







No web standard should require you to agree to an advertising company’s “terms of use.”
Introducing a terms of use and updated privacy notice for Firefox | The Mozilla Blog
UPDATE: We’ve seen a little confusion about the language regarding licenses, so we want to clear that up. We need a license to allow us to make some of t

WebPreferences Object | Electron
The OpenJS Foundation | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Bylaws | Code of Conduct | Trademark Policy | Trademark List | Cookie Policy
Governance of Ad Requests by a Union of Diverse Actors (GARUDA)
Governance for advertising on the Web

Google’s Chrome Antitrust Paradox
This Article examines Google’s dominance of the browser market, highlighting how Google’s Chrome browser plays a critical role in reinforcing Google’s dominance in other markets. While Google portrays Chrome as a neutral platform built on open-source technologies, this Article shows that Chrome is, in fact, instrumental in Google’s strategy to reinforce its dominance in the online advertising, publishing, and browser markets. The examination of Google’s strategic acquisitions, anticompetitive practices, and the implementation of so-called “privacy controls” underlines that Chrome is far from a neutral gateway to the web. Rather, it serves as a key tool for Google to maintain and extend its market power, often to the detriment of competition and innovation in the digital economy.This Article illustrates how Chrome not only bolsters Google’s position in online advertising and publishing through practices such as coercion and self-preferencing, but also leverages its advertising clout to engage in a “pay-to-play” paradigm—the cornerstone of Google’s larger strategy of market control. It also outlines potential regulatory interventions and remedies by drawing on historical antitrust precedents. Lastly, this Article proposes a triad of solutions motivated by an analysis of Google’s abuse of Chrome, including behavioral remedies targeting specific anticompetitive practices, structural remedies involving an internal separation of Google’s divisions, and divestiture of Chrome from Google into an independent organization.Despite Chrome’s dominance and its critical role in Google’s ecosystem, as well as its recent legal troubles with the Department of Justice, it so far has avoided significant antitrust action. A key reason for this inaction lies in the long-standing precedent supporting the hegemony of technology firms and the uncertainty surrounding Chrome’s viability as a standalone entity. This Article attempts to address these issues to enable antitrust actions that are essential in remedying current market imbalances. Such actions are also critical to mitigate future threats to competition from an increasingly monopolistic technology landscape, thereby fostering a competitive digital environment that promotes innovation and protects consumer interests.
The Web Can Thrive Without Google’s Search Monopoly
Viable browsers and meaningful contributions to web standards can be sustained with more modest revenue streams, writes Alissa Cooper.

Privacy vs. Profit: The Impact of Google's Manifest Version 3 (MV3) Update on Ad Blocker Effectiveness
Google's recent update to the manifest file for Chrome browser extensions, transitioning from manifest version 2 (MV2) to manifest version 3 (MV3), has raised concerns among users and ad blocker providers, who worry that the new restrictions, notably the shift from the powerful WebRequest API to the more restrictive DeclarativeNetRequest API, might reduce ad blocker effectiveness. Because ad blockers play a vital role for millions of users seeking a more private and ad-free browsing experience, this study empirically investigates how the MV3 update affects their ability to block ads and trackers. Through a browser-based experiment conducted across multiple samples of ad-supported websites, we compare the MV3 to MV2 instances of four widely used ad blockers. Our results reveal no statistically significant reduction in ad-blocking or anti-tracking effectiveness for MV3 ad blockers compared to their MV2 counterparts, and in some cases, MV3 instances even exhibit slight improvements in blocking trackers. These findings are reassuring for users, indicating that the MV3 instances of popular ad blockers continue to provide effective protection against intrusive ads and privacy-infringing trackers. While some uncertainties remain, ad blocker providers appear to have successfully navigated the MV3 update, finding solutions that maintain the core functionality of their extensions.

Pluralistic: Google’s new remote attestation scheme is every bit as terrible as its old remote attestation scheme (12 Jun 2026) – Pluralistic: Daily links from Cory Doctorow
Long before "agentic AI," we had the idea that software would act as your agent on the internet. That's why the old-fashioned technical term for a browser is a "user agent." Your browser acts on your behalf to retrieve information and then show it to you, in the format you choose. It's your agent:
Digital Credentials · Issue #1003 · mozilla/standards-positions
Request for Mozilla Position on an Emerging Web Specification Specification title: Digital Credentials Specification or proposal URL (if available): https://wicg.github.io/digital-identities/ Expla...
An Open Letter to Google regarding Mandatory Developer Registration for Android App Distribution
Open Letter to Google Regarding Mandatory Developer Registration for Third-Party App Distribution
Digital Omnibus: What Would it Mean for Competition and Privacy in Advertising? - The Platform Law Blog
In November 2025, the European Commission (“Commission”) proposed a “Digital Omnibus” regulation to amend several EU legislations.[1] Although presented as a simplification exercise to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness, the proposal revisits key provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the e-Privacy-Directive concerning the use of personal data, including for advertising purposes. The changes could […]

Chrome looks set to ship an LLM Prompt API to the web platform. At Mozilla, we oppose this API. We feel it has a large interoperability risk, and Google imposing T&Cs on a web API sets a dangerous precedent. Full details: github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/i…
Prompt API · Issue #1213 · mozilla/standards-positions
github.comI found a really great article around web standards "Every feature begins life as a non-standard proposal, often shipped. This is not a bug" that I shared with @blaine.bsky.social last September. Thread in the forum discourse.atprotocol.community/t/web-standards-and-the-fall-…
Web Standards and the Fall of the House of Iamus (Alex Russell)
discourse.atprotocol.communityBlaine
I need to write more about this, but one of the core benefits of atproto is that it (dramatically) lowers the cost of coordination, both in divergence and convergence.