







Recent studies suggest large language models (LLMs) can generate human-like responses, aligning with human behavior in economic experiments, surveys, and political discourse. This has led many to propose that LLMs can be used as surrogates or simulations for humans in social science research. However, LLMs differ fundamentally from humans, relying on probabilistic patterns, absent the embodied experiences or survival objectives that shape human cognition. We assess the reasoning depth of LLMs using the 11-20 money request game. Nearly all advanced approaches fail to replicate human behavior distributions across many models. The causes of failure are diverse and unpredictable, relating to input language, roles, safeguarding, and more. These results warrant caution in using LLMs as surrogates or for simulating human behavior in research.
A Theory of Response Sampling in LLMs: Part Descriptive and Part Prescriptive
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.
Testing and Improving Multi Agent LLM Cooperation
The Chameleon's Limit Investigating Persona Collapse and Homogenization in Large Language Models
The Chameleon's Limit Investigating Persona Collapse and Homogenization in Large Language Models
AI Behavioral Science
We outline a foundation for a new field of ``AI Behavioral Science,'' covering three perspectives. First, as AI becomes ubiquitous and is increasingly proprietary and opaque, it becomes vital to develop techniques for assessing AI behavior. We outline how tools developed to assess people's behaviors by social scientists can be used to assess and infer AI's behaviors biases, tendencies, and heuristics. Second, we also discuss how AI can change the ways in which we learn about human behavior. Beyond its computational power, AI offers new techniques for simulating, inferring, and predicting human behaviors that we outline and discuss. Third, as humans and AI are interacting in increasingly complex and intertwined systems, we need to understand the implications for the resulting economic and political outcomes. We outline issues that are increasingly pressing concerning the future of human-AI interactions and potential changes and disruptions that can ensue.

Language and Experience: A Computational Model of Social Learning in Complex Tasks
The ability to combine linguistic guidance from others with direct experience is central to human development, enabling safe and rapid learning in new environments. How do people integrate these two sources of knowledge, and how might AI systems? We present a computational framework that models social learning as joint probabilistic inference over structured, executable world models given sensorimotor and linguistic data. We make this possible by turning a pretrained language model into a probabilistic model of how humans share advice conditioned on their beliefs, allowing our agents both to generate advice for others and to interpret linguistic input as evidence during Bayesian inference. Using behavioral experiments and simulations across 10 video games, we show how linguistic guidance can shape exploration and accelerate learning by reducing risky interactions and speeding up key discoveries in both humans and models. We further explore how knowledge can accumulate across generations through iterated learning experiments and demonstrate successful knowledge transfer between humans and models -- revealing how structured, language-compatible representations might enable human-machine collaborative learning.

[Keynote 04] AgentSociety: Exploring Large Language Model Agents for Piloting Social Experiments
If LLMs Have Human-Like Attributes, Then So Does Age of Empires II
Much research has been carried out on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-powered agentic workflows. However, many works within the field state emergence of, ascribe to, or assume, generalised anthropomorphic attributes to them (e.g., morality or understanding of natural language). Our goal is not to argue in favour or against the existence of these attributes, but to point out that these conclusions could be incorrect. For this we build and train a simple neural network on the videogame Age of Empires II, and note that any entity in a sufficiently-powerful substrate, such as LEGO or the Greater Boston Area, could also present such attributes. Hence, the purported anthropomorphic attributes of LLMs are empirically non-unique: although some properties (e.g., responses to prompts) could remain constant, others, such as the interpretation of their perceived behaviour, might change with the substrate. Thus, any empirically-grounded discussion requires explicit measurement criteria; otherwise the interpretation is left to the representation. We then show that assuming that these attributes exist or not in a system, independent of the substrate and in a generalised way, leads to either circular or uninformative conclusions, regardless of the experimenter's viewpoint on the subject. Finally we propose a 'null' assumption, where one assumes LLM non-uniqueness instead of assuming anthropomorphic attributes to set up an experiment, along with examples of it. We also discuss potential objections to our work, briefly survey the field, and prove that Age of Empires II is functionally- and Turing-complete.

Generative AI Meets Open-Ended Survey Responses: Research Participant Use of AI and Homogenization
The growing popularity of generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools presents new challenges for data quality in online surveys and experiments. This study examines participants’ use of large language models to answer open-ended survey questions and describes empirical tendencies in human versus large language model (LLM)-generated text responses. In an original survey of research participants recruited from a popular online platform for sourcing social science research subjects, 34 percent reported using LLMs to help them answer open-ended survey questions. Simulations comparing human-written responses from three pre-ChatGPT studies with LLM-generated text reveal that LLM responses are more homogeneous and positive, particularly when they describe social groups in sensitive questions. These homogenization patterns may mask important underlying social variation in attitudes and beliefs among human subjects, raising concerns about data validity. Our findings shed light on the scope and potential consequences of participants’ LLM use in online research.

Understanding Understanding: A Pragmatic Framework Motivated by...
Motivated by the rapid ascent of Large Language Models (LLMs) and debates about the extent to which they possess human-level qualities, we propose a framework for testing whether any agent (be it...

Are Large Language Models Sensitive to the Motives Behind Communication?
Human communication is $\textit{motivated}$: people speak, write, and create content with a particular communicative intent in mind. As a result, information that large language models (LLMs) and AI agents process is inherently framed by humans' intentions and incentives. People are adept at navigating such nuanced information: we routinely identify benevolent or self-serving motives in order to decide what statements to trust. For LLMs to be effective in the real world, they too must critically evaluate content by factoring in the motivations of the source---for instance, weighing the credibility of claims made in a sales pitch. In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive study of whether LLMs have this capacity for $\textit{motivational vigilance}$. We first employ controlled experiments from cognitive science to verify that LLMs' behavior is consistent with rational models of learning from motivated testimony, and find they successfully discount information from biased sources in a human-like manner. We then extend our evaluation to sponsored online adverts, a more naturalistic reflection of LLM agents' information ecosystems. In these settings, we find that LLMs' inferences do not track the rational models' predictions nearly as closely---partly due to additional information that distracts them from vigilance-relevant considerations. However, a simple steering intervention that boosts the salience of intentions and incentives substantially increases the correspondence between LLMs and the rational model. These results suggest that LLMs possess a basic sensitivity to the motivations of others, but generalizing to novel real-world settings will require further improvements to these models.
Simulating Human Memory with Language Models
Language models are increasingly being deployed as user simulators, but their memory is far more reliable than that of real users. To measure this gap, we run a series of classic memory...

Large language models outperform humans at estimating society's everyday norms—but hybrids are even better
As AI assistants and social robots enter human environments, their ability to navigate context-dependent social norms is essential to avoid harm and ensure successful collaboration. We evaluate six large language models (LLMs) on their ability to estimate American social norms across 555 everyday scenarios (measured in prior work) and compare these to estimates from 320 humans. LLMs achieve remarkably high accuracy, clearly outperforming the average human. However, the errors LLMs make are systematic; they are similar across runs of the same LLM and even across different LLMs. As a consequence of this homogeneity, aggregating estimates of LLMs produces little improvement. Individual humans make much worse estimates, often defaulting to extreme right-or-wrong judgments even when asked to estimate population averages, but their errors are idiosyncratic and, consequently, aggregating their estimates yields dramatic improvement through wisdom-of-crowds effects. As humans make different errors than LLMs, hybrid ensembles combining both substantially outperform either alone.
Reasoning Under Uncertainty: Exploring Probabilistic Reasoning Capabilities of LLMs
Despite widespread success in language understanding and generation, large language models (LLMs) exhibit unclear and often inconsistent behavior when faced with tasks that require probabilistic reasoning. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study of the reasoning capabilities of LLMs over explicit discrete probability distributions. Given observations from a probability distribution, we evaluate models on three carefully designed tasks, mode identification, maximum likelihood estimation, and sample generation, by prompting them to provide responses to queries about either the joint distribution or its conditionals. These tasks thus probe a range of probabilistic skills, including frequency analysis, marginalization, and generative behavior. Through comprehensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that there exists a clear performance gap between smaller and larger models, with the latter demonstrating stronger inference and surprising capabilities in sample generation. Furthermore, our investigations reveal notable limitations, including sensitivity to variations in the notation utilized to represent probabilistic outcomes and performance degradation of over 60% as context length increases. Together, our results provide a detailed understanding of the probabilistic reasoning abilities of LLMs and identify key directions for future improvement.

Reasoning Under Uncertainty: Exploring Probabilistic Reasoning Capabilities of LLMs
Despite widespread success in language understanding and generation, large language models (LLMs) exhibit unclear and often inconsistent behavior when faced with tasks that require probabilistic reasoning. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study of the reasoning capabilities of LLMs over explicit discrete probability distributions. Given observations from a probability distribution, we evaluate models on three carefully designed tasks, mode identification, maximum likelihood estimation, and sample generation, by prompting them to provide responses to queries about either the joint distribution or its conditionals. These tasks thus probe a range of probabilistic skills, including frequency analysis, marginalization, and generative behavior. Through comprehensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that there exists a clear performance gap between smaller and larger models, with the latter demonstrating stronger inference and surprising capabilities in sample generation. Furthermore, our investigations reveal notable limitations, including sensitivity to variations in the notation utilized to represent probabilistic outcomes and performance degradation of over 60% as context length increases. Together, our results provide a detailed understanding of the probabilistic reasoning abilities of LLMs and identify key directions for future improvement.

Consistently Simulating Human Personas with Multi Turn Reinforcement Learning