The trouble with polling about ideological labels
The *Socialist* Political Compass: Methods to create socialism
Correlates of the Mamdani Vote
No class gradient is a big win for democratic socialism
The Democratic image is underwater — but they're not losing
The party has a near-historically low favorability rating. This is mostly due to disaffection on the left, where voters still say they'll vote Democratic for the midterms
Legitimize or Delegitimize? Mainstream Party Strategy toward (Former) Pariah Parties and How Voters Respond
Mainstream parties have often shifted from initially portraying new competitors as undemocratic pariahs (i.e., a delegitimizing strategy) to portraying the same parties later as democratic (i.e., a legitimizing strategy). I argue that voters follow mainstream parties’ legitimizing strategies in their legitimacy evaluations of these parties. I investigate this argument with two independent survey experiments and a quantitative media content analysis in two countries that differ sharply in the nature of party competition—from mainstream parties delegitimizing a far-right party (i.e., Germany) to mainstream parties legitimizing it (i.e., Sweden). I find strong evidence that (a) mainstream parties can effectively legitimize pariah parties in the eyes of voters, (b) turning back to delegitimization has little effect, (c) legitimization is no less effective in the face of a third party’s delegitimizing strategy, and (d) legitimization resonates beyond co-partisans. The results suggest that mainstream party legitimization of pariah parties has far-reaching consequences.
Public support for the <i>cordon sanitaire</i> : Descriptive evidence from Spain
Reactions to the rise of far-right parties that advocate democratic backsliding, and the dilution of socially liberal democratic norms present a dilemma for existing political parties. How should existing political parties respond to this challenge? A commonly adopted strategy is to apply a cordon sanitaire which excludes radical right-wing challengers from the government-forming process. Do voters support this policy? Leveraging data from Spain – where the mainstream right has accommodated the radical right-wing party, VOX, via numerous governing coalitions – I rely on individual citizens’ views on how parties should respond to rise of the far-right party, to answer this question. Empirically, the results show very low-level support for the cordon sanitaire in Spain. Indeed, the modal position of the electorate, regardless of their ideological position, is to treat the party just like any other. These results are not conditioned by the propensity of individuals to identify VOX as indeed being a “radical right” party. These descriptive findings suggest that whilst radical right-wing parties may present an inimical threat to democratic norms, citizens do not necessarily view the means of squashing this threat to be one of strategic exclusion. This likely explains why the mainstream right has been able to institutionalise VOX as a political ally: where strategic exclusion is not expected, the mainstream right need not fear violating an expectation that does not exist.
Public support for the <i>cordon sanitaire</i> : Descriptive evidence from Spain
Reactions to the rise of far-right parties that advocate democratic backsliding, and the dilution of socially liberal democratic norms present a dilemma for existing political parties. How should existing political parties respond to this challenge? A commonly adopted strategy is to apply a cordon sanitaire which excludes radical right-wing challengers from the government-forming process. Do voters support this policy? Leveraging data from Spain – where the mainstream right has accommodated the radical right-wing party, VOX, via numerous governing coalitions – I rely on individual citizens’ views on how parties should respond to rise of the far-right party, to answer this question. Empirically, the results show very low-level support for the cordon sanitaire in Spain. Indeed, the modal position of the electorate, regardless of their ideological position, is to treat the party just like any other. These results are not conditioned by the propensity of individuals to identify VOX as indeed being a “radical right” party. These descriptive findings suggest that whilst radical right-wing parties may present an inimical threat to democratic norms, citizens do not necessarily view the means of squashing this threat to be one of strategic exclusion. This likely explains why the mainstream right has been able to institutionalise VOX as a political ally: where strategic exclusion is not expected, the mainstream right need not fear violating an expectation that does not exist.
The Median Voter Theorem is a Clarity Trap
What the Democratic party needs - what it demands - is bold, persistent experimentation
It’s Not Polarization; It’s the Radicalization of the Political Right
Polarization has become the master concept for diagnosing contemporary democratic crises. The notion denotes three features: symmetry between parties, politics as an opinion space where positions diverge, and mutual repulsion between opposing camps. Yet none of these capture current realities. Across democracies, the central dynamic is not two poles drifting apart but the transformation of the political right into authoritarianism, norm breaking, and openness to political violence. Social democratic and center-right parties tend to respond in the opposite way from what “polarization” implies: by accommodating rightward. Attempts to salvage the polarization frame with modifiers (“asymmetric,” “affective,” “sectarian,” “pernicious”) concede these realities but risk hollowing out the concept’s definitional core. These limitations reveal a deeper misdiagnosis: when one party turns antidemocratic and illiberal, incivility and conflict are inevitable—but they are symptoms, not the root problem. Misdiagnosing them as the central issue leads to viewing civility and compromise as remedies, thereby risking the legitimation of authoritarian actors. This article proposes an alternative lens: the radicalization of the political right. Developed in the study of extremism, the radicalization framework better captures asymmetric change, identity-driven politics, and the mainstreaming of illiberalism. It foregrounds identity fusion, threat narratives, elite entrepreneurship, and escalation. Concepts are never politically innocent and persisting with “polarization” risks both misdiagnosing and normalizing authoritarian threats.
It’s Not Polarization; It’s the Radicalization of the Political Right
Polarization has become the master concept for diagnosing contemporary democratic crises. The notion denotes three features: symmetry between parties, politics as an opinion space where positions diverge, and mutual repulsion between opposing camps. Yet none of these capture current realities. Across democracies, the central dynamic is not two poles drifting apart but the transformation of the political right into authoritarianism, norm breaking, and openness to political violence. Social democratic and center-right parties tend to respond in the opposite way from what “polarization” implies: by accommodating rightward. Attempts to salvage the polarization frame with modifiers (“asymmetric,” “affective,” “sectarian,” “pernicious”) concede these realities but risk hollowing out the concept’s definitional core. These limitations reveal a deeper misdiagnosis: when one party turns antidemocratic and illiberal, incivility and conflict are inevitable—but they are symptoms, not the root problem. Misdiagnosing them as the central issue leads to viewing civility and compromise as remedies, thereby risking the legitimation of authoritarian actors. This article proposes an alternative lens: the radicalization of the political right. Developed in the study of extremism, the radicalization framework better captures asymmetric change, identity-driven politics, and the mainstreaming of illiberalism. It foregrounds identity fusion, threat narratives, elite entrepreneurship, and escalation. Concepts are never politically innocent and persisting with “polarization” risks both misdiagnosing and normalizing authoritarian threats.
Partidismo negativo, derecha radical y voto: un análisis de su relación en el contexto de las elecciones generales españolas de 2023
Although the concept of partisan identification included a positive and a negative dimension as postulated by the Michigan model, the truth is that the latter dimension has received practically no attention. The present research aims to evaluate to what extent negative partisanship currently represents an explanatory factor of electoral behavior in Spain. Specifically, we study how, in the context of the Spanish general elections of July 2023, negative partisanship towards the radical right increased the probability of voting for the PSOE and whether, in turn, the rejection generated by the PSOE also promoted support for Vox. To test these hypotheses, we use data from the III National Survey of Political Polarization in Spain, elaborated by the Murcian Centre for Public Opinion Studies (CEMOP) in the middle of the election campaign. The results of the binary logistic regression models implemented show that negative partisanship towards the radical right represents a (novel) explanatory factor of the vote for the PSOE, but that Vox did not feed significantly on the rejection of the socialists —nor even of Sumar—.We also note the exceptional capacity of the radical right to arouse processes of negative identification, especially among women.
Likely voters lean more Democratic for November's midterms, a change from past cycles
In every wave of our poll this year, screening for likely voters has nudged the congressional generic ballot a point or two bluer
The Protean Politics of Social Democracy: New Democrats at a Crossroads? | Perspectives Journal
Contemporary social democracy is not equipped to take up the first of these options without a fundamental re-foundation ideologically, programmatically, and organizationally. Is such a deep reinvention possible by Canadian social democrats?
How to break populist parties’ appeal? An experimental evaluation of communication counter-strategies
Right-wing populist parties have become a major challenge to liberal democracies worldwide. How can mainstream parties effectively counter their appeal? While prior research has focused on the drivers of populist support, much less is known about how to counter right-wing populist rhetoric. We test four communication counter-strategies that target core elements of right-wing populist appeals: (i) undermining populists’ claims to democratic credibility, (ii) promoting inclusive in-group identity to counter exclusionary narratives, (iii) highlighting their performance legitimacy, and (iv) emphasizing the procedural legitimacy of mainstream parties. Drawing on real-world party communications from social media, manifestos, and press releases, we created 170 experimental treatments (posters and social media posts varying in format and complexity) to simulate how voters encounter political messages in everyday life. In a large-scale survey experiment with over 24,000 respondents in Germany, messages undermining right-wing populists’ democratic credibility prove most effective, particularly among citizens with high initial support for such parties.
When Do Parties Lie? Misinformation and Radical-Right Populism Across 26 Countries - Petter Törnberg, Juliana Chueri, 2026
The spread of misinformation has emerged as a global concern. Academic attention has recently shifted to emphasize the role of political elites as drivers of mi...