







Under the guise of counterterrorism, the government is accelerating pressure on social media companies to crack down on speech the feds deem disinformation.
Trumpās DHS is using an obscure law to secretly snoop on journalists, non-profits and unions: āItās outrageousā
Even after judges rejected the same ploy, the Trump administration is going directly to social media and telecommunications companies

We're getting the social media crisis wrong
The bigger problem isn't disinformation. It's degraded democratic publics

We're getting the social media crisis wrong
The bigger problem isn't disinformation. It's degraded democratic publics

We're getting the social media crisis wrong
The bigger problem isn't disinformation. It's degraded democratic publics

Political disinformation concentrates in repeated claims across media
The prevalence and dynamics of disinformation remain contentious, partly because measures have relied on posts containing URLs from untrustworthy sources. We move beyond this by detecting disinformation in text and across posts. Using retrieval-augmented generation, we match six million Facebook, Instagram, and X posts by politicians from the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, and two million articles from news outlets to fact-checked claims. We show that disinformation is concentrated in a small number of combinations of policy issues and parties and that just over hundred distinct claims account for around half of all disinformation across the three countries. They often appear first on a single platform, later on multiple, and subsequently in news coverage before being fact-checked. These findings suggest that disinformation is concentrated in a narrow segment of political communication, potentially creating repeated exposure that may shape the terms of public debate through both social and news media.
Elena Rossini on GoToSocial ā (@elena@aseachange.com)
[3 media attachments] Dear friends, Please gather around for a long post about #WSocial and how they are responding to critiques. I have noticed a trend: W Social leaders and staunch supporters are describing any critical posts about the company as "targeted disinformation." Its CEO said they will soon have a technical solution in place for this. Oh?!? š: https://mu.social/profile/anna.wsocial.eu/post/3mtqufy6g4s2r I suppose the "targeted disinformation" claims are about recent posts by the likes of me and @pallenberg about troubling hate speech that is allowed on W Social. Claims backed by hard evidence, in the form of screenshots and video captures. (I am increasingly doing screen recordings of problematic posts and interactions by W Social people because they have a tendency to delete evidence - like an infamous comment on a video by the Instutute for Remigration). ā¬ļø ā¬ļø ā¬ļø Discrediting sources, renaming evidence as "disinformation" and creating a victim narrative has a long, storied history. ā¬ļø ā¬ļø ā¬ļø But I'm digressing. I speak up about W Social because: - Mainstream media runs PR fluff about them; - Horrid hate speech on the platform is completely unmoderated. W Social is currently showing the limits of free speech absolutism. Its CEO wrote: "We donāt need W to become another echo chamber." Reminds you of something? Atmosphere user @echna.bsky.social astutely remarked that "W Social is on an X speedrun, without ever having been like Twitter." š: https://mu.social/profile/echna.bsky.social/post/3mtqlknzork2t Bluesky, #Blacksky, and #Northsky have mechanisms in place to report hate speech - and I am super thankful for that. As of today, I cannot report to W Social posts by their users that contain hate speech. The W Social moderation list's only purpose is to make a distinction between verified users and bots. Compare it with Blacksky's moderation list and be amazed (see screenshots). What's the big deal about the lack of content moderā¦

AI-driven disinformation running rampant on social media before US midterms, experts warn
Social media companies including Meta have pulled back on efforts to protect voters from election-meddling lies

āShockingā scale of UK governmentās secret files on critics revealed
Dossiers were compiled by 15 departments after scouring social media activity to vet people invited to speak at official events

How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument
The Chinese government has long been suspected of hiring as many as 2,000,000 people to surreptitiously insert huge numbers of pseudonymous and other deceptive writings into the stream of real social media posts, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary people. Many academics, and most journalists and activists, claim that these so-called "50c party" posts vociferously argue for the government's side in political and policy debates. As we show, this is also true of the vast majority of posts openly accused on social media of being 50c. Yet, almost no systematic empirical evidence exists for this claim, or, more importantly, for the Chinese regime's strategic objective in pursuing this activity. In the first large scale empirical analysis of this operation, we show how to identify the secretive authors of these posts, the posts written by them, and their content. We estimate that the government fabricates and posts about 448 million social media comments a year. In contrast to prior claims, we show that the Chinese regime's strategy is to avoid arguing with skeptics of the party and the government, and to not even discuss controversial issues. We show that the goal of this massive secretive operation is instead to distract the public and change the subject, as most of the these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results fit with what is known about the Chinese censorship program, and suggest how they may change our broader theoretical understanding of "common knowledge" and information control in authoritarian regimes. This paper is related to our articles in *Science,* "[Reverse-Engineering Censorship In China: Randomized Experimentation And Participant Observation](/publication/reverse-engineering-censorship-in-china-randomized-experimentation-and-participant-observation/)", and the *American Political Science Review,* "[How Censorship In China Allows Government Criticism But Silences Collective Expression](/publication/how-censorship-in-china-allows-government-criticism-but-silences-collective-expression/)". Replication data at the Harvard Dataverse: [https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QSZMPD](https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QSZMPD).

How ICE Is Weaponizing Social Media Against Its Critics
The agency says its surveillance program searches for threats to agents, but critics see free-speech infringements.
An Attack on Tech Freedom, an Assault on Dissent
We live in a world of surveillance states, militarized police, and crackdowns on dissent. Meanwhile, corporate behemoths will often ally with the state to shut down dissident speech or aid and abet surveillance.Ā In this context, itās important for independent groups to develop and maintain encrypted communications platforms and independent web hosting. But the Trump...


How to Responsibly Report on Hacks and Disinformation
The run-up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election illustrated how vulnerable our most venerated journalistic outlets are to a new kind of information warfare. Reporters are a targeted adversary of foreign and domestic actors who want to harm our democracy. And to cope with this threat, especially in an election year, news organizations need to prepare for another wave of false, misleading, and hacked information. Often, the information will be newsworthy. Expecting reporters to refrain from covering news goes against core principles of American journalism and the practical business drivers that shape the intensely competitive media marketplace. In these cases, the question is not whether to report but how to do so most responsibly. Our goal is to give journalists actionable guidance.
š£ Take Action: Reform Section 702: End mass warrantless surveillance
Make an impact with guided actions from Freedom of The Press Foundation.
Fact-Checks Can Help Inoculate LLMs Against Disinformation
Large language models (LLMs) have become the first source millions consult when evaluating political claims, yet they were trained on an open internet that state-sponsored disinformation operations have been designed to pollute. We audit four frontier models across 2,268 responses to 63 fabrications from eight documented influence operations and find that even a single published fact-check can shift a model from hedging about a fabrication to rejecting it outright. Overall, models correctly rejected only 81% of fabrications while repeating disinformation in 3% of cases. Critically, the remaining 16% of responses would have left users unable to determine whether an fabricated claims were true or false. Fact-checks may present an avenue for addressing this vulnerability. Narratives which had been debunked by at least one IFCN certified fact-checking organization were correctly rejected as disinformation 93% of the time compared to just 76% of the time for unchecked narratives. Exploratory analyses suggest that this mechanism operates through training data, with models echoing the specific vocabulary of published corrections when available during their training windows. We conclude by discussing how fact-checks designed for human audiences appear to serve as effective protection for LLMs, converting both model uncertainty and outright disinformation into definitive rejections
U.S. Press Freedom Tracker
The U.S. Press Freedom Tracker is a project that aims to comprehensively document press freedom incidents in the United States ā such as the arrests of journalists, seizures of their equipment, interrogations and searches at the U.S. border, subpoenas to testify about sources, leak prosecutions and physical attacks. The Press Freedom Tracker documents cases across the country, involving national, state and local authorities.