Addressing the Precision-Breadth-Simplicity Impossible Trinity in Psychological Research: A Comprehensive Exploration Approach

Psychological research faces a fundamental challenge—the Precision-Breadth-Simplicity (PBS) impossible trinity. While experimental findings are often precise and simple, they tend to be narrow in scope. Conversely, broad-and-simple concepts frequently lack precision. Developing theories that are both precise and broad is scientifically valuable but inevitably introduces complexity, which conflicts with humans’ cognitive limitations in processing complexity. To address this impossible trinity, I propose a comprehensive exploration (CE) approach—a data-guided theory-building framework that involves: (1) designing experimental conditions in a stimulus-driven way, with minimal upfront theoretical specification; (2) conducting experiments with tens of millions of observations (e.g., 40 million responses in Huang, 2025a); (3) modeling the results through iterative improvements; and (4) producing the outcome: a moderately complex quantitative information-processing model to integrate diverse empirical findings. Inspired by similar strategies that drove breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (e.g., ImageNet’s role in advancing object recognition), the CE approach offers a promising path toward more integrative psychological theories. Initial implementations in visual working memory research demonstrate both its practicality and potential to transform how we study mental processes.

You and Your Research

Transcription of the Bell Communications Research Colloquium Seminar 7 March 1986

Against theory-motivated experimentation: Can random experimental choice lead to better theories?

Scientists must choose which among many experiments to perform. We study the epistemic success of experimental choice strategies proposed by philosophers of science or executed by scientists themselves. We develop a multi-agent model of the scientific process that jointly formalizes its core aspects: active experimentation, theorizing, and social learning. We find that agents who choose new experiments at random develop the most informative and predictive theories of the world. The agents aiming to confirm, falsify theories, or resolve theoretical disagreements end up with an illusion of epistemic success: they develop promising accounts for the data they collected, while misrepresenting the ground truth that they intended to learn about. Agents experimenting in these theory-motivated ways acquire less diverse or less representative samples from the ground truth that also turn out to be easier to account for. Random data collection, on the other hand, combines virtues of diverse and representative sampling from a target scientific domain which enables cumulative development of the successful theoretical accounts of it. We suggest that randomization, already a gold standard within experiments, is also beneficial at the level of experiments themselves.

Excess Capacity Learning

We introduce a new framework for understanding how cognitive systems (e.g., humans) learn from experience, based on the concept of representational capacity—the relative amount of representational resources devoted to encoding past experiences. Most paradigms in cognitive science have operated under the assumption that these resources are constrained, forcing cognitive systems to compress rich and noisy experiences to effectively generalize to new situations. We leverage recent advances in computer science to outline the implications of learning with excess capacity, or applying even more representational resources than needed to perfectly memorize all the details of one’s past experiences. In particular, we review evidence suggesting that excess capacity systems can exhibit many of the characteristics of human learning, such as the simultaneous ability to memorize individual experiences and generalize knowledge to new situations. We define and differentiate between constrained (not enough), sufficient (just enough), and excess (more than enough to perfectly capture all the details of one’s past experiences) capacity. We derive empirical properties of learning in each of these capacity regimes, and compare these predictions to effects documented for human learning. We highlight the broad implications of this framework for advancing theoretical and empirical work across cognitive, clinical, and developmental psychology.

Papers and patents are becoming less disruptive over time

Theories of scientific and technological change view discovery and invention as endogenous processes1,2, wherein previous accumulated knowledge enables future progress by allowing researchers to, in Newton’s words, ‘stand on the shoulders of giants’3–7. Recent decades have witnessed exponential growth in the volume of new scientific and technological knowledge, thereby creating conditions that should be ripe for major advances8,9. Yet contrary to this view, studies suggest that progress is slowing in several major fields10,11. Here, we analyse these claims at scale across six decades, using data on 45 million papers and 3.9 million patents from six large-scale datasets, together with a new quantitative metric—the CD index12—that characterizes how papers and patents change networks of citations in science and technology. We find that papers and patents are increasingly less likely to break with the past in ways that push science and technology in new directions. This pattern holds universally across fields and is robust across multiple different citation- and text-based metrics1,13–17. Subsequently, we link this decline in disruptiveness to a narrowing in the use of previous knowledge, allowing us to reconcile the patterns we observe with the ‘shoulders of giants’ view. We find that the observed declines are unlikely to be driven by changes in the quality of published science, citation practices or field-specific factors. Overall, our results suggest that slowing rates of disruption may reflect a fundamental shift in the nature of science and technology.

Maybe scientific progress isn’t slowing, after all

A new paper takes aim at the claim that science has become less disruptive

AI agents are checking the scientific literature — and spotting decades-old errors

The technology is proving adept at finding faults in decades-old papers and reference databases.

How and When to Involve Crowds in Scientific Research - The Book

This book explores how millions of people can significantly contribute to scientific research. Discover main elements, authors, and who this book is for and why.

Knowledge Collapse

AI companies are racing to mechanize mathematics. Where does that leave human understanding?

On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models

AI is undergoing a paradigm shift with the rise of models (e.g., BERT, DALL-E, GPT-3) that are trained on broad data at scale and are adaptable to a wide range of downstream tasks. We call these models foundation models to underscore their critically central yet incomplete character. This report provides a thorough account of the opportunities and risks of foundation models, ranging from their capabilities (e.g., language, vision, robotics, reasoning, human interaction) and technical principles(e.g., model architectures, training procedures, data, systems, security, evaluation, theory) to their applications (e.g., law, healthcare, education) and societal impact (e.g., inequity, misuse, economic and environmental impact, legal and ethical considerations). Though foundation models are based on standard deep learning and transfer learning, their scale results in new emergent capabilities,and their effectiveness across so many tasks incentivizes homogenization. Homogenization provides powerful leverage but demands caution, as the defects of the foundation model are inherited by all the adapted models downstream. Despite the impending widespread deployment of foundation models, we currently lack a clear understanding of how they work, when they fail, and what they are even capable of due to their emergent properties. To tackle these questions, we believe much of the critical research on foundation models will require deep interdisciplinary collaboration commensurate with their fundamentally sociotechnical nature.

Science in the Age of Algorithms

Founded in 1920, the NBER is a private, non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to conducting economic research and to disseminating research findings among academics, public policy makers, and business professionals.

Language agents achieve superhuman synthesis of scientific knowledge

Language models are known to hallucinate incorrect information, and it is unclear if they are sufficiently accurate and reliable for use in scientific research. We developed a rigorous human-AI comparison methodology to evaluate language model agents on real-world literature search tasks covering information retrieval, summarization, and contradiction detection tasks. We show that PaperQA2, a frontier language model agent optimized for improved factuality, matches or exceeds subject matter expert performance on three realistic literature research tasks without any restrictions on humans (i.e., full access to internet, search tools, and time). PaperQA2 writes cited, Wikipedia-style summaries of scientific topics that are significantly more accurate than existing, human-written Wikipedia articles. We also introduce a hard benchmark for scientific literature research called LitQA2 that guided design of PaperQA2, leading to it exceeding human performance. Finally, we apply PaperQA2 to identify contradictions within the scientific literature, an important scientific task that is challenging for humans. PaperQA2 identifies 2.34 +/- 1.99 contradictions per paper in a random subset of biology papers, of which 70% are validated by human experts. These results demonstrate that language model agents are now capable of exceeding domain experts across meaningful tasks on scientific literature.

Scientific production in the era of Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly reshaping scientific research. We analyze these changes in multiple, large-scale datasets with 2.1M preprints, 28K peer review reports, and 246M online accesses to scientific documents. We find: 1) scientists adopting LLMs to draft manuscripts demonstrate a large increase in paper production, ranging from 23.7-89.3% depending on scientific field and author background, 2) LLM use has reversed the relationship between writing complexity and paper quality, leading to an influx of manuscripts that are linguistically complex but substantively underwhelming, and 3) LLM adopters access and cite more diverse prior work, including books and younger, less-cited documents. These findings highlight a stunning shift in scientific production that will likely require a change in how journals, funding agencies, and tenure committees evaluate scientific works.

Can AI Agents Synthesize Scientific Conclusions?

Scientific AI agents increasingly retrieve evidence, reason across sources, and synthesize conclusions used in consequential decisions. Yet, their ability to do so in high-stakes domains such as health remains unclear. We introduce SciConBench, a large-scale live benchmark of 9.11K questions and expert-written conclusions from systematic reviews to evaluate open-domain scientific conclusion synthesis. The benchmark draws on an expert-validated automated evaluation pipeline that decomposes conclusions into atomic facts and measures correctness and comprehensiveness via factual precision and recall. To mitigate data leakage, we further introduce SciConHarness, a clean-room evaluation harness that equips agents with controlled web interaction to ensure valid measurement. Evaluating 8 frontier models and deep research agents, we find that factual quality remains low: under clean-room settings, the best agent achieves only a factual F1 of 0.337. Our clean-room setting consistently reduces performance relative to unconstrained evaluation, suggesting that leakage inflates estimates of models' true synthesis capabilities. Finally, we audit consumer-facing agents (e.g., Google AI Overview, OpenEvidence) and find they frequently generate incomplete and sometimes contradictory conclusions, even when the ground-truth answer is available. Overall, our results show that reliable synthesis of scientific conclusions remains an open challenge, and that clean-room evaluation is essential for assessing open-domain AI agents.

Unequal Scientific Recognition in the Age of LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) are reshaping how scientific knowledge is accessed and represented. This study evaluates the extent to which popular and frontier LLMs including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Gemini 1.5 Pro recognize scientists, benchmarking their outputs against OpenAlex and Wikipedia. Using a dataset focusing on 100,000 physicists from OpenAlex to evaluate LLM recognition, we uncover substantial disparities: LLMs exhibit selective and inconsistent recognition patterns. Recognition correlates strongly with scholarly impact such as citations, and remains uneven across gender and geography. Women researchers, and researchers from Africa, Asia, and Latin America are significantly underrecognized. We further examine the role of training data provenance, identifying Wikipedia as a potential sources that contributes to recognition gaps. Our findings highlight how LLMs can reflect, and potentially amplify existing disparities in science, underscoring the need for more transparent and inclusive knowledge systems.

Thoughts about the Leiden Declaration

Last September I went to a workshop at the Lorentz Centre in Leiden to discuss mathematics and AI with historians, philosophers, computer scientists, AI researchers, and mathematicians of several d…

Could AI slow science?

Confronting the production-progress paradox