Large language models (LLMs) like the GPT family learn the statistical structure of language by optimising their ability to predict missing words in sentences (as in ‘The cat sat on the [BLANK]’). Despite the impressive technical ju-jitsu of transformer models and the billions of parameters they learn, it’s still a computational guessing game. ChatGPT is, in technical terms, a ‘bullshit generator’. If a generated sentence makes sense to you, the reader, it means the mathematical model has made sufficiently good guess to pass your sense-making filter. The language model has no idea what it’s talking about because it has no idea about anything at all. It’s more of a bullshitter than the most egregious egoist you’ll ever meet, producing baseless assertions with unfailing confidence because that’s what it’s designed to do. It’s a bonus for the parent corporation when journalists and academics respond by generating acres of breathless coverage, which works as PR even when expressing concerns about the end of human creativity.
What Is ChatGPT Doing … and Why Does It Work?
Stephen Wolfram explores the broader picture of what's going on inside ChatGPT and why it produces meaningful text. Discusses models, training neural nets, embeddings, tokens, transformers, language syntax.
When ChatGPT Broke an Entire Field: An Oral History | Quanta Magazine
Researchers in “natural language processing” tried to tame human language. Then came the transformer.
ChatGPT is bullshit
Ethics and Information Technology - Recently, there has been considerable interest in large language models: machine learning systems which produce human-like text and dialogue. Applications of...
Why Does ChatGPT "Delve" So Much? Exploring the Sources of Lexical Overrepresentation in Large Language Models
Scientific English is currently undergoing rapid change, with words like "delve," "intricate," and "underscore" appearing far more frequently than just a few years ago. It is widely assumed that scientists' use of large language models (LLMs) is responsible for such trends. We develop a formal, transferable method to characterize these linguistic changes. Application of our method yields 21 focal words whose increased occurrence in scientific abstracts is likely the result of LLM usage. We then pose "the puzzle of lexical overrepresentation": WHY are such words overused by LLMs? We fail to find evidence that lexical overrepresentation is caused by model architecture, algorithm choices, or training data. To assess whether reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) contributes to the overuse of focal words, we undertake comparative model testing and conduct an exploratory online study. While the model testing is consistent with RLHF playing a role, our experimental results suggest that participants may be reacting differently to "delve" than to other focal words. With LLMs quickly becoming a driver of global language change, investigating these potential sources of lexical overrepresentation is important. We note that while insights into the workings of LLMs are within reach, a lack of transparency surrounding model development remains an obstacle to such research.
Why Does ChatGPT "Delve" So Much? Exploring the Sources of Lexical Overrepresentation in Large Language Models
Scientific English is currently undergoing rapid change, with words like "delve," "intricate," and "underscore" appearing far more frequently than just a few years ago. It is widely assumed that scientists' use of large language models (LLMs) is responsible for such trends. We develop a formal, transferable method to characterize these linguistic changes. Application of our method yields 21 focal words whose increased occurrence in scientific abstracts is likely the result of LLM usage. We then pose "the puzzle of lexical overrepresentation": WHY are such words overused by LLMs? We fail to find evidence that lexical overrepresentation is caused by model architecture, algorithm choices, or training data. To assess whether reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) contributes to the overuse of focal words, we undertake comparative model testing and conduct an exploratory online study. While the model testing is consistent with RLHF playing a role, our experimental results suggest that participants may be reacting differently to "delve" than to other focal words. With LLMs quickly becoming a driver of global language change, investigating these potential sources of lexical overrepresentation is important. We note that while insights into the workings of LLMs are within reach, a lack of transparency surrounding model development remains an obstacle to such research.
A recent experience with ChatGPT 5.5 Pro
We are all having to keep revising upwards our assessments of the mathematical capabilities of large language models. I have just made a fairly large revision as a result of ChatGPT 5.5 Pro, to whi…
Empirical evidence of Large Language Model's influence on human spoken communication
From the printing press to social media, innovations in communication technology have repeatedly reshaped how ideas spread through human culture. Chatbots powered by generative artificial intelligence constitute a new medium, encoding cultural patterns in their neural representations and disseminating them in conversations with hundreds of millions of people. Whether these patterns transmit into human language, and ultimately shape human culture, is a fundamental question. While fully quantifying the causal impact of a chatbot like ChatGPT on human culture is challenging, lexical shifts in human spoken communication may offer an early indicator. Here we show that words preferentially generated by ChatGPT, such as delve, showcase, boast, intricacies and meticulous, increased abruptly in spontaneous human speech. A synthetic-control analysis of 737,083 hours of conversation from 824,634 podcast episodes, screened for unscripted speech, causally links this shift to ChatGPT's release. The measurable influence on spontaneous speech suggests that humans internalize the lexical choices of large language models (LLMs). A preregistered experiment (N = 496) confirms they do, as a brief chatbot interaction led participants to adopt its words as their own, persisting past a distractor task and confirmed in forced lexical choice, indicating entrenchment in the active vocabulary. Together these results show that machines trained on human data now feed their own traits back into human language, integrating LLMs into the ongoing processes of cultural evolution.. This coupling raises concerns about linguistic homogenization and the capacity of a few major AI providers for latent cultural influence at scale.
On-screen and now IRL: FSU researchers find evidence of ChatGPT buzzwords turning up in everyday speech
Within five days of ChatGPT’s release in 2022, the artificial intelligence chatbot gained more than a million users. Today, more than half of all adults
ChatGPT talks too much and it’s ruining learning
How the UX of AI chat can hijack our brains to compromise learning in schools and beyond
Embers of autoregression show how large language models are shaped by the problem they are trained to solve
The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that to develop a holistic understanding of these systems, we must consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts, we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. Using this approach—which we call the teleological approach—we identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. To test our predictions, we evaluate five LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Claude 3, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.0) on 11 tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the hypothesized ways. Many of the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4’s accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability sentence but only 13% when it is low-probability, even though this task is a deterministic one for which probability should not matter. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system—one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.
Embers of autoregression show how large language models are shaped by the problem they are trained to solve
The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that to develop a holistic understanding of these systems, we must consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts, we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. Using this approach—which we call the teleological approach—we identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. To test our predictions, we evaluate five LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Claude 3, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.0) on 11 tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the hypothesized ways. Many of the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4’s accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability sentence but only 13% when it is low-probability, even though this task is a deterministic one for which probability should not matter. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system—one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.
ChatGPT Is a Gimmick
AI offers a tempting illusion to students—and evidently to some teachers.
Why mental metaphors do not help us understand chatbot mistakes
The function of chatbots like OpenAI’s ChatGPT is based on detecting probabilistic patterns in the training data. This makes them vulnerable to generating factual mistakes in their outputs. Recently, it has become commonplace in philosophical, scientific, and popular discourses to capture such mistakes by metaphors that draw on discourses about the human mind. The two most popular metaphors at present are hallucinating and bullshitting. In this paper, we review, discuss, and criticise these mental metaphors. By applying conceptual metaphor theory, we provide numerous reasons why they do not succeed in providing us with a better understanding of factual chatbot mistakes. We conclude by calling for justifications of the epistemic feasibility and fruitfulness of the metaphors at issue. Furthermore, we raise the question what would be lost if we stopped trying to capture factual chatbot mistakes by mental metaphors.
'Nature' Retracts Paper on the Benefits of ChatGPT in Education
“What educators, parents and policy officials really needed was high quality data and evidence to help guide them. What they have had to deal with instead is some substandard research.”
Looking for AI use-cases — Benedict Evans
We’ve had ChatGPT for 18 months, but what’s it for? What are the use-cases? Why isn’t it useful for everyone, right now? Do Large Language Models become universal tools that can do ‘any’ task, or do we wrap them in single-purpose apps, and build thousands of new companies around that?
The Unpredictable Abilities Emerging From Large AI Models | Quanta Magazine
Large language models like ChatGPT are now big enough that they’ve started to display startling, unpredictable behaviors.
