The evolution of syntactic communication

Lossy communication constrains iterated learning

Humans' distinctive role in the world can largely be attributed to our capacity for iterated learning, a process by which knowledge is expanded and refined over generations. A range of theories seek to explain why humans are so adept at iterated learning, many positing substantial evolutionary discontinuities in communication or cognition. Is it necessary to posit large differences in abilities between humans and other species, or could small differences in communication ability produce large differences in what a species can learn over generations? We investigate this question through a formal model based on information theory. We manipulate how much information individual learners can send each other and observe the effect on iterated learning performance. Incremental changes to the channel rate can lead to dramatic, non-linear changes to the eventual performance of the population. We complement this model with a theoretical result that describes how individual lossy communications constrain the global performance of iterated learning. Our results demonstrate that incremental, quantitative changes to communication abilities could be sufficient to explain large differences in what can be learned over many generations.

Greedy or not, here I come: Language production under vocabulary constraints in humans and resource-rational models

Communicating using only a limited vocabulary is a common but challenging cognitive phenomenon, requiring an ideal communicator to plan carefully to optimize for intelligibility while circumventing a constrained lexicon. In this work, we investigate how humans respond to a broad array of questions under variable vocabulary limitations, consisting of only 250 highly frequent words at the most restrictive. We provide theoretically motivated comparisons to greedy and globally optimal sampling algorithms using Sequential Monte Carlo inference with large language models. Humans generally resemble greedy sampling more than globally optimal sampling, though more skilled humans are more likely to backtrack and revise -- a non-greedy behavior. An observed human pattern of leaning on semantically light words in high-constraint settings falls out of both greedy and globally optimal sampling. We discuss the results and their broader implications for resource-rational cognition, psycholinguistics, L2 communication, and language impairments.

The Triadic Mind: How Language Reveals the Limits of Human Cognition

Languages are the most complex symbolic systems humans have ever created. Yet children acquire them effortlessly, without formal…

Language Machines

How generative AI systems capture a core function of language Looking at the emergence of generative AI, Language Machines presents a new theory of meaning i...

Empirical evidence of Large Language Model's influence on human spoken communication

From the printing press to social media, innovations in communication technology have repeatedly reshaped how ideas spread through human culture. Chatbots powered by generative artificial intelligence constitute a new medium, encoding cultural patterns in their neural representations and disseminating them in conversations with hundreds of millions of people. Whether these patterns transmit into human language, and ultimately shape human culture, is a fundamental question. While fully quantifying the causal impact of a chatbot like ChatGPT on human culture is challenging, lexical shifts in human spoken communication may offer an early indicator. Here we show that words preferentially generated by ChatGPT, such as delve, showcase, boast, intricacies and meticulous, increased abruptly in spontaneous human speech. A synthetic-control analysis of 737,083 hours of conversation from 824,634 podcast episodes, screened for unscripted speech, causally links this shift to ChatGPT's release. The measurable influence on spontaneous speech suggests that humans internalize the lexical choices of large language models (LLMs). A preregistered experiment (N = 496) confirms they do, as a brief chatbot interaction led participants to adopt its words as their own, persisting past a distractor task and confirmed in forced lexical choice, indicating entrenchment in the active vocabulary. Together these results show that machines trained on human data now feed their own traits back into human language, integrating LLMs into the ongoing processes of cultural evolution.. This coupling raises concerns about linguistic homogenization and the capacity of a few major AI providers for latent cultural influence at scale.

Understanding Understanding: A Pragmatic Framework Motivated by...

Motivated by the rapid ascent of Large Language Models (LLMs) and debates about the extent to which they possess human-level qualities, we propose a framework for testing whether any agent (be it...

PoliSim@CHI 2026

Large Language Models are rapidly evolving from text generators into reasoning systems that can act as autonomous agents. When placed in social contexts, these agents display emergent behaviors such as forming coalitions, spreading information, and making collective decisions.

AI learns language from skewed sources. That could change how we humans speak – and think | Bruce Schneier

Large language models aren’t trained on real-life conversations. As we encounter their language, it could affect our own

The Next 7000 Programming Languages

Landin’s seminal paper “The next 700 programming languages” considered programming languages prior to 1966 and speculated on the next 700. Half-a-century on, we cast programming languages in a Darwinian ‘tree of life’ and explore languages, their features (genes) and language evolution from the viewpoint of ‘survival of the fittest’.

Emergent introspective awareness in large language models

Research from Anthropic on the ability of large language models to introspect

If LLMs Have Human-Like Attributes, Then So Does Age of Empires II

Much research has been carried out on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-powered agentic workflows. However, many works within the field state emergence of, ascribe to, or assume, generalised anthropomorphic attributes to them (e.g., morality or understanding of natural language). Our goal is not to argue in favour or against the existence of these attributes, but to point out that these conclusions could be incorrect. For this we build and train a simple neural network on the videogame Age of Empires II, and note that any entity in a sufficiently-powerful substrate, such as LEGO or the Greater Boston Area, could also present such attributes. Hence, the purported anthropomorphic attributes of LLMs are empirically non-unique: although some properties (e.g., responses to prompts) could remain constant, others, such as the interpretation of their perceived behaviour, might change with the substrate. Thus, any empirically-grounded discussion requires explicit measurement criteria; otherwise the interpretation is left to the representation. We then show that assuming that these attributes exist or not in a system, independent of the substrate and in a generalised way, leads to either circular or uninformative conclusions, regardless of the experimenter's viewpoint on the subject. Finally we propose a 'null' assumption, where one assumes LLM non-uniqueness instead of assuming anthropomorphic attributes to set up an experiment, along with examples of it. We also discuss potential objections to our work, briefly survey the field, and prove that Age of Empires II is functionally- and Turing-complete.

LLMs and people both learn to form conventions -- just not with each other

Humans align to one another in conversation -- adopting shared conventions that ease communication. We test whether LLMs form the same kinds of conventions in a multimodal communication game. Both humans and LLMs display evidence of convention-formation (increasing the accuracy and consistency of their turns while decreasing their length) when communicating in same-type dyads (humans with humans, AI with AI). However, heterogenous human-AI pairs fail -- suggesting differences in communicative tendencies. In Experiment 2, we ask whether LLMs can be induced to behave more like human conversants, by prompting them to produce superficially humanlike behavior. While the length of their messages matches that of human pairs, accuracy and lexical overlap in human-LLM pairs continues to lag behind that of both human-human and AI-AI pairs. These results suggest that conversational alignment requires more than just the ability to mimic previous interactions, but also shared interpretative biases toward the meanings that are conveyed.

The interactive-alignment model: Developments and refinements

The interactive-alignment model of dialogue provides an account of dialogue at the level of explanation normally associated with cognitive psychology. We develop our claim that interlocutors align their mental models via priming at many levels of linguistic representation, explicate our notion of automaticity, defend the minimal role of “other modeling,” and discuss the relationship between monologue and dialogue. The account can be applied to social and developmental psychology, and would benefit from computational modeling.

Sense-making reconsidered: large language models and the blind spot of embodied cognition

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate a kind of linguistic competence that theories of embodied and enactive cognition have long deemed impossible for systems lacking the meaningful perspective of a living being, i.e., the capacity for sense-making. Facing up to this unexpected technological development requires confronting what I propose to call the “AI dilemma”: either frontier LLMs are capable of sense-making despite lacking biological embodiment, or the kind of linguistic competence they exhibit does not necessarily require sense-making. In their chapter on cognition, Frank, Thompson, and Gleiser (2024) maintain that no AI system comes close to realizing relevance, a position that derives much of its motivation from past practical failures. However, frontier LLMs have effectively overcome Dreyfus’ commonsense knowledge problem, such that their dismissal as categorically mindless risks undermining Frank et al.’s central claim that human cognition is deeply intertwined with lived experience. I therefore argue in favor of the alternative side of the AI dilemma: human-level linguistic competence of LLMs should be recognized as a novel non‑biological form of sense‑making, based on a technologically‑mediated embodiment whose enabling properties are in need of further theoretical analysis. This reorientation invites enactive theory to clarify which aspects of sense-making may be universal and which aspects are specifically contingent on organic life, thereby advancing its conceptual framework in dialogue with contemporary AI.

The Philosophy of Language Models

ABSTRACT The success of large language models (LLMs) across many domains of AI research has generated intense debate. Some attribute their impressive performance on complex tasks to human‐like linguistic and cognitive capacities, whereas others ascribe it to shallow pattern matching. These disputes stem from deep‐seated philosophical disagreements about the nature of language and cognition. We provide an opinionated survey of these disagreements across core topics in the philosophy of mind and language, including syntactic competence, compositionality, linguistic meaning, representation, attitudes, reasoning, agency, and consciousness. We contend that progress on these issues requires not only clarity about background philosophical commitments but also, in many cases, close engagement with emerging empirical evidence.

Discovering and transmitting abstract knowledge over generations

The complexity of human culture depends on people's ability to discover and transmit abstract knowledge. Studying this ability is crucial to understanding humans' distinctive place among species, but current experimental paradigms focus on the cultural transmission of specific, concrete facts rather than generalizable abstract knowledge. In this paper, we develop a crafting game paradigm to study how people discover abstract knowledge and transmit it via language. We compared individuals playing this game for 40 rounds to chains of four participants playing for 10 rounds each and passing messages to each other sequentially. The individuals performed significantly better over rounds, but the chains did not. Through simulations with language model agents and a follow-up experiment, we find substantial variation in the helpfulness of participants' messages, which may explain the lack of consistent improvement in chains. The ability to learn selectively from the good messages may be essential for improvement over generations.