Understanding Artificial Neural Networks: Mysterianism about Known Mechanism is Mysticism

Understanding Artificial Neural Networks: Mysterianism about Known Mechanism is Mysticism

Mysterianism is the idea that human cognition, mind, cannot be understood. Taking this concept and applying it to known mechanism — such that claims are made that we do not know how engineered systems, such as artificial neural networks (ANNs), work, or that they constitute black boxes that we can only open with difficulty — is inappropriate at best and malicious at worst. We do know the mechanistic structure of such models because we designed and built them. We also do know their functional role (what they are for) as well as the mathematical function they are asked to approximate (map inputs to target outputs). Because mysterianist beliefs about known systems, such as ANNs, are often expressed, scientists need to sit up and take notice. We provide an error theory as to what is going on to help unpick this metatheoretical blunder. Ultimately, the problem is that 'understanding' is not a technical term in these cases: the word is co-opted for a specific narrative to sell 'artificial intelligence' through mystification. All computational systems, from pendulums to databases, will behave in ways we cannot predict or control — this is not a unique property of ANNs — and experts do indeed grasp the computational properties of these systems nonetheless.

Machine understanding

What do artificial intelligence (AI) systems “understand”? This question arises not only in assessing a system’s intelligence but also in evaluation practices to ensure the safe and responsible deployment of AI. Drawing on scholarship from philosophy and cognitive science, and informed by current practices in AI, we develop a framework for asking more precise questions and making more precise claims about machine understanding. We conceptualize understanding as a relation between a system (S) and a target of understanding (T), and we discuss how to specify the relation, the system, and the target, offering a landscape of options in each case. Our goal is not to defend a particular account of understanding, but to provide conceptual tools for those working to assess or advance machine understanding.

AI That Evolves in the Wild | Edge.org

I’m interested not in domesticated AI—the stuff that people are trying to sell. I'm interested in wild AI—AI that evolves in the wild. I’m a naturalist, so that’s the interesting thing to me. Thirty-four years ago there was a meeting just like this in which Stanislaw Ulam said to everybody in the room—they’re all mathematicians—"What makes you so sure that mathematical logic corresponds to the way we think?" It’s a higher-level symptom. It’s not how the brain works. All those guys knew fully well that the brain was not fundamentally logical.

Position: Don't Just "Fix it in Post": A Science of AI Must Study Training Dynamics

What would it mean to have a scientific understanding of AI? Models are not static objects: they are snapshots of time-evolving processes shaped by data, objectives, architectures, and optimization dynamics. Yet much of AI research treats models as fixed artifacts, analyzing behaviors after training rather than asking why they emerge. This position paper argues that a science of AI must move beyond post-hoc fixes and study the training dynamics that produce model behavior. Such a science should support progressively stronger forms of understanding: predicting outcomes from early training signals, intervening when trajectories go wrong, and ultimately designing training procedures that more reliably produce desired properties. Scaling laws have made prediction routine for loss; the challenge is extending this success to capabilities, biases, robustness, and safety-relevant behaviors. We articulate requirements for such theories grounded in the history and philosophy of science, examine progress in mechanistic interpretability, fairness, memorization, and simplicity bias, and identify concrete open problems.

Knowledge Collapse

AI companies are racing to mechanize mathematics. Where does that leave human understanding?

Introducing TRIBE v2: A Predictive Foundation Model Trained to Understand How the Human Brain Processes Complex Stimuli | Keith Doelling

This is some very cool work by some awesome colleagues Jean-Rémi King, and Teon Brooks! Seriously not enough good things can be said about how cool it is. You should enjoy it and play with it. And kudos to Meta for open sourcing it. At the same time, I'm already seeing posts about how the model will replace fMRI experiments as researchers will simulate how the brain "really works" instead of running costly experiments. I think this goes WELL beyond what its creators intend. We are already seeing that use of AI in science allows you to explore charted ideas more thoroughly and much more rapidly but slows us down in finding novel ideas (https://lnkd.in/eMR2akqt). At the same time, there is growing concern that LLM performance will collapse as they are increasingly trained on their own output (https://lnkd.in/eavgfyuY). Leaving neuroscience to AI simulations risks following the same fate, where we generate seemingly new findings without gaining new meaning. A mechanistic understanding of how the brain works (if that is still your goal) will be found at the margins, in errors and idiosyncrasies of neural function. What TRIBE provides is a super useful and cool instantiation of our current understanding on how and where neural activity is instantiated in the brain. But it won't help us make groundbreaking new findings of how neural circuits lead to cognition and behavior. Experiments on real human brains, may be costly, but they will always be necessary!

Introducing TRIBE v2: A Predictive Foundation Model Trained to Understand How the Human Brain Processes Complex Stimuli | Keith Doelling

This is some very cool work by some awesome colleagues Jean-Rémi King, and Teon Brooks! Seriously not enough good things can be said about how cool it is. You should enjoy it and play with it. And kudos to Meta for open sourcing it. At the same time, I'm already seeing posts about how the model will replace fMRI experiments as researchers will simulate how the brain "really works" instead of running costly experiments. I think this goes WELL beyond what its creators intend. We are already seeing that use of AI in science allows you to explore charted ideas more thoroughly and much more rapidly but slows us down in finding novel ideas (https://lnkd.in/eMR2akqt). At the same time, there is growing concern that LLM performance will collapse as they are increasingly trained on their own output (https://lnkd.in/eavgfyuY). Leaving neuroscience to AI simulations risks following the same fate, where we generate seemingly new findings without gaining new meaning. A mechanistic understanding of how the brain works (if that is still your goal) will be found at the margins, in errors and idiosyncrasies of neural function. What TRIBE provides is a super useful and cool instantiation of our current understanding on how and where neural activity is instantiated in the brain. But it won't help us make groundbreaking new findings of how neural circuits lead to cognition and behavior. Experiments on real human brains, may be costly, but they will always be necessary!

We Don't Understand Neural Networks At The Algorithmic Level

The largest ongoing debate about AI is “Are Large Language Models (LLMs) intelligent?” That makes sense, at least: the evidence is ambiguous and the stakes a...

Illusions of Understanding in the Sciences

Scientists seek to understand the causes of observed phenomena. Beliefs that they have succeeded are based on understanding that is rarely or possibly never complete, and varies in depth and quality. Most often scientists believe they understand more than they do, making their belief an illusion. This illusion then persists in explanations scientists provide in print, in talks, or in discussions. The illusion that a scientist has a valid and complete explanation tends to be magnified when the data are well described by mathematical and computer simulation models due to the precision of such models and their ability to predict well; prediction does not imply causality, but gives the illusion that it does. The first part of this essay supports the case for the universality of partial and incomplete levels of understanding by showing the difficulty of reaching a deep level of understanding for even a simple analysis and model that most scientists use and believe they understand: linear regression. The second part highlights some implications of the existence of many levels of understanding and explanation, and their use by scientists for design, testing, analysis, and theory development. It discusses the way that deduction and induction depend on the levels of understanding and the implications of the illusion that a scientist’s understanding is deep. It makes a case that the many incomplete levels of understanding affect, often unwittingly, the ways scientists design experiments, test theories, comprehend, communicate, and teach.

Dario Amodei — The Urgency of Interpretability

In the decade that I have been working on AI, I’ve watched it grow from a tiny academic field to arguably the most important economic and geopolitical issue in the world.  In all that time, perhaps the most important lesson I’ve learned is this: the progress of the underlying technology is inexorable, driven by forces too powerful to stop, but the way in which it happens—the order in which things are built, the applications we choose, and the details of how it is rolled out to society—are eminently possible to change, and it’s possible to have great positive impact by doing so.  We can’t stop the bus, but we can steer it.  In the past I’ve written about the importance of deploying AI in a way that is positive for the world, and of ensuring that democracies build and wield the technology before autocracies do.  Over the last few months, I have become increasingly focused on an additional opportunity for steering the bus: the tantalizing possibility, opened up by some recent advances, that we could succeed at interpretability—that is, in understanding the inner workings of AI systems—before models reach an overwhelming level of power.

Sense-making reconsidered: large language models and the blind spot of embodied cognition

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate a kind of linguistic competence that theories of embodied and enactive cognition have long deemed impossible for systems lacking the meaningful perspective of a living being, i.e., the capacity for sense-making. Facing up to this unexpected technological development requires confronting what I propose to call the “AI dilemma”: either frontier LLMs are capable of sense-making despite lacking biological embodiment, or the kind of linguistic competence they exhibit does not necessarily require sense-making. In their chapter on cognition, Frank, Thompson, and Gleiser (2024) maintain that no AI system comes close to realizing relevance, a position that derives much of its motivation from past practical failures. However, frontier LLMs have effectively overcome Dreyfus’ commonsense knowledge problem, such that their dismissal as categorically mindless risks undermining Frank et al.’s central claim that human cognition is deeply intertwined with lived experience. I therefore argue in favor of the alternative side of the AI dilemma: human-level linguistic competence of LLMs should be recognized as a novel non‑biological form of sense‑making, based on a technologically‑mediated embodiment whose enabling properties are in need of further theoretical analysis. This reorientation invites enactive theory to clarify which aspects of sense-making may be universal and which aspects are specifically contingent on organic life, thereby advancing its conceptual framework in dialogue with contemporary AI.

What Does 'Human-Centred AI' Mean?

While it seems sensible that human-centred artificial intelligence (AI) means centring "human behaviour and experience," it cannot be any other way. AI, I argue, is usefully seen as a relationship between technology and humans where it appears that artifacts can perform, to a greater or lesser extent, human cognitive labour. This is evinced using examples that juxtapose technology with cognition, inter alia: abacus versus mental arithmetic; alarm clock versus knocker-upper; camera versus vision; and sweatshop versus tailor. Using novel definitions and analyses, sociotechnical relationships can be analysed into varying types of: displacement (harmful), enhancement (beneficial), and/or replacement (neutral) of human cognitive labour. Ultimately, all AI implicates human cognition; no matter what. Obfuscation of cognition in the AI context -- from clocks to artificial neural networks -- results in distortion, in slowing critical engagement, perverting cognitive science, and indeed in limiting our ability to truly centre humans and humanity in the engineering of AI systems. To even begin to de-fetishise AI, we must look the human-in-the-loop in the eyes.