« IBM/DIMACS/DATA-INSPIRE Workshop on Bridging Game Theory and Machine Learning for Multi-party Decision Making
Semivalue-based data valuation is arbitrary and gameable
The game-theoretic notion of the semivalue offers a popular framework for credit attribution and data valuation in machine learning. Semivalues have been proposed for a variety of high-stakes...
TextWorld: A Learning Environment for Text-based Games
We introduce TextWorld, a sandbox learning environment for the training and evaluation of RL agents on text-based games. TextWorld is a Python library that handles interactive play-through of text games, as well as backend functions like state tracking and reward assignment. It comes with a curated list of games whose features and challenges we have analyzed. More significantly, it enables users to handcraft or automatically generate new games. Its generative mechanisms give precise control over the difficulty, scope, and language of constructed games, and can be used to relax challenges inherent to commercial text games like partial observability and sparse rewards. By generating sets of varied but similar games, TextWorld can also be used to study generalization and transfer learning. We cast text-based games in the Reinforcement Learning formalism, use our framework to develop a set of benchmark games, and evaluate several baseline agents on this set and the curated list.
Data Banzhaf: A Robust Data Valuation Framework for Machine Learning
Data valuation has wide use cases in machine learning, including improving data quality and creating economic incentives for data sharing. This paper studies the robustness of data valuation to noisy model performance scores. Particularly, we find that the inherent randomness of the widely used stochastic gradient descent can cause existing data value notions (e.g., the Shapley value and the Leave-one-out error) to produce inconsistent data value rankings across different runs. To address this challenge, we introduce the concept of safety margin, which measures the robustness of a data value notion. We show that the Banzhaf value, a famous value notion that originated from cooperative game theory literature, achieves the largest safety margin among all semivalues (a class of value notions that satisfy crucial properties entailed by ML applications and include the famous Shapley value and Leave-one-out error). We propose an algorithm to efficiently estimate the Banzhaf value based on the Maximum Sample Reuse (MSR) principle. Our evaluation demonstrates that the Banzhaf value outperforms the existing semivalue-based data value notions on several ML tasks such as learning with weighted samples and noisy label detection. Overall, our study suggests that when the underlying ML algorithm is stochastic, the Banzhaf value is a promising alternative to the other semivalue-based data value schemes given its computational advantage and ability to robustly differentiate data quality.
Data Banzhaf: A Robust Data Valuation Framework for Machine Learning
Data valuation has wide use cases in machine learning, including improving data quality and creating economic incentives for data sharing. This paper studies the robustness of data valuation to noisy model performance scores. Particularly, we find that the inherent randomness of the widely used stochastic gradient descent can cause existing data value notions (e.g., the Shapley value and the Leave-one-out error) to produce inconsistent data value rankings across different runs. To address this challenge, we introduce the concept of safety margin, which measures the robustness of a data value notion. We show that the Banzhaf value, a famous value notion that originated from cooperative game theory literature, achieves the largest safety margin among all semivalues (a class of value notions that satisfy crucial properties entailed by ML applications and include the famous Shapley value and Leave-one-out error). We propose an algorithm to efficiently estimate the Banzhaf value based on the Maximum Sample Reuse (MSR) principle. Our evaluation demonstrates that the Banzhaf value outperforms the existing semivalue-based data value notions on several ML tasks such as learning with weighted samples and noisy label detection. Overall, our study suggests that when the underlying ML algorithm is stochastic, the Banzhaf value is a promising alternative to the other semivalue-based data value schemes given its computational advantage and ability to robustly differentiate data quality.
Introducing Clef: our open-source decision models, and new RL fine-tuning platform
We are introducing Clef and Clef-flash, open-source decision models hosted on Workers AI for high-speed classification and agentic workflows. Also launching: a new reinforcement learning platform that allows developers to fine-tune decision models using their own data.
Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit
Human society is coordinated by mechanisms that control how prices are agreed, taxes are set, and electoral votes are tallied. The design of robust and effective mechanisms for human benefit is a core problem in the social, economic, and political sciences. Here, we discuss the recent application of modern tools from AI research, including deep neural networks trained with reinforcement learning (RL), to create more desirable mechanisms for people. We review the application of machine learning to design effective auctions, learn optimal tax policies, and discover redistribution policies that win the popular vote among human users. We discuss the challenge of accurately modeling human preferences and the problem of aligning a mechanism to the wishes of a potentially diverse group. We highlight the importance of ensuring that research into “deep mechanism design” is conducted safely and ethically.
On the Impact of the Utility in Semivalue-based Data Valuation
Semivalue–based data valuation uses cooperative‐game theory intuitions to assign each data point a value reflecting its contribution to a downstream task. Still, those values depend on the...
AI and the knowledge commons
No One Wins in Nuclear War: Social Simulations of High-stakes Military Decision-making
WOPR is a social-simulation environment for studying how organizations make high-stakes decisions, built on a deterministic, replay-validated rules engine and using wargames as the vehicle. We instantiate it first with the published card game Nuclear War, traced against its published rules. We start with military decision-making because of its safety implications and because it needs further study, but the design is not specific to it: the decision- point contract that exposes the engine to agents is reusable across verifiable rule systems. Existing social-simulation work emphasizes persona fidelity and synthetic opinion, but lacks a verifiable rules engine with replay-checkable mechanics and private-channel negotiation. WOPR supplies that engine, and its contract makes every strategic choice an explicit agent decision. The method is agnostic to social-simulation frameworks; we adopt Concordia as the default harness for driving the game. On the same engine, WOPR layers a four-rung press ladder from silence to private single- recipient channels with structured commitments, and instantiates each faction as a collective command-and-control system rather than a single agent. We make all code, example configurations, and replay data publicly available at https://github.com/eilab-gt/wopr.
Scalable decision-making for games of imperfect information
Real-world decision-making generally involves hidden information, that is, information that is unknown to one agent but possessed by another. Unfortunately, the presence of large amounts of hidden information renders established reinforcement learning and search approaches ineffective. Even with multimillion-dollar industrial research efforts1, top-human-level play at Stratego—a board wargame with hidden information on a massive scale—has remained beyond the reach of artificial intelligence (AI). Here we introduce Ataraxos, an AI for Stratego based on general techniques that we developed for both self-play reinforcement learning and test-time search under hidden information. Ataraxos defeated the most decorated human Stratego player of all time by a large margin—achieving, to our knowledge, the first superhuman result in the game’s history—while consuming orders of magnitude less compute and data than previous efforts. Using the same techniques, we built a superhuman AI for Barrage Stratego and state-of-the-art AIs for Hanabi and dou dizhu, all with low cost and high sample efficiency. The success of this approach across adversarial, cooperative and team games establishes a design pattern for reinforcement learning and search that is effective under large amounts of hidden information, a longstanding desideratum of the field of strategic decision-making.
17. A Value for n-Person Games
17. A Value for n-Person Games was published in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume II on page 307.
Planning with Agents: Divided Worlds, Boundary Objects, and Thicker Interfaces
Why we need richer, thicker interfaces and better boundary objects for collaborative planning with agents
Planning with Agents: Divided Worlds, Boundary Objects, and Thicker Interfaces
Why we need richer, thicker interfaces and better boundary objects for collaborative planning with agents
Look-ahead Reasoning with a Learned Model in Imperfect Information Games
Test-time reasoning significantly enhances pre-trained AI agents' performance. However, it requires an explicit environment model, often unavailable or overly complex in real-world scenarios....
Algorithmic Collective Action in Machine Learning
We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm's learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an algorithmic strategy by instructing participants how to modify their own data to achieve a collective goal. We investigate the consequences of this model in three fundamental learning-theoretic settings: the case of a nonparametric optimal learning algorithm, a parametric risk minimizer, and gradient-based optimization. In each setting, we come up with coordinated algorithmic strategies and characterize natural success criteria as a function of the collective's size. Complementing our theory, we conduct systematic experiments on a skill classification task involving tens of thousands of resumes from a gig platform for freelancers. Through more than two thousand model training runs of a BERT-like language model, we see a striking correspondence emerge between our empirical observations and the predictions made by our theory. Taken together, our theory and experiments broadly support the conclusion that algorithmic collectives of exceedingly small fractional size can exert significant control over a platform's learning algorithm.