







Social media platforms are one of the most important domains in which artificial intelligence (AI) has already transformed the nature of economic and social interaction. AI enables the massive scale and highly personalized nature of online information sharing that we now take for granted. Extensive attention has been devoted to the polarization that social media platforms appear to facilitate. However, a key implication of the transformation we are experiencing due to these AI-powered platforms has received much less attention: how platforms impact what observers of online discourse come to believe about community views. These observers include policymakers and legislators, who look to social media to gauge the prospects for policy and legislative change, as well as developers of AI models trained on large-scale internet data, whose outputs may similarly reflect a distorted view of public opinion. In this paper, we present a nested game-theoretic model to show how observed online opinion is produced by the interaction of the decisions made by users about whether and with what rhetorical intensity to share their opinions on a platform, the efforts of viewpoint organizations (such as traditional media and advocacy organizations) that seek to encourage or discourage opinion-sharing online, and the operation of AI-powered recommender systems controlled by social media platforms. We show that signals from ideological viewpoint organizations encourage an increase in rhetorical intensity, leading to the rational silence of moderate users. This, in turn, creates a polarized impression of where average opinions lie. We also show that this observed polarization can also be amplified by recommender systems that, pursuant to a platform’s incentive to maximize engagement, encourage the formation of viewpoint communities online that end up seeing a skewed sample of opinion. Unlike existing models, these well-known online phenomena are not here attributed to distortion in the formation of opinions nor to the seeking out of like-minded others, but rather to the interaction of the incentives of users, viewpoint organizations, and platforms implementing recommender systems. In addition to showing how these interactions can play out in simulations, we also identify practical strategies platforms can implement, such as reducing exposure to signals from ideological viewpoint organizations and a tailored approach to content moderation.
Social media is populist and polarising; AI may be the opposite
Large language models elevate expert consensus and moderate views, in sharp contrast to social platforms

Towards a Post-Social Media Studies
For two decades, "social media" has been the master lens through which scholars have understood digital communication—an era defined by user-generated content, networked publics, and participatory culture. That era is drawing to a close. This paper argues that three interrelated dynamics are dissolving the social media paradigm: an algorithmic shift from social-graph-based to interest-based recommendation, which is remaking the active "user" into a passive "viewer"; the generative AI revolution, which is replacing user-generated content with synthetic media and decoupling platforms from any dependence on human participation; and an exodus from public platforms toward private, closed spaces. Together, these dynamics are giving rise to three distinct post-social formations: algorithmically governed broadcasting platforms, semi-private spheres and micro-communities, and AI-mediated communication as a new media form in its own right. Understanding this transformation demands a fundamental reorientation of the field—new conceptual tools that move beyond networked publics and participatory culture, new methods suited to synthetic and ephemeral media environments, and renewed attention to the political stakes of communication systems that no longer require human participation.
Towards a Post-Social Media Studies
For two decades, "social media" has been the master lens through which scholars have understood digital communication—an era defined by user-generated content, networked publics, and participatory culture. That era is drawing to a close. This paper argues that three interrelated dynamics are dissolving the social media paradigm: an algorithmic shift from social-graph-based to interest-based recommendation, which is remaking the active "user" into a passive "viewer"; the generative AI revolution, which is replacing user-generated content with synthetic media and decoupling platforms from any dependence on human participation; and an exodus from public platforms toward private, closed spaces. Together, these dynamics are giving rise to three distinct post-social formations: algorithmically governed broadcasting platforms, semi-private spheres and micro-communities, and AI-mediated communication as a new media form in its own right. Understanding this transformation demands a fundamental reorientation of the field—new conceptual tools that move beyond networked publics and participatory culture, new methods suited to synthetic and ephemeral media environments, and renewed attention to the political stakes of communication systems that no longer require human participation.
Evaluating Twitter’s algorithmic amplification of low-credibility content: an observational study
Artificial intelligence (AI)-powered recommender systems play a crucial role in determining the content that users are exposed to on social media platforms. However, the behavioural patterns of these systems are often opaque, complicating the evaluation of their impact on the dissemination and consumption of disinformation and misinformation. To begin addressing this evidence gap, this study presents a measurement approach that uses observed digital traces to infer the status of algorithmic amplification of low-credibility content on Twitter over a 14-day period in January 2023. Using an original dataset of ≈ 2.7 million posts on COVID-19 and climate change published on the platform, this study identifies tweets sharing information from low-credibility domains, and uses a bootstrapping model with two stratifications, a tweet’s engagement level and a user’s followers level, to compare any differences in impressions generated between low-credibility and high-credibility samples. Additional stratification variables of toxicity, political bias, and verified status are also examined. This analysis provides valuable observational evidence on whether the Twitter algorithm favours the visibility of low-credibility content, with results indicating that, on aggregate, tweets containing low-credibility URL domains perform better than tweets that do not across both datasets. However, this effect is largely attributable to a difference in high-engagement, high-followers tweets, which are very impactful in terms of impressions generation, and are more likely receive amplified visibility when containing low-credibility content. Furthermore, high toxicity tweets and those with right-leaning bias see heightened amplification, as do low-credibility tweets from verified accounts. Ultimately, this suggests that Twitter’s recommender system may have facilitated the diffusion of false content by amplifying the visibility of low-credibility content with high-engagement generated by very influential users.

Evaluating Twitter’s algorithmic amplification of low-credibility content: an observational study
Artificial intelligence (AI)-powered recommender systems play a crucial role in determining the content that users are exposed to on social media platforms. However, the behavioural patterns of these systems are often opaque, complicating the evaluation of their impact on the dissemination and consumption of disinformation and misinformation. To begin addressing this evidence gap, this study presents a measurement approach that uses observed digital traces to infer the status of algorithmic amplification of low-credibility content on Twitter over a 14-day period in January 2023. Using an original dataset of ≈ 2.7 million posts on COVID-19 and climate change published on the platform, this study identifies tweets sharing information from low-credibility domains, and uses a bootstrapping model with two stratifications, a tweet’s engagement level and a user’s followers level, to compare any differences in impressions generated between low-credibility and high-credibility samples. Additional stratification variables of toxicity, political bias, and verified status are also examined. This analysis provides valuable observational evidence on whether the Twitter algorithm favours the visibility of low-credibility content, with results indicating that, on aggregate, tweets containing low-credibility URL domains perform better than tweets that do not across both datasets. However, this effect is largely attributable to a difference in high-engagement, high-followers tweets, which are very impactful in terms of impressions generation, and are more likely receive amplified visibility when containing low-credibility content. Furthermore, high toxicity tweets and those with right-leaning bias see heightened amplification, as do low-credibility tweets from verified accounts. Ultimately, this suggests that Twitter’s recommender system may have facilitated the diffusion of false content by amplifying the visibility of low-credibility content with high-engagement generated by very influential users.

Introducing AI to an Online Petition Platform Changed Outputs but not Outcomes
The rapid integration of AI writing tools into online platforms raises critical questions about their impact on content production and outcomes. We leverage a unique natural experiment on Change$.$org, a leading social advocacy platform, to causally investigate the effects of an in-platform ''write with AI'' tool. To understand the impact of the AI integration, we collected 1.5 million petitions and employed a difference-in-differences analysis. Our findings reveal that in-platform AI access significantly altered the lexical features of petitions and increased petition homogeneity, but did not improve petition outcomes. We confirmed the results in a separate analysis of repeat petition writers who wrote petitions before and after introduction of the AI tool. The results suggest that while AI writing tools can profoundly reshape online content, their practical utility for improving desired outcomes may be less beneficial than anticipated, and introduce unintended consequences like content homogenization.

On the Conversational Persuasiveness of Large Language Models: A Randomized Controlled Trial
The development and popularization of large language models (LLMs) have raised concerns that they will be used to create tailor-made, convincing arguments to push false or misleading narratives online. Early work has found that language models can generate content perceived as at least on par and often more persuasive than human-written messages. However, there is still limited knowledge about LLMs' persuasive capabilities in direct conversations with human counterparts and how personalization can improve their performance. In this pre-registered study, we analyze the effect of AI-driven persuasion in a controlled, harmless setting. We create a web-based platform where participants engage in short, multiple-round debates with a live opponent. Each participant is randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions, corresponding to a two-by-two factorial design: (1) Games are either played between two humans or between a human and an LLM; (2) Personalization might or might not be enabled, granting one of the two players access to basic sociodemographic information about their opponent. We found that participants who debated GPT-4 with access to their personal information had 81.7% (p < 0.01; N=820 unique participants) higher odds of increased agreement with their opponents compared to participants who debated humans. Without personalization, GPT-4 still outperforms humans, but the effect is lower and statistically non-significant (p=0.31). Overall, our results suggest that concerns around personalization are meaningful and have important implications for the governance of social media and the design of new online environments.

Can We Fix Social Media? Testing Prosocial Interventions using Generative Social Simulation
Social media platforms have been widely linked to societal harms, including rising polarization and the erosion of constructive debate. Can these problems be mitigated through prosocial interventions? We address this question using a novel method - generative social simulation - that embeds Large Language Models within Agent-Based Models to create socially rich synthetic platforms. We create a minimal platform where agents can post, repost, and follow others. We find that the resulting following-networks reproduce three well-documented dysfunctions: (1) partisan echo chambers; (2) concentrated influence among a small elite; and (3) the amplification of polarized voices - creating a 'social media prism' that distorts political discourse. We test six proposed interventions, from chronological feeds to bridging algorithms, finding only modest improvements - and in some cases, worsened outcomes. These results suggest that core dysfunctions may be rooted in the feedback between reactive engagement and network growth, raising the possibility that meaningful reform will require rethinking the foundational dynamics of platform architecture.

Can We Fix Social Media? Testing Prosocial Interventions using Generative Social Simulation
Social media platforms have been widely linked to societal harms, including rising polarization and the erosion of constructive debate. Can these problems be mitigated through prosocial interventions? We address this question using a novel method - generative social simulation - that embeds Large Language Models within Agent-Based Models to create socially rich synthetic platforms. We create a minimal platform where agents can post, repost, and follow others. We find that the resulting following-networks reproduce three well-documented dysfunctions: (1) partisan echo chambers; (2) concentrated influence among a small elite; and (3) the amplification of polarized voices - creating a 'social media prism' that distorts political discourse. We test six proposed interventions, from chronological feeds to bridging algorithms, finding only modest improvements - and in some cases, worsened outcomes. These results suggest that core dysfunctions may be rooted in the feedback between reactive engagement and network growth, raising the possibility that meaningful reform will require rethinking the foundational dynamics of platform architecture.

Modelling Opinion Dynamics in the Age of Algorithmic Personalisation
Modern technology has drastically changed the way we interact and consume information. For example, online social platforms allow for seamless communication exchanges at an unprecedented scale. However, we are still bounded by cognitive and temporal constraints. Our attention is limited and extremely valuable. Algorithmic personalisation has become a standard approach to tackle the information overload problem. As result, the exposure to our friends' opinions and our perception about important issues might be distorted. However, the effects of algorithmic gatekeeping on our hyper-connected society are poorly understood. Here, we devise an opinion dynamics model where individuals are connected through a social network and adopt opinions as function of the view points they are exposed to. We apply various filtering algorithms that select the opinions shown to users i) at random ii) considering time ordering or iii) their current beliefs. Furthermore, we investigate the interplay between such mechanisms and crucial features of real networks. We found that algorithmic filtering might influence opinions' share and distributions, especially in case information is biased towards the current opinion of each user. These effects are reinforced in networks featuring topological and spatial correlations where echo chambers and polarisation emerge. Conversely, heterogeneity in connectivity patterns reduces such tendency. We consider also a scenario where one opinion, through nudging, is centrally pushed to all users. Interestingly, even minimal nudging is able to change the status quo moving it towards the desired view point. Our findings suggest that simple filtering algorithms might be powerful tools to regulate opinion dynamics taking place on social networks

Community by Design
Social media empower distributed content creation by algorithmically harnessing "the social fabric" (explicit and implicit signals of association) to serve this content. While this overcomes the bottlenecks and biases of traditional gatekeepers, many believe it has unsustainably eroded the very social fabric it depends on by maximizing engagement for advertising revenue. This paper participates in open and ongoing considerations to translate social and political values and conventions, specifically social cohesion, into platform design. We propose an alternative platform model that includes the social fabric an explicit output as well as input. Citizens are members of communities defined by explicit affiliation or clusters of shared attitudes. Both have internal divisions, as citizens are members of intersecting communities, which are themselves internally diverse. Each is understood to value content that bridge (viz. achieve consensus across) and balance (viz. represent fairly) this internal diversity, consistent with the principles of the Hutchins Commission (1947). Content is labeled with social provenance, indicating for which community or citizen it is bridging or balancing. Subscription payments allow citizens and communities to increase the algorithmic weight on the content they value in the content serving algorithm. Advertisers may, with consent of citizen or community counterparties, target them in exchange for payment or increase in that party's algorithmic weight. Underserved and emerging communities and citizens are optimally subsidized/supported to develop into paying participants. Content creators and communities that curate content are rewarded for their contributions with algorithmic weight and/or revenue. We discuss applications to productivity (e.g. LinkedIn), political (e.g. X), and cultural (e.g. TikTok) platforms.

"Okay, I've Actually Softened My Take on This": How People in Decentralized Social Media Reason about the Appropriateness of Generative AI
Generative AI (GenAI) is increasingly integrated into social media, raising questions about whether, where, and how it belongs. In decentralized social media (DSM), these decisions are distributed across users, developers, moderators, and administrators, making GenAI a collective governance challenge. At the same time, public discourse often flattens arguments to broad pro- or anti-AI positions that offer little insight into what people actually find (in)appropriate and why. Through 20 semi-structured interviews with people from Mastodon and Bluesky, structured around seven GenAI scenarios, we examine how people reason about GenAI's appropriateness in DSM. We find that participants drew conditional boundaries around particular GenAI configurations through distinct, salient, and weighted considerations spanning technology, integration, and use. We conceptualize this as boundary drawing and show how making such boundaries visible can support more grounded design, policy, and collective deliberation around GenAI in DSM.

"Okay, I've Actually Softened My Take on This": How People in Decentralized Social Media Reason about the Appropriateness of Generative AI
Generative AI (GenAI) is increasingly integrated into social media, raising questions about whether, where, and how it belongs. In decentralized social media (DSM), these decisions are distributed across users, developers, moderators, and administrators, making GenAI a collective governance challenge. At the same time, public discourse often flattens arguments to broad pro- or anti-AI positions that offer little insight into what people actually find (in)appropriate and why. Through 20 semi-structured interviews with people from Mastodon and Bluesky, structured around seven GenAI scenarios, we examine how people reason about GenAI's appropriateness in DSM. We find that participants drew conditional boundaries around particular GenAI configurations through distinct, salient, and weighted considerations spanning technology, integration, and use. We conceptualize this as boundary drawing and show how making such boundaries visible can support more grounded design, policy, and collective deliberation around GenAI in DSM.

The levers of political persuasion with conversational artificial intelligence
There are widespread fears that conversational artificial intelligence (AI) could soon exert unprecedented influence over human beliefs. In this work, in three large-scale experiments ( N = 76,977 participants), we deployed 19 large language models (LLMs)—including some post-trained explicitly for persuasion—to evaluate their persuasiveness on 707 political issues. We then checked the factual accuracy of 466,769 resulting LLM claims. We show that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem more from post-training and prompting methods—which boosted persuasiveness by as much as 51 and 27%, respectively—than from personalization or increasing model scale, which had smaller effects. We further show that these methods increased persuasion by exploiting LLMs’ ability to rapidly access and strategically deploy information and that, notably, where they increased AI persuasiveness, they also systematically decreased factual accuracy. , Editor’s summary Many fear that we are on the precipice of unprecedented manipulation by large language models (LLMs), but techniques driving their persuasiveness are poorly understood. In the initial “pretrained” phase, LLMs may exhibit flawed reasoning. Their power unlocks during vital “posttraining,” when developers refine pretrained LLMs to sharpen their reasoning and align with users’ needs. Posttraining also enables LLMs to maintain logical, sophisticated conversations. Hackenburg et al . examined which techniques made diverse, conversational LLMs most persuasive across 707 British political issues (see the Perspective by Argyle). LLMs were most persuasive after posttraining, especially when prompted to use facts and evidence (information) to argue. However, information-dense LLMs produced the most inaccurate claims, raising concerns about the spread of misinformation during rollouts of future models. —Ekeoma Uzogara , INTRODUCTION Rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked widespread concerns about its potential to influence human beliefs. One possibility is that conversational AI could be used to manipulate public opinion on political issues through interactive dialogue. Despite extensive speculation, however, fundamental questions about the actual mechanisms, or “levers,” responsible for driving advances in AI persuasiveness—e.g., computational power or sophisticated training techniques—remain largely unanswered. In this work, we systematically investigate these levers and chart the horizon of persuasiveness with conversational AI. RATIONALE We considered multiple factors that could enhance the persuasiveness of conversational AI: raw computational power (model scale), specialized post-training methods for persuasion, personalization to individual users, and instructed rhetorical strategies. Across three large-scale experiments with 76,977 total UK participants, we deployed 19 large language models (LLMs) to persuade on 707 political issues while varying these factors independently. We also analyzed more than 466,000 AI-generated claims, examining the relationship between persuasiveness and truthfulness. RESULTS We found that the most powerful levers of AI persuasion were methods for post-training and rhetorical strategy (prompting), which increased persuasiveness by as much as 51 and 27%, respectively. These gains were often larger than those obtained from substantially increasing model scale. Personalizing arguments on the basis of user data had a comparatively small effect on persuasion. We observe that a primary mechanism driving AI persuasiveness was information density: Models were most persuasive when they packed their arguments with a high volume of factual claims. Notably, however, we documented a concerning trade-off between persuasion and accuracy: The same levers that made AI more persuasive—including persuasion post-training and information-focused prompting—also systematically caused the AI to produce information that was less factually accurate. CONCLUSION Our findings suggest that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem less from model scale or personalization and more from post-training and prompting techniques that mobilize an LLM’s ability to rapidly generate information during conversation. Further, we reveal a troubling trade-off: When AI systems are optimized for persuasion, they may increasingly deploy misleading or false information. This research provides an empirical foundation for policy-makers and technologists to anticipate and address the challenges of AI-driven persuasion, and it highlights the need for safeguards that balance AI’s legitimate uses in political discourse with protections against manipulation and misinformation. Persuasiveness of conversational AI increases with model scale. The persuasive impact in percentage points on the y axis is plotted against effective pretraining compute [floating-point operations (FLOPs)] on the x axis. Point estimates are persuasive effects of different AI models. Colored lines show trends for models that we uniformly chat-tuned for open-ended conversation (purple) versus those that were post-trained using heterogeneous, opaque methods by AI developers (green). pp, percentage points; CI, confidence interval.

The governance & behavioral challenges of generative artificial intelligence’s hypercustomization capabilities
Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) is changing human–machine interactions and the broader information ecosystem. Much as social media algorithms personalize online experiences, GenAI applications can align with user preferences to customize the way individuals interact with information. However, through training, fine-tuning, and prompting, GenAI applications can introduce a new level of customization: hypercustomization. By dynamically tailoring responses to an individual’s explicit and implicit preferences, hypercustomization can reinforce biases, false beliefs, or misconceptions. As a result, it can heighten significant societal challenges, such as the spread of misinformation and political and social polarization. In this article, we explore the risks associated with hypercustomization and the governance and behavioral challenges that might impede effective risk mitigation. These challenges include a lack of transparency in GenAI applications, opacity of the nature of their interactions with users, users’ overreliance on these systems, and the inefficacy of warning messages. We also provide recommendations for overcoming these challenges.

The echo chamber effect on social media
Significance We explore the key differences between the main social media platforms and how they are likely to influence information spreading and the formation of echo chambers. To assess the different dynamics, we perform a comparative analysis on more than 100 million pieces of content concerning controversial topics (e.g., gun control, vaccination, abortion) from Gab, Facebook, Reddit, and Twitter. The analysis focuses on two main dimensions: 1) homophily in the interaction networks and 2) bias in the information diffusion toward like-minded peers. Our results show that the aggregation in homophilic clusters of users dominates online dynamics. However, a direct comparison of news consumption on Facebook and Reddit shows higher segregation on Facebook. , Social media may limit the exposure to diverse perspectives and favor the formation of groups of like-minded users framing and reinforcing a shared narrative, that is, echo chambers. However, the interaction paradigms among users and feed algorithms greatly vary across social media platforms. This paper explores the key differences between the main social media platforms and how they are likely to influence information spreading and echo chambers’ formation. We perform a comparative analysis of more than 100 million pieces of content concerning several controversial topics (e.g., gun control, vaccination, abortion) from Gab, Facebook, Reddit, and Twitter. We quantify echo chambers over social media by two main ingredients: 1) homophily in the interaction networks and 2) bias in the information diffusion toward like-minded peers. Our results show that the aggregation of users in homophilic clusters dominate online interactions on Facebook and Twitter. We conclude the paper by directly comparing news consumption on Facebook and Reddit, finding higher segregation on Facebook.
