







Dario Amodei wants independent evaluators to help “pace the frontier.” But the divide between AI safety and cybersecurity complicates a seemingly simple question: Who should do the evaluating?
Safety cases at AISI | AISI Work
As a complement to our empirical evaluations of frontier AI models, AISI is planning a series of collaborations and research projects sketching safety cases for more advanced models than exist today, focusing on risks from loss of control and autonomy. By a safety case, we mean a structured argument that an AI system is safe within a particular training or deployment context.
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Clear, Compelling Arguments: Rethinking the Foundations of Frontier AI Safety Cases
This paper contributes to the nascent debate around safety cases for frontier AI systems. Safety cases are structured, defensible arguments that a system is acceptably safe to deploy in a given context. Historically, they have been used in safety-critical industries, such as aerospace, nuclear or automotive. As a result, safety cases for frontier AI have risen in prominence, both in the safety policies of leading frontier developers and in international research agendas proposed by leaders in generative AI, such as the Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities and the International AI Safety Report. This paper appraises this work. We note that research conducted within the alignment community which draws explicitly on lessons from the assurance community has significant limitations. We therefore aim to rethink existing approaches to alignment safety cases. We offer lessons from existing methodologies within safety assurance and outline the limitations involved in the alignment community's current approach. Building on this foundation, we present a case study for a safety case focused on Deceptive Alignment and CBRN capabilities, drawing on existing, theoretical safety case "sketches" created by the alignment safety case community. Overall, we contribute holistic insights from the field of safety assurance via rigorous theory and methodologies that have been applied in safety-critical contexts. We do so in order to create a better foundational framework for robust, defensible and useful safety case methodologies which can help to assure the safety of frontier AI systems.

Developing Enterprise Frontier Safeguards with our customers
Anthropic is an AI safety and research company that's working to build reliable, interpretable, and steerable AI systems.
Who decides when AI is too dangerous?
Anthropic asked for AI regulation, but not like this.

Our updated Preparedness Framework
Sharing our updated framework for measuring and protecting against severe harm from frontier AI capabilities.

Action Plan to increase the safety and security of advanced AI
The first U.S. government-commissioned assessment on catastrophic national security risks from advanced AI on the path to AGI.

Arvind Narayanan (@aisnakeoil)
Companies check their own work through various internal but independent functional units: QA, security red teams, model risk management in banks. I think it’s time for AI evaluation to become one such unit. Orgs deploying AI should stand up cross-functional eval teams with their own reporting line. Many reasons: 1) Evals as IP / moat. It’s now widely recognized that evals are the new IP. So it makes sense to have teams whose primary focus is on creating and widening this moat. 2) Evals are harder than you think. This is less well recognized but as someone whose research centers on AI evals this has been my consistent experience. It can't be an afterthought and must be a center of excellence. 3) Evals are inherently cross-functional and require a distinct set of skills. They are judgment heavy, require both AI expertise and deep domain expertise, as well as customer understanding and sophisticated thinking about risk. To do them well, you need competence in data science & stats, business operations, product/customer experience, IT, risk management, and even compliance (depending on the sector). 4) In-house but independent eval teams keep companies honest. A climate where teams are getting top-down mandates to hit deployment targets and show results has resulted in a culture of companies fooling themselves. It is extremely easy to knowingly or unknowingly to do evals poorly, making your AI deployment look much more successful than it is. Eval teams who don’t share the deploying teams’ KPIs are the best defense against this.

A big-tent or small-tent AI safety movement?
The unstated disagreement that underpins safety debates

The Age Of Artificial Intelligence: 73% Concerned About Potential Threat To Human Survival, Quinnipiac University Poll On AI Finds; 86% Support Independent Safety Standards For AI Companies | Quinnipiac University Poll
"The results show a clear theme about the fear of harm coming from AI and its users. More people expect AI to do more harm than good in their day-to-day lives, and while there are significant concerns about future AI threatening humans, Americans are much more worried about AI being used by people to do harm to others," said Brian O'Neill, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Computer Science and Associate Dean, Quinnipiac University School of Computing and Engineering.

Responsible Innovation at the Frontier - Americans for Responsible Innovation
ARI’s blueprint for federal AI governance is designed to promote safe frontier AI development in America. The blueprint is built around three governance functions any federal proposal should incorporate.

Frontier Risk Report (February to March 2026)
A pilot assessment of rogue deployment risk at frontier AI companies. Starting in February 2026, METR conducted a pilot exercise to assess misalignment risks from AI agents used inside frontier AI developers, with participation from Anthropic, Google, Meta, and OpenAI.

OpenAI introduces new governance model for AI safety oversight
OpenAI grants its board the power to regulate AI model releases, enhancing safety measures and mitigating potential risks in AI development.

AI agents aren’t ‘going rogue.’ Frontier labs are skipping security basics.
Cyber experts say AI labs’ containment and monitoring failures — not agents with minds of their own — are to blame for recent alarming hacking reports. CISOs should vet their AI vendors and tighten security basics as safeguards.

AI Companies Should Report Pre- and Post-Mitigation Safety Evaluations
The rapid advancement of AI systems has raised widespread concerns about potential harms of frontier AI systems and the need for responsible evaluation and oversight. In this position paper, we argue that frontier AI companies should report both pre- and post-mitigation safety evaluations to enable informed policy decisions. Evaluating models at both stages provides policymakers with essential evidence to regulate deployment, access, and safety standards. We show that relying on either in isolation can create a misleading picture of model safety. Our analysis of AI safety disclosures from leading frontier labs identifies three critical gaps: (1) companies rarely evaluate both pre- and post-mitigation versions, (2) evaluation methods lack standardization, and (3) reported results are often too vague to inform policy. To address these issues, we recommend mandatory disclosure of pre- and post- mitigation capabilities to approved government bodies, standardized evaluation methods, and minimum transparency requirements for public safety reporting. These ensure that policymakers and regulators can craft targeted safety measures, assess deployment risks, and scrutinize companies’ safety claims effectively.
The AI safety movement needs normies
A broader base may be the only way for the AI safety field to get what it wants

1000+ scientists at frontier AI companies are speaking out to warn that the current commercial race leads to unacceptable security risks. I agree with their call for an international effort to develop technical and governance guardrails to ensure a safer way forward. pacingthefrontier.com
Pacing the Frontier
www.pacingthefrontier.com