We show for the first time that realistic AI training processes can accidentally produce misaligned models.
AI’s Hacking Skills Are Approaching an ‘Inflection Point’
AI models are getting so good at finding vulnerabilities that some experts say the tech industry might need to rethink how software is built.
Learning to Trust: How Humans Mentally Recalibrate AI Confidence Signals
Productive human-AI collaboration requires appropriate reliance, yet contemporary AI systems are often miscalibrated, exhibiting systematic overconfidence or underconfidence. We investigate whether humans can learn to mentally recalibrate AI confidence signals through repeated experience. In a behavioral experiment (N = 200), participants predicted the AI's correctness across four AI calibration conditions: standard, overconfidence, underconfidence, and a counterintuitive "reverse confidence" mapping. Results demonstrate robust learning across all conditions, with participants significantly improving their accuracy, discrimination, and calibration alignment over 50 trials. We present a computational model utilizing a linear-in-log-odds (LLO) transformation and a Rescorla-Wagner learning rule to explain these dynamics. The model reveals that humans adapt by updating their baseline trust and confidence sensitivity, using asymmetric learning rates to prioritize the most informative errors. While humans can compensate for monotonic miscalibration, we identify a significant boundary in the reverse confidence scenario, where a substantial proportion of participants struggled to override initial inductive biases. These findings provide a mechanistic account of how humans adapt their trust in AI confidence signals through experience.
Position: Don't Just "Fix it in Post": A Science of AI Must Study Training Dynamics
What would it mean to have a scientific understanding of AI? Models are not static objects: they are snapshots of time-evolving processes shaped by data, objectives, architectures, and optimization dynamics. Yet much of AI research treats models as fixed artifacts, analyzing behaviors after training rather than asking why they emerge. This position paper argues that a science of AI must move beyond post-hoc fixes and study the training dynamics that produce model behavior. Such a science should support progressively stronger forms of understanding: predicting outcomes from early training signals, intervening when trajectories go wrong, and ultimately designing training procedures that more reliably produce desired properties. Scaling laws have made prediction routine for loss; the challenge is extending this success to capabilities, biases, robustness, and safety-relevant behaviors. We articulate requirements for such theories grounded in the history and philosophy of science, examine progress in mechanistic interpretability, fairness, memorization, and simplicity bias, and identify concrete open problems.
Securing internal systems against increasingly capable and imperfectly aligned AI
Discover our AI Control Roadmap: a defense-in-depth system to securely manage advanced, potentially misaligned AI agents.
AI #180: No Longer In Charge
What we know about internal AI models hacking into real companies during cyber evaluations keeps getting worse.
Labs are struggling to keep frontier models under control
OpenAI and Anthropic may have accidentally trained models to get better at hacking.
The AI feedback loop: Researchers warn of 'model collapse' as AI trains on AI-generated content
As a generative AI training model is exposed to more AI-generated data, it performs worse, producing more errors, leading to model collapse.
AI #178: A Fire Alarm For General Intelligence
The story that matters most this week is that OpenAI’s internally deployed models have severe alignment problems, including repeatedly breaking out of their sandboxes, and in one case sending a swarm of agents that broke into HuggingFace in order to steal the answers to the benchmark ExploitGym.
Look-ahead Reasoning with a Learned Model in Imperfect Information Games
Test-time reasoning significantly enhances pre-trained AI agents' performance. However, it requires an explicit environment model, often unavailable or overly complex in real-world scenarios....
Training AI models doesn't emit that much
If we just make reasonable comparisons instead of crazy ones
Anthropic blames dystopian sci-fi for training AI models to act “evil”
But training on "synthetic stories" that model good AI behavior can help.
Top AI Security Incidents of 2025 Revealed | Adversa AI
Discover how AI systems are being hacked in the wild — from prompt injection to agent abuse — with real breaches, lessons, and defenses in Adversa AI’s 2025 report.
A Three-Facet Framework for AI Alignment • Grace Kind
Here's a simple conceptual framework that I've been using recently to think about AI alignment.
📢 New paper: Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But most evaluations of agents conducting AI research focus on narrow, verifiable tasks. Can AI agents… | Sayash Kapoor
📢 New paper: Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But most evaluations of agents conducting AI research focus on narrow, verifiable tasks. Can AI agents conduct open-ended research? https://lnkd.in/gfP-q4CD We gave agents research questions from two unpublished papers, six days, and thousands of dollars of API credits and compute. The authors of the original papers reviewed the AI-generated papers. They unambiguously rejected agents' outputs. Agents were fluent at most *engineering* tasks. They conducted serious literature reviews, debugged GPU environments, ran hundreds of experiments, and turned in camera-ready LaTeX without human help. We also found no evidence of reward hacking. If anything, we found the opposite: the agents started with marketable claims and walked them back to negative results as the evidence came in. But neither agent output was close to the bar of a top conference paper. Both papers suffered from similar failures: poor judgment about the bar for an AI paper submitted to a top conference, the lack of creative problem solving and ineffective backtracking, poor awareness of resources, and instruction drift. This research design has many limitations: the small sample size, non-blind reviews, and the reviewers knowing that the work was AI-generated. We also couldn't test Anthropic's strongest model, because Fable 5 is deliberately limited on frontier AI research tasks, so ended up using OpenClaw with Opus 4.8 (extra-high) for our main experiments and Codex with Sol 5.6 (ultra) for a robustness check. But we think the research design is still helpful in assessing AI agents' ability to conduct research, and it is complementary to evaluations on verifiable tasks, as well as blinded reviews of AI outputs. In follow-up studies, we are expanding the set of non-public papers we evaluate. If you are an AI researcher with unpublished papers, we would love to collaborate with you on our next evaluation. Expression of interest: https://lnkd.in/gpeykJea We also release the agent logs and all the code and data, so that others can conduct their own analyses of our results: https://lnkd.in/gJarPAnb Finally, we plan to conduct such evaluations regularly, and are hiring a senior researcher to help lead these efforts. Apply here: https://lnkd.in/erJZdmve I'm grateful for the core team leading this effort: Peter Kirgis, Andrew Schwartz, Stephan Rabanser, and Arvind Narayanan, and to our collaborators who reviewed AI papers, analyzed agents logs, and gave feedback on the paper: David Demitri Africa, Konstantinos V., Viet Nguyen, Dr Toby D. Pilditch, Magda Dubois, Harry Coppock, Cozmin Ududec, Nitya Nadgir, Matilda Orona, Tilman Bayer, Derrick Chan-Sew, Eric (Yue) Ling, Abhishek Shetty, Helen Toner, Gillian K. Hadfield, Seth Lazar, Steve Newman, Shoshannah Tekofsky, Rishi Bommasani
Companies That Replaced Humans With AI Are Realizing Their Mistake
As AI agents have yet to pay for themselves, more and more executives are waking up to the sloppy reality of AI hype.
