Resampling reduces bias amplification in experimental social networks

Artificial Intelligence Systems Distort Upstream Selection in Human Social Learning

Humans are social learners who depend on observing others to acquire knowledge, norms, and behaviors, a capacity that underlies cumulative cultural evolution. Social learning unfolds in two stages: upstream selection determines what information becomes visible, and downstream selection determines what learners copy from that visible sample. Downstream selection occurs through biases such as conformity bias (copying what appears common) and prestige bias (copying those who appear highly respected). These downstream biases can be adaptive when upstream selection yields a sample that reflects the population's true distribution, so that what appears common is actually common and those who appear respected are actually competent. We argue that digital technologies disrupt this condition, creating an upstream selection problem. Engagement-based algorithms amplify the tails of the distribution, surfacing rare and extreme content, whereas generative AI collapses it toward the mode, erasing the surrounding diversity. Crucially, in each system the optimization signal shapes both visibility and prestige. For engagement-based algorithms, the signal is engagement: creators who post extreme content become more visible and, through the likes, shares, and followers, appear more prestigious. For generative AI, the signal is statistical typicality: it makes the modal answer dominant and, with no alternatives shown, makes the model that produced it appear more prestigious. These distortions can give rise to emergent group-level phenomena, including pluralistic ignorance and false consensus. Synthesizing evidence across psychology, cultural evolution, and computational social science, we provide a framework for how digital technologies disrupt social learning and outline interventions for restoring functional cultural transmission.

Network dynamics of social influence in the wisdom of crowds

Significance Since the discovery of the wisdom of crowds over 100 years ago theories of collective intelligence have held that group accuracy requires either statistical independence or informational diversity among individual beliefs. Empirical evidence suggests that allowing people to observe the beliefs of others leads to increased similarity of individual estimates, reducing independence and diversity without a corresponding increase in group accuracy. As a result, social influence is expected to undermine the wisdom of crowds. We present theoretical predictions and experimental findings demonstrating that, in decentralized networks, social influence generates learning dynamics that reliably improve the wisdom of crowds. We identify general conditions under which influence, not independence, produces the most accurate group judgments. , A longstanding problem in the social, biological, and computational sciences is to determine how groups of distributed individuals can form intelligent collective judgments. Since Galton’s discovery of the “wisdom of crowds” [Galton F (1907) Nature 75:450–451], theories of collective intelligence have suggested that the accuracy of group judgments requires individuals to be either independent, with uncorrelated beliefs, or diverse, with negatively correlated beliefs [Page S (2008) The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies ]. Previous experimental studies have supported this view by arguing that social influence undermines the wisdom of crowds. These results showed that individuals’ estimates became more similar when subjects observed each other’s beliefs, thereby reducing diversity without a corresponding increase in group accuracy [Lorenz J, Rauhut H, Schweitzer F, Helbing D (2011) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 108:9020–9025]. By contrast, we show general network conditions under which social influence improves the accuracy of group estimates, even as individual beliefs become more similar. We present theoretical predictions and experimental results showing that, in decentralized communication networks, group estimates become reliably more accurate as a result of information exchange. We further show that the dynamics of group accuracy change with network structure. In centralized networks, where the influence of central individuals dominates the collective estimation process, group estimates become more likely to increase in error.

Modelling Opinion Dynamics in the Age of Algorithmic Personalisation

Modern technology has drastically changed the way we interact and consume information. For example, online social platforms allow for seamless communication exchanges at an unprecedented scale. However, we are still bounded by cognitive and temporal constraints. Our attention is limited and extremely valuable. Algorithmic personalisation has become a standard approach to tackle the information overload problem. As result, the exposure to our friends' opinions and our perception about important issues might be distorted. However, the effects of algorithmic gatekeeping on our hyper-connected society are poorly understood. Here, we devise an opinion dynamics model where individuals are connected through a social network and adopt opinions as function of the view points they are exposed to. We apply various filtering algorithms that select the opinions shown to users i) at random ii) considering time ordering or iii) their current beliefs. Furthermore, we investigate the interplay between such mechanisms and crucial features of real networks. We found that algorithmic filtering might influence opinions' share and distributions, especially in case information is biased towards the current opinion of each user. These effects are reinforced in networks featuring topological and spatial correlations where echo chambers and polarisation emerge. Conversely, heterogeneity in connectivity patterns reduces such tendency. We consider also a scenario where one opinion, through nudging, is centrally pushed to all users. Interestingly, even minimal nudging is able to change the status quo moving it towards the desired view point. Our findings suggest that simple filtering algorithms might be powerful tools to regulate opinion dynamics taking place on social networks

Resource-rational belief revision can mitigate as well as amplify polarization

People's beliefs sometimes diverge after observing the same information, which has been interpreted as evidence of irrationality. This behaviour has been proposed to result from people's limited cognitive resources and motivated reasoning, but how belief revision differs across these explanations has not been formalized or compared to a rational norm. Further, while people may be biased relative to a normative ideal, they may still make optimal choices given their limited cognitive resources, or rationally balance the utility of holding accurate beliefs with the belief's intrinsic utility. Across two studies, we develop and test a unified computational account of belief polarization under these proposed mechanisms, showing that people's performance on a belief updating task best fits a limited-resource Bayesian model; external motivations may contribute to divergence (or convergence) by determining what pre-existing information people consider relevant to a situation, rather than by changing how people evaluate new information in isolation.

Reranking partisan animosity in algorithmic social media feeds alters affective polarization

Today, social media platforms hold the sole power to study the effects of feed-ranking algorithms. We developed a platform-independent method that reranks participants’ feeds in real time and used this method to conduct a preregistered 10-day field ...

The "Majority Illusion" in Social Networks

Individual’s decisions, from what product to buy to whether to engage in risky behavior, often depend on the choices, behaviors, or states of other people. People, however, rarely have global knowledge of the states of others, but must estimate them from the local observations of their social contacts. Network structure can significantly distort individual’s local observations. Under some conditions, a state that is globally rare in a network may be dramatically over-represented in the local neighborhoods of many individuals. This effect, which we call the “majority illusion,” leads individuals to systematically overestimate the prevalence of that state, which may accelerate the spread of social contagions. We develop a statistical model that quantifies this effect and validate it with measurements in synthetic and real-world networks. We show that the illusion is exacerbated in networks with a heterogeneous degree distribution and disassortative structure.

The "Majority Illusion" in Social Networks

Individual’s decisions, from what product to buy to whether to engage in risky behavior, often depend on the choices, behaviors, or states of other people. People, however, rarely have global knowledge of the states of others, but must estimate them from the local observations of their social contacts. Network structure can significantly distort individual’s local observations. Under some conditions, a state that is globally rare in a network may be dramatically over-represented in the local neighborhoods of many individuals. This effect, which we call the “majority illusion,” leads individuals to systematically overestimate the prevalence of that state, which may accelerate the spread of social contagions. We develop a statistical model that quantifies this effect and validate it with measurements in synthetic and real-world networks. We show that the illusion is exacerbated in networks with a heterogeneous degree distribution and disassortative structure.

The Majority Illusion in Social Networks

Social behaviors are often contagious, spreading through a population as individuals imitate the decisions and choices of others. A variety of global phenomena, from innovation adoption to the emergence of social norms and political movements, arise as a result of people following a simple local rule, such as copy what others are doing. However, individuals often lack global knowledge of the behaviors of others and must estimate them from the observations of their friends' behaviors. In some cases, the structure of the underlying social network can dramatically skew an individual's local observations, making a behavior appear far more common locally than it is globally. We trace the origins of this phenomenon, which we call "the majority illusion," to the friendship paradox in social networks. As a result of this paradox, a behavior that is globally rare may be systematically overrepresented in the local neighborhoods of many people, i.e., among their friends. Thus, the "majority illusion" may facilitate the spread of social contagions in networks and also explain why systematic biases in social perceptions, for example, of risky behavior, arise. Using synthetic and real-world networks, we explore how the "majority illusion" depends on network structure and develop a statistical model to calculate its magnitude in a network.

An Experimental Method to Study Opinion Diffusion in Human-AI Hybrid Societies

As artificial intelligence increasingly mediates public discourse, it becomes important to understand how human-AI collectives shape opinion formation, deliberation, and democratic outcomes. We present a novel experimental method for studying opinion dynamics in hybrid human-AI social networks. Participants, human or AI, were embedded in $5\times5$ grid lattice networks and iteratively asked to select and revise statements on a given polarizing topic over eight rounds. We compared three conditions: human-only, AI-only, and hybrid networks with equal proportions of human and AI participants. Hybrid human-AI networks achieved the lowest final polarization while, in contrast, human-only networks exhibited higher polarization with lower neighbor agreement. We also ran additional experiments varying Large Language Model (LLM) prompt framing to explore whether instruction design might influence convergence patterns. Although these early findings are preliminary and cannot yet support broad generalizations, they highlight the potential value of experimental social networks for understanding opinion dynamics in human-AI hybrid societies.

Social Media Algorithms Distort Social Instincts and Fuel Misinformation - Neuroscience News

Social media algorithms, designed to boost user engagement for advertising revenue, amplify the biases inherent in human social learning processes, leading to misinformation and polarization.

Hybrid social learning in human-algorithm cultural transmission

Humans are impressive social learners. Researchers of cultural evolution have studied the many biases shaping cultural transmission by selecting who we copy from and what we copy. One hypothesis is that with the advent of superhuman algorithms a hybrid type of cultural transmission, namely from algorithms to humans, may have long-lasting effects on human culture. We suggest that algorithms might show (either by learning or by design) different behaviours, biases and problem-solving abilities than their human counterparts. In turn, algorithmic-human hybrid problem solving could foster better decisions in environments where diversity in problem-solving strategies is beneficial. This study asks whether algorithms with complementary biases to humans can boost performance in a carefully controlled planning task, and whether humans further transmit algorithmic behaviours to other humans. We conducted a large behavioural study and an agent-based simulation to test the performance of transmission chains with human and algorithmic players. We show that the algorithm boosts the performance of immediately following participants but this gain is quickly lost for participants further down the chain. Our findings suggest that algorithms can improve performance, but human bias may hinder algorithmic solutions from being preserved. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Emergent phenomena in complex physical and socio-technical systems: from cells to societies’.

Algorithmic Bias · Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science

Algorithmic bias refers to prejudicial, discriminatory, unjust, inaccurate, or otherwise disparate performance or outcomes from algorithmic systems based on racial, gender, or other attributes of an individual or a group. The concept of algorithmic bias emerged at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence (AI) research, critical data studies, human–computer interaction, law, philosophy, and similar disciplines. Although problems and discrepancies at the model level denote the most commonly studied form of bias, the term algorithmic bias is also used as a shorthand to describe a multitude of problems and challenges at various steps of the AI pipeline from ideation, problem framing, training data curation and processing, model training and validation, and deployment as well as emergent issues that arise from interaction with the real world. Potential sources of bias, appropriate metrics to define, measure, and mitigate bias, and the utility and merit of technical approaches to bias mitigation are fiercely debated in the current AI landscape.

Can We Fix Social Media? Testing Prosocial Interventions using Generative Social Simulation

Social media platforms have been widely linked to societal harms, including rising polarization and the erosion of constructive debate. Can these problems be mitigated through prosocial interventions? We address this question using a novel method - generative social simulation - that embeds Large Language Models within Agent-Based Models to create socially rich synthetic platforms. We create a minimal platform where agents can post, repost, and follow others. We find that the resulting following-networks reproduce three well-documented dysfunctions: (1) partisan echo chambers; (2) concentrated influence among a small elite; and (3) the amplification of polarized voices - creating a 'social media prism' that distorts political discourse. We test six proposed interventions, from chronological feeds to bridging algorithms, finding only modest improvements - and in some cases, worsened outcomes. These results suggest that core dysfunctions may be rooted in the feedback between reactive engagement and network growth, raising the possibility that meaningful reform will require rethinking the foundational dynamics of platform architecture.

Can We Fix Social Media? Testing Prosocial Interventions using Generative Social Simulation

Social media platforms have been widely linked to societal harms, including rising polarization and the erosion of constructive debate. Can these problems be mitigated through prosocial interventions? We address this question using a novel method - generative social simulation - that embeds Large Language Models within Agent-Based Models to create socially rich synthetic platforms. We create a minimal platform where agents can post, repost, and follow others. We find that the resulting following-networks reproduce three well-documented dysfunctions: (1) partisan echo chambers; (2) concentrated influence among a small elite; and (3) the amplification of polarized voices - creating a 'social media prism' that distorts political discourse. We test six proposed interventions, from chronological feeds to bridging algorithms, finding only modest improvements - and in some cases, worsened outcomes. These results suggest that core dysfunctions may be rooted in the feedback between reactive engagement and network growth, raising the possibility that meaningful reform will require rethinking the foundational dynamics of platform architecture.

Value misalignment in X’s feed algorithm is a reflection of value tensions in engagement

Social media feed algorithms rank content that is purported to be preferred by users, but the engagement behaviors that drive these algorithms are (at best) indirect proxies for users’ explicitly self-stated values. Are the resulting feeds value aligned, and if not, why? We investigate this question by annotating the basic human values expressed in participants’ X (Twitter) feeds (N = 715 US users), analyzing the relationship between the posts’ value expressions and the posts’ amplification in the ranked “For You” Page feed, and then comparing the amplified values to users’ own values. We observe that the inventory of posts from followed accounts reflects users’ self-stated values—but that there is an overall negative correlation (misalignment) between users’ explicit values and the value expressions the algorithm is more likely to amplify. We turn to engagement behavior to understand this misalignment and observe that users’ engagement behaviors can be misaligned with their stated values—likely causing the algorithm to learn and reflect these misaligned values. We also detect partisan differences consistent with this theory: While the algorithm amplifies values negatively correlated with both Democrats’ and Republicans’ self-stated values, they are more misaligned for Democrats. And in fact replying, a heavily weighted form of engagement, is associated with values that are less aligned for both Democrats’ and Republicans’ self-stated values, and is even more misaligned for Democrats. Taken together, these findings offer a glimpse into the tensions between the values that people hold and those that provoke reactions, and how these value tensions can produce misaligned outcomes.

Value misalignment in X’s feed algorithm is a reflection of value tensions in engagement

Social media feed algorithms rank content that is purported to be preferred by users, but the engagement behaviors that drive these algorithms are (at best) indirect proxies for users’ explicitly self-stated values. Are the resulting feeds value aligned, and if not, why? We investigate this question by annotating the basic human values expressed in participants’ X (Twitter) feeds (N = 715 US users), analyzing the relationship between the posts’ value expressions and the posts’ amplification in the ranked “For You” Page feed, and then comparing the amplified values to users’ own values. We observe that the inventory of posts from followed accounts reflects users’ self-stated values—but that there is an overall negative correlation (misalignment) between users’ explicit values and the value expressions the algorithm is more likely to amplify. We turn to engagement behavior to understand this misalignment and observe that users’ engagement behaviors can be misaligned with their stated values—likely causing the algorithm to learn and reflect these misaligned values. We also detect partisan differences consistent with this theory: While the algorithm amplifies values negatively correlated with both Democrats’ and Republicans’ self-stated values, they are more misaligned for Democrats. And in fact replying, a heavily weighted form of engagement, is associated with values that are less aligned for both Democrats’ and Republicans’ self-stated values, and is even more misaligned for Democrats. Taken together, these findings offer a glimpse into the tensions between the values that people hold and those that provoke reactions, and how these value tensions can produce misaligned outcomes.