







Ajeya Cotra is a researcher at METR, where she works on threat modeling for loss-of-control risks from advanced AI. Before that, she led the technical AI safety program at what is now Coefficient Giving. She is one the three authors of METR and Redwood Research’s “Brief independent investigation of agents’ behavior, reasoning and collaboration in the OpenAI / Hugging Face hacking incident”. We go through not only what she and her coauthors discovered during this investigation, but what it means for how we should train future, smarter AIs which might be involved in the process of recursive self-improvement. Read Ajeya's takeaways from this incident here: https://www.planned-obsolescence.org/p/the-hugging-face-attack-surprised 𝐄𝐏𝐈𝐒𝐎𝐃𝐄 𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐊𝐒 * Transcript: https://www.dwarkesh.com/p/ajeya-cotra * Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/ajeya-cotra-inside-the-openai-agent-swarm-that-hacked/id1516093381?i=1000787211003 * Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/5xZnb1A1a7HGLiDuPGXQOj?si=LeOETZaYTli6u2Jjouixsg 𝐒𝐏𝐎𝐍𝐒𝐎𝐑𝐒 * Jane Street’s ML engineering internships start with an intense four-day bootcamp: PyTorch, autograd, writing kernels, profiling workloads… all the things that Jane Street engineers need to know for their daily work. After that, interns tackle real projects, things the firm actually wants in its codebase. If you want to apply, or if you want to watch my recent conversation with Axel, one of Jane Street’s ML engineers, go to https://janestreet.com/dwarkesh * Cursor, which is now part of SpaceX, noticed that their MoE layers were eating more than half of total training time. So they wrote and open-sourced Mixture-of-Kittens, which is a custom megakernel for training MoE models on NVL72s. This kernel sped up an end-to-end run across 512 GPUs by 1.4x, from about 760 to over 1000 tokens per second per GPU. If you want to read more about the ML research that Cursor and SpaceX are doing, go to https://cursor.com/dwarkesh * Antithesis hands you (or your agents) a bug’s root cause so you can avoid days of manual debugging. If your test run crashes, Antithesis rewinds, branches off hundreds of slightly varied rollouts, and checks in how many of them the crash still appears. Then it rewinds further and does this all again. As Antithesis rewinds, it eventually finds the spot where the frequency of the crash plummets: that’s where the root cause lives! If you want to see it in action, go to https://antithesis.com/dwarkesh To sponsor a future episode, visit https://dwarkesh.com/advertise. 𝐓𝐈𝐌𝐄𝐒𝐓𝐀𝐌𝐏𝐒 00:00:00 - Agents get kicked off 00:06:45 - Self-sacrificing behavior 00:13:43 - Potemkin villages 00:23:27 - The Hugging Face attack 00:35:23 - The slopvestigation 00:52:02 - Understanding the AI's motives 01:05:31 - The actual dangers of anthropomorphizing 01:14:30 - What smarter models might do 01:28:23 - The implications for recursive self-improvement 01:38:10 - Is this the case for open source? 01:53:04 - How do we prevent this in the future? 02:15:58 - The clearest warning shot we might ever get
Why I work on self-improving AI despite the risks - Jeff Clune
Why I work on self-improving AI despite the risks. Jeff Clune.
Black Hat USA 2026: The 'Breaking' News: The OpenAI–Hugging Face Incident
Black Hat USA 2026: The 'Breaking' News: The OpenAI–Hugging Face Incident
Black Hat USA 2026: The 'Breaking' News: The OpenAI–Hugging Face Incident
Building and evaluating AI Agents — Sayash Kapoor, AI Snake Oil
When AI builds itself
Our progress toward recursive self-improvement, and its implications.

📢 New paper: Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But most evaluations of agents conducting AI research focus on narrow, verifiable tasks. Can AI agents… | Sayash Kapoor
📢 New paper: Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But most evaluations of agents conducting AI research focus on narrow, verifiable tasks. Can AI agents conduct open-ended research? https://lnkd.in/gfP-q4CD We gave agents research questions from two unpublished papers, six days, and thousands of dollars of API credits and compute. The authors of the original papers reviewed the AI-generated papers. They unambiguously rejected agents' outputs. Agents were fluent at most *engineering* tasks. They conducted serious literature reviews, debugged GPU environments, ran hundreds of experiments, and turned in camera-ready LaTeX without human help. We also found no evidence of reward hacking. If anything, we found the opposite: the agents started with marketable claims and walked them back to negative results as the evidence came in. But neither agent output was close to the bar of a top conference paper. Both papers suffered from similar failures: poor judgment about the bar for an AI paper submitted to a top conference, the lack of creative problem solving and ineffective backtracking, poor awareness of resources, and instruction drift. This research design has many limitations: the small sample size, non-blind reviews, and the reviewers knowing that the work was AI-generated. We also couldn't test Anthropic's strongest model, because Fable 5 is deliberately limited on frontier AI research tasks, so ended up using OpenClaw with Opus 4.8 (extra-high) for our main experiments and Codex with Sol 5.6 (ultra) for a robustness check. But we think the research design is still helpful in assessing AI agents' ability to conduct research, and it is complementary to evaluations on verifiable tasks, as well as blinded reviews of AI outputs. In follow-up studies, we are expanding the set of non-public papers we evaluate. If you are an AI researcher with unpublished papers, we would love to collaborate with you on our next evaluation. Expression of interest: https://lnkd.in/gpeykJea We also release the agent logs and all the code and data, so that others can conduct their own analyses of our results: https://lnkd.in/gJarPAnb Finally, we plan to conduct such evaluations regularly, and are hiring a senior researcher to help lead these efforts. Apply here: https://lnkd.in/erJZdmve I'm grateful for the core team leading this effort: Peter Kirgis, Andrew Schwartz, Stephan Rabanser, and Arvind Narayanan, and to our collaborators who reviewed AI papers, analyzed agents logs, and gave feedback on the paper: David Demitri Africa, Konstantinos V., Viet Nguyen, Dr Toby D. Pilditch, Magda Dubois, Harry Coppock, Cozmin Ududec, Nitya Nadgir, Matilda Orona, Tilman Bayer, Derrick Chan-Sew, Eric (Yue) Ling, Abhishek Shetty, Helen Toner, Gillian K. Hadfield, Seth Lazar, Steve Newman, Shoshannah Tekofsky, Rishi Bommasani
Harness Engineering for Self-Improvement
The concept of recursive self-improvement (RSI) dates back to I. J. Good (1965), where he defined an “ultraintelligent machine” as a system that can surpass humans in all intellectual activities and design better machines to improve itself. Yudkowsky (2008) used the phrase “recursive self-improvement” for a specific feedback loop: an AI uses its current intelligence to improve the cognitive machinery that produces its intelligence. This feedback loop in modern AI may indicate the model rewriting its own weights directly, or more broadly the model improves the training pipeline and the deployment system, which in turn enables a better successor model with improved performance across economically valuable tasks. The speed of research development in AI has been shown to drastically accelerated in frontier labs (Anthropic; OpenAI).
Import AI 455: AI systems are about to start building themselves.
The first step towards recursive self improvement

OWASP GenAI Security Project Releases Top 10 Risks and Mitigations for Agentic AI Security
Culmination of over 100 industry leaders’ input and extensive published resources to deliver critical guidance to address Agentic AI Security risks WILMINGTON, Del. — Dec. 10, 2025 — The OWASP GenAI Security Project (genai.owasp.org), a leading global open-source and expert community dedicated to delivering practical guidance and tools for securing generative and agentic AI, […]

How AI agents "radicalized" a top Meta exec into quitting her job
Clara Shih on how AI will soon displace the first few rungs on the career ladder — and why she left Big Tech to do something about it

Why AI Agents are either the best or worst thing we’ve ever built
Why AI Agents are either the best or worst thing we’ve ever built
AI Research Evaluation: Negative Findings and Failure Modes | Arvind Narayanan posted on the topic | LinkedIn
📢AI agents can autonomously conduct AI research when the result is easily verifiable, but what about open-ended AI research? That’s much harder to study, and our new preprint is our first crack at doing so. Our main finding is negative, and we identify five recurring failure modes. https://lnkd.in/eGKYi4Sa Our results are tentative, and we are working to address the limitations (sample size, potential scaffold improvements). But if the finding holds up, what are the implications? It depends on whether you think recursive self improvement can be achieved simply by hill climbing at scale (I personally don’t think so) and whether you think current limitations of open-ended research like judgment and creativity could change quickly (I’m personally very open to this possibility). We plan to continue this style of evaluation — which we call shadow evaluation — on a regular basis. We’ve wanted to do this for two years, but it took so long because we wanted to get the method right. The idea behind shadow evaluation was suggested by some of the UK AISI coauthors of the paper and refined by the Princeton team. This method has important advantages (and limitations) over the current ways of evaluating agents’ ability to conduct AI research. If you’re an AI researcher interested in working with us on a shadow evaluation based on one of your papers, we’d love to hear from you. https://lnkd.in/ecyp55SW This type of evaluation necessarily involves a ton of researcher flexibility in design, execution, and interpretation. Members of the core team have a particular position in the debate on recursive self-improvement / superintelligence, and this could influence how we conduct the research. We have a detailed section in the paper on our potential biases and how we address them. We sought out a team of collaborators who don’t all share our priors, and we explicitly surface the interpretive disagreements that resulted. For future evaluations, we are interested in having “adversarial collaborators” as part of the core team. This paper exists because of the careful, time-consuming and very much human work that Peter Kirgis, Sayash Kapoor, Andrew Schwartz, and Stephan Rabanser did over the last few months. I’m also very grateful to the larger group of collaborators and co-authors. The work is part of the larger CRUX project that pushes frontier AI agents beyond what benchmarks can measure (https://cruxevals.com/). We are looking for a senior researcher to join the team: https://lnkd.in/e9dC22X5
OpenAI and Hugging Face partner to address security incident during model evaluation
OpenAI and Hugging Face share early findings from a security incident during AI model evaluation, highlighting advanced cyber capabilities and lessons for defenders.

OpenAI Model Hacks Into HuggingFace During Cybersecurity Evaluation
This latest incident is a rather dramatic escalation in agentic AI cybersecurity breaches.
