This is neat: Here, we describe a new acoustic cryptanalysis key extraction attack, applicable to GnuPG’s current implementation of RSA. The attack can extract full 4096-bit RSA decryption keys from laptop computers (of various models), within an hour, using the sound generated by the computer during the decryption of some chosen ciphertexts. We experimentally demonstrate that such attacks can be carried out, using either a plain mobile phone placed next to the computer, or a more sensitive microphone placed 4 meters away. Beyond acoustics, we demonstrate that a similar low-bandwidth attack can be performed by measuring the electric potential of a computer chassis. A suitably-equipped attacker need merely touch the target computer with his bare hand, or get the required leakage information from the ground wires at the remote end of VGA, USB or Ethernet cables. ...
Hackers Can Silently Control Siri From 16 Feet Away
A clever attack by French researchers turns your headphone cable into an antenna to send surreptitious voice commands.
Hidden Microphones Exposed As Part of Government Surveillance Program In The Bay Area
A clandestine government surveillance program that has been operating around the Bay Area is being exposed.
Great. Now Even Your Headphones Can Spy on You
Israeli researchers show that even if you're paranoid enough to remove your computer's microphone, malware can convert your headphones into spy bugs.
The Duty of a Scholar
There was a joke at the time that although the National Security Agency had opened up in recent years and started taking their defensive role more seriously, the one aspect of cryptography which they would never discuss publicly was side channel attacks — and this itself constituted a side channel, revealing the importance they attributed to the field. Being active in computer security, and recognizing that the NSA knew a few things about the topic, my immediate priority was to determine whether the information leakage I had identified was sufficient to construct a practical cryptographic side channel. By mid-December I had a proof-of-concept exploit which stole enough bits of an RSA private key for the entire key to be reconstructed, and I turned my attention to the hard part of the problem: Quietly notifying security teams and working together to get the issue fixed before disclosing it publicly.
The Plan B OS for ubiquitous computing. Voice control, security, and terminals as case studies
The Gyroscopes in Your Phone Could Let Apps Eavesdrop on Conversations
In the age of surveillance paranoia, most smartphone users know better than to give a random app or website permission to use their device’s microphone. But researchers have found there’s another, little-considered sensor in modern phones that can also listen in on their conversations. And it doesn’t even need to ask. In a presentation at \[…\]
SS7 hack explained: what can you do about it?
A vulnerability means hackers can read texts, listen to calls and track mobile phone users. What are the implications and how can you protect yourself from snooping?
The hum that helps to fight crime
How a hum emitted from the electrical mains is transforming the work of forensic audio scientists.
Is Apple Security a MYTH?
The dawn of trustworthy computing
When we currently use a smart phone or a laptop on a cell network or the Internet, the other end of these interactions typically run on othe...
New physical attacks are quickly diluting secure enclave defenses from Nvidia, AMD, and Intel
On-chip TEEs withstand rooted OSes but fall instantly to cheap physical attacks.
Encryption, Privacy Are Larger Issues Than Fighting Terrorism, Clarke Says
David Greene talks to former national security official Richard Clarke about the fight between Apple and the FBI. The FBI wants an iPhone that was used by one of the San Bernardino shooters unlocked.
Police forensic tools may bypass key phone security feature
Up-to-date iPhones can lock out some forensic devices by rebooting. One major forensics company claims to have a workaround
Investigation into Message Layer Security (MLS)
This article investigates Message Layer Security (MLS), the IETF standard protocol (RFC 9420) for Signal-style end-to-end encryption. Through a practical analysis of OpenMLS (the Rust reference implementation) and a demonstration CLI chat application (mls-chat), the post reveals the substantial gap between protocol specification and production deployment. Introduction MLS (Message Layer …
