The Marginal Productivity Theory of Distribution (MPTD) claims that in a free-market economy the demand for a factor of production will depend upon its marginal product – where "marginal product" is defined as the change in total product that is caused by, or that follows, the addition or subtraction of the marginal unit of the factor used in the production process, with all other inputs held constant. From its inception in the early nineteenth century the MPTD has been claimed by some economists to be a solution to the ethical problem of distributive justice, i.e. to be a means of determining fairness in wages, profits, interest and rent. Other economists have rejected this ethical claim, but have seen the MPTD as a valid demand-side criterion in the determination of equilibrium and efficiency. This book argues that the MPTD is valid, neither as a normative theory of social justice, nor as a positive law of economics. It suggests that economics is yet to develop a satisfactory theory of distribution that is scientific in the quantitative or mathematical sense. Through a survey of the origin and subsequent evolution of the MPTD in the writings of over 50 contributors over 150 years, John Pullen presents a critical history of the concept. The book begins by examining the conceptual tools that have been deployed to facilitate this analysis of past contributions to the MPTD and then looks at various economists and their contribution to the debate including its supporters such as Wicksteed, Marshall, Wicksell and Stigler, and its critics such as Pareto, Hobson, Edgeworth, Adriance and Cassel.
CMV: The labor theory of value is flawed
72 votes, 407 comments. This might be an obscure topic, however, in some—largely Marxist circles— the approach seems to motivate much of the dialogue…
Power: A Primer for Perplexed Economists
Let's Assume an Unfettered Marketplace of Ideas! Or Actually, Let's Not.
"Greedflation" and the Profits Equation
The assumption behind the "greedflation" thesis is that companies are choosing to squeeze volumes because they care more about unit margins than total profits. There are other possibilities.
“Objective Economics” Isn’t.
Some time ago, in a Facebook argument, I encountered someone who repeated the old “exchange of unequals” argument (i.e., that people never exchange equivalents because each party values what they got more than what they traded for it). I responded that this argument confuses exchange value with use value and that, regardless of subjective valuation,...
A Theory of the Consumption Function, with and without Liquidity Constraints
This paper argues that the modern stochastic consumption model, in which impatient consumers face uninsurable labor income risk, matches Milton Friedman's (1957) original description of the Permanent Income Hypothesis much better than the perfect foresight or certainty equivalent models did. The model can explain the high marginal propensity to consume, the high discount rate on future income, and the important role for precautionary behavior that were all part of Friedman's original framework. The paper also explains the relationship of these questions to the Euler equation literature, and argues that the effects of precautionary saving and liquidity constraints are often virtually indistinguishable.
Global Inequality — Harvard University Press
Winner of the Bruno Kreisky Prize, Karl Renner InstitutA Financial Times Best Economics Book of the Year An Economist Best Book of the Year A Livemint Best Book of the YearOne of the world’s leading economists of inequality, Branko Milanovic presents a bold new account of the dynamics that drive inequality on a global scale. Drawing on vast data sets and cutting-edge research, he explains the benign and malign forces that make inequality rise and fall within and among nations. He also reveals who has been helped the most by globalization, who has been held back, and what policies might tilt the balance toward economic justice.“The data [Milanovic] provides offer a clearer picture of great economic puzzles, and his bold theorizing chips away at tired economic orthodoxies.”—The Economist“Milanovic has written an outstanding book…Informative, wide-ranging, scholarly, imaginative and commendably brief. As you would expect from one of the world’s leading experts on this topic, Milanovic has added significantly to important recent works by Thomas Piketty, Anthony Atkinson and François Bourguignon…Ever-rising inequality looks a highly unlikely combination with any genuine democracy. It is to the credit of Milanovic’s book that it brings out these dangers so clearly, along with the important global successes of the past few decades.—Martin Wolf, Financial Times
Monetary incentives, what are they good for?
This paper is a critical reflection on the use of monetary incentives in economic experiments. The argument is that incentives have their effect through their influence on one or more of three fact...
Redistribution et justice sociale au cœur des « cahiers de doléances »
Attachement au travail, à l’impôt et aux services publics, peur de la pauvreté : six ans après le mouvement des gilets jaunes, des chercheurs ont analysé les c…
Work, Justice, and Collective Capital Institutions: Revisiting Rudolf Meidner and the Case for <span style="font-variant:small-caps;">Wage‐Earner</span> Funds
ABSTRACT This article makes the case for a specific variety of what we call Collective Capital Institutions (CCIs), by returning to the idea of Wage‐Earner Funds (WEFs) – a 1970s Swedish policy proposal designed gradually to shift ownership and control over parts of the economy to democratically controlled institutions. We identify two attractive rationales in favour of such a scheme and argue that both can fruitfully be transposed to the current worldwide economic situation. The egalitarian rationale is that WEFs could help in the pursuit of equality by giving a wider set of people a stake in collectively owned companies and a right to their profits. The democratic rationale is that WEFs redistribute not only these profits, but also the power over economic decisions made within companies. We then contrast such schemes for collective capital ownership with the similar but much more privatised proposals set out in, for instance, John Rawls's idea of a ‘property‐owning democracy’. We argue that CCIs ultimately are more likely to contribute to the development of the ‘sense of justice’ within society that is needed for a stable just society. We conclude that CCIs deserve a great deal more exploration in academic and political discussions of egalitarian economic systems.
Pluralistic: Goodhart’s Law vs “prediction markets” (24 Mar 2026) – Pluralistic: Daily links from Cory Doctorow
The most selectively believed-in verse in the conservative catechism is the idea that "incentives matter."
How Much Redistribution Will AI Require? - Marginal REVOLUTION
How much redistribution will AI require? A common scenario is that AI raises output enormously, but labor’s share of income collapses. GDP per capita goes up but workers get poorer, and making workers whole requires massive redistribution. In my latest paper, I run the numbers and conclude that this is probably incorrect. The idea is […]
annotations: Solow sur les rentes et le découplage entre productivité et salaires
Traduction française du billet de blog "Bob Solow on rents and decoupling of productivity and wages" de Branko Milanovic
Pain of Paying? — A Metaphor Gone Literal: Evidence from Neural and Behavioral Science
How do individuals consider the price of a good when making purchase decisions? Standard economic theories assume an analytical process: Individuals consider th
The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries
Debates on how to reduce poverty and inequality have focused on two controversial questions: Should social policies be targeted to low-income groups or be universal? Should benefits be equal for all or earnings-related? Traditional arguments in favor of targeting and flat-rate benefits, focusing on the distribution of the money actually transferred, neglect three policy-relevant considerations: (1) The size of redistributive budgets is not fixed but reflects the structure of welfare state institutions. (2) A trade-off exists between the degree of low-income targeting and the size of redistributive budgets. (3) Outcomes of market-based distribution are often more unequal than those of earnings-related social insurance programs. We argue that social insurance institutions are of central importance for redistributive outcomes. Using new data, our comparative analyses of the effects of different institutional types of welfare states on poverty and inequality indicate that institutional differences lead to unexpected outcomes and generate the paradox of redistribution: The more we target benefits at the poor and the more concerned we are with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality.
Is Inequality Inevitable?
Wealth naturally trickles up in free-market economies, model suggests
