy to nudge behaviour in beneficial directions in consumption domains including financial decision making, product choice, healthy eating and sustainable consumption.

Social Influence and Action — Jen Christiansen
I’m wary of climate solutions that are hyper focused on the action of individuals as opposed to systems and corporations. Do you experience carbon footprint guilt every time you board a plane to visit family too? Well, that whole schema was a product of the PR firm Ogilvy & Mather for British Petroleum. It was an effort to shift focus away from oil companies and onto individual responsibility to lower greenhouse gas emissions. For more, read “The carbon footprint sham” by Mark Kaufman for Mashable in 2021, and “Big oil coined ‘carbon footprints’ to blame us for their greed. Keep them on the hook” by Rebecca Solnit for The Guardian.

Characterizing the causes, dynamics, and consequences of choice deferral
The fact that people often avoid making decisions is well known, and past research has helped to identify some of the conditions and reasons for doing so. For instance, people may forgo choices between bad options because they prefer not to end up with one of those options. It is much less clear when and why people avoid choosing in cases where they eventually will have to make a given decision. To study such instances of choice deferral, we presented participants with a series of choices, and for each choice they were allowed to either choose immediately or defer the decision until later in the experiment. Across six experiments and three choice domains (choices among consumer goods, artwork, and political candidates), we find that the strongest predictor of choice deferral is the overall value of a given set of options, with relative value (i.e., how hard it is to identify the best option) counterintuitively playing a smaller role. We show that the influence of overall value on choice deferral can be accounted for by a dynamic decision model according to which participants appraise the option set relative to a criterion before deciding whether to choose or defer, comparing this to a previous model whereby participants make such a decision based on a predetermined decision time limit. We further reveal that the influence of overall value on choice deferral is determined by how congruent options are with a given choice goal (choose-best or choose-worst) rather than simply how bad those options are. Collectively, our findings shed new light on how people decide to put off the inevitable.
Sweden Wants To Fight Our Disposable Culture With Tax Breaks For Repairing Old Stuff - Fast Company
A proposed new law takes aim at wasteful consumerism.

New Study: No Evidence That High-End Tax Cuts Help the Economy
Many policymakers cite as fact that cuts in the top income and capital gains tax rates spur much greater economic growth and that increases in those tax rates significantly hurt growth. A new...
Restoring Consumer Sovereignty
For decades, there has been broad consensus within antitrust, intellectual property, and consumer law scholarship that consumers make decisions in their own best interests by consciously weighting the market’s relative prices, quantities, and qualities against each other. That consensus is unraveling in light of novel findings from cognitive and social psychology that explain how individuals’ concepts of what they prefer drive the global economy. At the same time, producers nowadays no longer merely satisfy consumers’ needs but also communicate their values, identities, and aspirations through the sale and marketing of products. As part of the growing interest in observations such as these, a wealth of psychological studies challenge the fundamental teaching of economics that the interplay of demand and supply of goods in a free market economy provides us with material wealth. This book provides a normative defense of that assumption and a theoretical framework for understanding its contradictions. It argues that the erosion of consumer sovereignty through the ability of product manufacturers and sellers to systematically take advantage of individuals’ psychological weaknesses demands a twenty-first-century reconceptualization of the consumer and a modern account of how the law should regulate the digital economy. Such an account is justified to ensure a diverse marketplace in which consumers can influence how our societies are structured and arranged. By examining the role that market manipulation plays, it offers ingredients for a realistic descriptive and normative market regulatory theory that is aware of its political economy, its behavioral suppositions, and its distributional consequences.

The critical role of second-order normative beliefs in predicting energy conservation
Sustaining large-scale public goods requires individuals to make environmentally friendly decisions today to benefit future generations1–6. Recent research suggests that second-order normative beliefs are more powerful predictors of behaviour than first-order personal beliefs7,8. We explored the role that second-order normative beliefs—the belief that community members think that saving energy helps the environment—play in curbing energy use. We first analysed a data set of 211 independent, randomized controlled trials conducted in 27 US states by Opower, a company that uses comparative information about energy consumption to reduce household energy usage (pooled N = 16,198,595). Building off the finding that the energy savings varied between 0.81% and 2.55% across states, we matched this energy use data with a survey that we conducted of over 2,000 individuals in those same states on their first-order personal and second-order normative beliefs. We found that second-order normative beliefs predicted energy savings but first-order personal beliefs did not. A subsequent pre-registered experiment provides causal evidence for the role of second-order normative beliefs in predicting energy conservation above first-order personal beliefs. Our results suggest that second-order normative beliefs play a critical role in promoting energy conservation and have important implications for policymakers concerned with curbing the detrimental consequences of climate change.

The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of Savings and Debt
In the standard economic account of consumer behavior the cost of a purchase takes the form of a reduction in future utility when expenditures that otherwise could have been made are forgone. The reality of consumer hedonics is different. When people make purchases, they often experience an immediate pain of paying, which can undermine the pleasure derived from consumption. The ticking of the taxi meter, for example, reduces one's pleasure from the ride. We propose a “double-entry” mental accounting theory that describes the nature of these reciprocal interactions between the pleasure of consumption and the pain of paying and draws out their implications for consumer behavior and hedonics. A central assumption of the model, which we call prospective accounting, is that consumption that has already been paid for can be enjoyed as if it were free and that the pain associated with payments made prior to consumption (but not after) is buffered by thoughts of the benefits that the payments will finance. Another important concept is coupling, which refers to the degree to which consumption calls to mind thoughts of payment, and vice versa. Some financing methods, such as credit cards, tend to weaken coupling, whereas others, such as cash payment, produce tight coupling. Our model makes a variety of predictions that are at variance with economic formulations. Contrary to the standard prediction that people will finance purchases to minimize the present value of payments, our model predicts strong debt aversion—that they should prefer to prepay for consumption or to get paid for work after it is performed. Such pay-before sequences confer hedonic benefits because consumption can be enjoyed without thinking about the need to pay for it in the future. Likewise, when paying beforehand, the pain of paying is mitigated by thoughts of future consumption benefits. Contrary to the economic prediction that consumers should prefer to pay, at the margin, for what they consume, our model predicts that consumers will find it less painful to pay for, and hence will prefer, flat-rate pricing schemes such as unlimited Internet access at a fixed monthly price, even if it involves paying more for the same usage. Other predictions concern spending patterns with cash, charge, or credit cards, and preferences for the earmarking of purchases. We test these predictions in a series of surveys and in a conjoint-like analysis that pitted our double-entry mental accounting model against a standard discounting formulation and another benchmark that did not incorporate hedonic interactions between consumption and payments. Our model provides a better fit of the data for 60% of the subjects; the discounting formulation provides a better fit for only 29% of the subjects (even when allowing for positive and negative discount rates). The pain of paying, we argue, plays an important role in consumer self-regulation, but is hedonically costly. From a hedonic perspective the ideal situation is one in which payments are tightly coupled to consumption (so that paying evokes thoughts about the benefits being financed) but consumption is decoupled from payments (so that consumption does not evoke thoughts about payment). From an efficiency perspective, however, it is important for consumers to be aware of what they are paying for consumption. This creates a tension between hedonic efficiency and what we call decision efficiency. Various institutional arrangements, such as financing of public parks through taxes or usage fees, play into this tradeoff. A producer developing a pricing structure for their product or service should be aware of these two conflicting objectives, and should try to devise a structure that reconciles them.

Learning to accept welfare-enhancing policies: an experimental investigation of congestion pricing
Welfare-enhancing policies such as congestion pricing are argued to improve efficiency in situations with externalities. Unfamiliarity and lack of any personal experience with such policies, however, can hinder their implementation; particularly the ex-ante uncertainties of incidences of gains and losses as well as debates regarding equity concerns and how to recycle revenues often stymies implementation. This paper employs a laboratory experiment with heterogeneous users to investigate the effectiveness and acceptability of a toll in a six-player-two-route congestion game. To measure acceptability and how it is affected by experience with the toll, we conduct referenda before, during, and after subjects experience a congestion problem and a toll. The experiment employs a 2×2 design that varies two treatments: the rate of revenue reallocation and the level of information before the final vote. After an experiential learning phase, congestion pricing is found to curb congestion effectively, and although some subjects do not vote in their monetary self-interest initially, the majority does so after experiencing the congestion pricing policy. Data on worldviews and beliefs are collected and matched to voting behavior to examine the evolution of how experience determines acceptability. Some worldviews and beliefs can predict voting behavior and the timing of when an individual finds a toll (un)acceptable.

Will Canada’s gas tax holiday drive up emissions and help the rich? | The Narwhal
The Carney government is keeping its tax off at gas pumps to help with the cost of living, but critics call it a subsidy for the oil and gas industry that won’t help those who need it most
