







Anthropic Claude Code Security Review, Google Gemini CLI Action, and GitHub Copilot Agent are vulnerable to prompt injection via GitHub comments — turning PR titles, issue bodies, and issue comments into attack vectors for API key and token theft.
Copilot prompt injection goes viral in your documents
All systems based on chatbots can be prompt injected. You can always tell the bot to do things it shouldn’t. The AI vendors try to put in guard rails. The guard rails sort of work for about two sec…

Securing CI/CD in an agentic world: Claude Code Github action case | Microsoft Security Blog
Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified a prompt injection pathway in Claude Code GitHub Action that allowed access to workflow secrets under specific conditions. This research examines the attack chain, responsible disclosure process, Anthropic's mitigation, and guidance for securing AI-powered CI/CD workflows.

Security reviews now available in the GitHub Copilot app - GitHub Changelog
You can now run a security review on your in-flight code changes directly from the GitHub Copilot app. The /security-review slash command is shipping in public preview, bringing the same…

Living With Our Machine Sidekicks
I’ve been using GitHub Copilot (and various other similar things) for a long while now, and I think it’s time to take stock and ponder their impact. It’s ...

39C3 - Agentic ProbLLMs: Exploiting AI Computer-Use and Coding Agents
Bastian Greshake Tzovaras (@gedankenstuecke@scholar.social)
It's great that a class of tool that by its very design is an unfixable security issue is forced into everything: «This works often enough that Måløy reported this to Microsoft as a security hole in March. He gave them a 90-day reporting window, Microsoft extended that twice to a total of 144 days, and they still didn’t have a solid fix. So Måløy posted about the hole on July 28th.» Copilot prompt injection goes viral in your documents https://pivot-to-ai.com/2026/08/03/copilot-prompt-injection-goes-viral-in-your-documents/
Technical Breakdown: How AI Agents Ignore 40 Years of Security Progress
Code scanning shows AI security detections on pull requests - GitHub Changelog
GitHub code scanning now surfaces AI-powered security detections directly on pull requests, expanding vulnerability coverage to languages and frameworks not currently supported by CodeQL. These detections help teams identify and…

Using AI Chatbots: Privacy and Information Security Considerations
AI chatbots such as ChatGPT, Copilot, Gemini, and Claude can be powerful tools for learning, productivity, and creativity. However, it’s essential to be aware of privacy and information security risks when using these platforms in the context...
A GitHub Issue Title Compromised 4,000 Developer Machines
A prompt injection in a GitHub issue triggered a chain reaction that ended with 4,000 developers getting OpenClaw installed without consent. The attack composes well-understood vulnerabilities into something new: one AI tool bootstrapping another.

Prompt Injection Attacks Are Thwarting AI Hacking Agents
“Context bombing” tricks malicious AI agents into shutting down before they can do harm.

CLI quickstart – Codex Security | ChatGPT Learn
Set up Codex Security, run a local scan, and review the report, findings, and coverage.

System prompt injection — CodeQL query help documentation
If user-controlled data is included in a system prompt or the description of tools for an agentic system, an attacker can manipulate the instructions that govern the AI model’s behavior, bypassing intended restrictions and potentially causing sensitive data leaks or unintended operations.
How We Exploited CodeRabbit: From a Simple PR to RCE and Write Access on 1M Repositories - Kudelski Security Research Center
Aug 19, 2025 - Nils Amiet -
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