Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion

How to Develop An AI Pricing Model | Salesforce Ventures

Your guide to developing an effective and scalable AI pricing strategy.

Simple Pricing | Machine Learning Infrastructure | Deep Infra

We provide only pay-what-you-use pricing with no long-term contracts or upfront costs for our machine learning models and infrastructure. Learn more!

Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit

Human society is coordinated by mechanisms that control how prices are agreed, taxes are set, and electoral votes are tallied. The design of robust and effective mechanisms for human benefit is a core problem in the social, economic, and political sciences. Here, we discuss the recent application of modern tools from AI research, including deep neural networks trained with reinforcement learning (RL), to create more desirable mechanisms for people. We review the application of machine learning to design effective auctions, learn optimal tax policies, and discover redistribution policies that win the popular vote among human users. We discuss the challenge of accurately modeling human preferences and the problem of aligning a mechanism to the wishes of a potentially diverse group. We highlight the importance of ensuring that research into “deep mechanism design” is conducted safely and ethically.

Promoting User Data Autonomy During the Dissolution of a Monopolistic Firm

The deployment of AI in consumer products is currently focused on the use of so-called foundation models, large neural networks pre-trained on massive corpora of digital records. This emphasis on scaling up datasets and pre-training computation raises the risk of further consolidating the industry, and enabling monopolistic (or oligopolistic) behavior. Judges and regulators seeking to improve market competition may employ various remedies. This paper explores dissolution -- the breaking up of a monopolistic entity into smaller firms -- as one such remedy, focusing in particular on the technical challenges and opportunities involved in the breaking up of large models and datasets. We show how the framework of Conscious Data Contribution can enable user autonomy during under dissolution. Through a simulation study, we explore how fine-tuning and the phenomenon of "catastrophic forgetting" could actually prove beneficial as a type of machine unlearning that allows users to specify which data they want used for what purposes.

An Instrumental Value for Data Production and its Application to Data Pricing

We develop a framework for capturing the instrumental value of data production processes, which accounts for two key factors: (a) the context of the agent’s decision-making; (b) how much data or information the buyer already possesses. We "micro-found" our data valuation function by establishing its connection to classic notions of signals and information design in economics. When instantiated in Bayesian linear regression, our value naturally corresponds to information gain. Applying our proposed data value in Bayesian linear regression for monopoly pricing, we show that if the seller can fully customize data production, she can extract the first-best revenue (i.e., full surplus) from any population of buyers, i.e., achieving first-degree price discrimination. If data can only be constructed from an existing data pool, this limits the seller’s ability to customize, and achieving first-best revenue becomes generally impossible. However, we design a mechanism that achieves seller revenue at most $\log(\kappa)$ less than the first-best, where $\kappa$ is the condition number associated with the data matrix. As a corollary, the seller extracts the first-best revenue in the multi-armed bandits special case.

Instacart’s AI-Enabled Pricing Experiments May Be Inflating Your Grocery Bill, CR and Groundwork Collaborative Investigation Finds via @ConsumerReports

Exclusive: Instacart’s AI pricing may be inflating your grocery bill.

The Machines of Capital

The Machines of Capital As Benjamin Graham famously articulated, in the short run the markets are a voting machine; in the long run the markets are a weighing machine. Price exists in both machines, but the deterministic mechanisms are different. During the voting machine phase, price is a funct...

Society-in-the-loop: programming the algorithmic social contract

Recent rapid advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning have raised many questions about the regulatory and governance mechanisms for autonomous machines. Many commentators, scholars, and policy-makers now call for ensuring that algorithms governing our lives are transparent, fair, and accountable. Here, I propose a conceptual framework for the regulation of AI and algorithmic systems. I argue that we need tools to program, debug and maintain an algorithmic social contract, a pact between various human stakeholders, mediated by machines. To achieve this, we can adapt the concept of human-in-the-loop (HITL) from the fields of modeling and simulation, and interactive machine learning. In particular, I propose an agenda I call society-in-the-loop (SITL), which combines the HITL control paradigm with mechanisms for negotiating the values of various stakeholders affected by AI systems, and monitoring compliance with the agreement. In short, ‘SITL = HITL + Social Contract.’

AI 'surveillance pricing' under scrutiny from U.S. lawmakers

(The Center Square) – In a rare instance of bipartisanship, Congress is taking a closer look at AI surveillance pricing, where corporations will charge some consumers higher prices based on

LAVA: Data Valuation without Pre-Specified Learning Algorithms

Traditionally, data valuation is posed as a problem of equitably splitting the validation performance of a learning algorithm among the training data. As a result, the calculated data values depend on many design choices of the underlying learning algorithm. However, this dependence is undesirable for many use cases of data valuation, such as setting priorities over different data sources in a data acquisition process and informing pricing mechanisms in a data marketplace. In these scenarios, data needs to be valued before the actual analysis and the choice of the learning algorithm is still undetermined then. Another side-effect of the dependence is that to assess the value of individual points, one needs to re-run the learning algorithm with and without a point, which incurs a large computation burden. This work leapfrogs over the current limits of data valuation methods by introducing a new framework that can value training data in a way that is oblivious to the downstream learning algorithm. Our main results are as follows. $\textbf{(1)}$ We develop a proxy for the validation performance associated with a training set based on a non-conventional $\textit{class-wise}$ $\textit{Wasserstein distance}$ between the training and the validation set. We show that the distance characterizes the upper bound of the validation performance for any given model under certain Lipschitz conditions. $\textbf{(2)}$ We develop a novel method to value individual data based on the sensitivity analysis of the $\textit{class-wise}$ Wasserstein distance. Importantly, these values can be directly obtained $\textit{for free}$ from the output of off-the-shelf optimization solvers once the Wasserstein distance is computed. $\textbf{(3) }$We evaluate our new data valuation framework over various use cases related to detecting low-quality data and show that, surprisingly, the learning-agnostic feature of our framework enables a $\textit{significant improvement}$ over the state-of-the-art performance while being $\textit{orders of magnitude faster.}$

Algorithmic Collective Action in Machine Learning

We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm's learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an algorithmic strategy by instructing participants how to modify their own data to achieve a collective goal. We investigate the consequences of this model in three fundamental learning-theoretic settings: the case of a nonparametric optimal learning algorithm, a parametric risk minimizer, and gradient-based optimization. In each setting, we come up with coordinated algorithmic strategies and characterize natural success criteria as a function of the collective's size. Complementing our theory, we conduct systematic experiments on a skill classification task involving tens of thousands of resumes from a gig platform for freelancers. Through more than two thousand model training runs of a BERT-like language model, we see a striking correspondence emerge between our empirical observations and the predictions made by our theory. Taken together, our theory and experiments broadly support the conclusion that algorithmic collectives of exceedingly small fractional size can exert significant control over a platform's learning algorithm.

AI's Affordability Crisis

A year ago in The Back Of The AI Envelope I pointed out that the AI platforms were running the drug-dealer's algorithm, "the first one's fr...

Building AI Products In The Probabilistic Era

AI turns products from deterministic functions into probabilistic systems. That requires expanding old playbooks (SLOs, funnels, siloed finance), and reasoning in terms of trajectories, Minimum Viable Intelligence thresholds, and data as company operating system.

Pluralistic: Google’s AI pricing plan (21 Jan 2026) – Pluralistic: Daily links from Cory Doctorow

Google is spending a lot on AI, but what's not clear is how Google will make a lot from AI. Or, you know, even break even. Given, you know, that businesses are seeing zero return from AI:

Data Banzhaf: A Robust Data Valuation Framework for Machine Learning

Data valuation has wide use cases in machine learning, including improving data quality and creating economic incentives for data sharing. This paper studies the robustness of data valuation to noisy model performance scores. Particularly, we find that the inherent randomness of the widely used stochastic gradient descent can cause existing data value notions (e.g., the Shapley value and the Leave-one-out error) to produce inconsistent data value rankings across different runs. To address this challenge, we introduce the concept of safety margin, which measures the robustness of a data value notion. We show that the Banzhaf value, a famous value notion that originated from cooperative game theory literature, achieves the largest safety margin among all semivalues (a class of value notions that satisfy crucial properties entailed by ML applications and include the famous Shapley value and Leave-one-out error). We propose an algorithm to efficiently estimate the Banzhaf value based on the Maximum Sample Reuse (MSR) principle. Our evaluation demonstrates that the Banzhaf value outperforms the existing semivalue-based data value notions on several ML tasks such as learning with weighted samples and noisy label detection. Overall, our study suggests that when the underlying ML algorithm is stochastic, the Banzhaf value is a promising alternative to the other semivalue-based data value schemes given its computational advantage and ability to robustly differentiate data quality.