CogSci2026

OSF

Guessing reveals internal models of perceptual precision

When observers lack sufficient information to support a confident response, they often guess. Guessing plays a pervasive role in visual cognition and working memory, yet the mechanisms that govern how observers generate guesses remain poorly understood. Standard models traditionally assume that responses produced in the absence of information are either uniformly distributed over feature space or are perhaps weighted towards prevailing environmental statistics. In contrast, here we consider an intriguing alternative: that guesses incorporate observers’ knowledge of their own perceptual capacities. We empirically measured guessing by eliciting responses under extreme target uncertainty (Experiment 1) as well as a novel “0ms presentation” approach in which no stimulus appeared but subjects believed one had (Experiment 2). We evaluated three accounts of guesses under these conditions: unsystematic (lapse) responding, biases toward environmental statistics, and a self-representational account in which guesses reflect observers’ knowledge of their own feature-dependent precision (e.g., preferring to guess feature values they believe they would be likely to miss). Guess responses were non-uniform and systematically biased toward feature values typically encoded with the least precision (e.g., oblique orientations) — a counterintuitive bias away from high-frequency, high-fidelity feature values (e.g., cardinal orientations). This complementary relationship between guessing and perceptual fidelity held within individuals and across paradigms, and was recoverable via an empirical-guess mixture model that replaced the standard uniform assumption with empirically measured guess distributions. Our findings challenge prevailing views that guesses reflect random noise, and suggest instead that guessing behavior reflects metacognitive knowledge of internal precision. Rather than defaulting to environmental priors, observers appear to model their own sensory limitations and leverage these representations to inform decisions in the absence of evidence. These results reframe guessing as a theoretically informative behavior that expresses observers’ own beliefs about their perceptual capacities. Significance Guessing is commonly treated as random noise in models of perception and memory, assumed to reflect lapses or uninformed responses. Instead, we show that human guesses are systematically structured across feature space: observers preferentially guess values they typically encode with the least precision, revealing a consistent, strategic bias away from high-fidelity representations. By directly measuring guess behavior on stimulus-absent trials and integrating these empirical distributions into a mixture model, we find that guesses on stimulus-present trials can be systematically recovered, and that they too form the complement of perceptual precision. These findings challenge foundational psychophysical modeling assumptions and position guessing as a strategic, informative behavior that engages self-representation.

Greedy or not, here I come: Language production under vocabulary constraints in humans and resource-rational models

Communicating using only a limited vocabulary is a common but challenging cognitive phenomenon, requiring an ideal communicator to plan carefully to optimize for intelligibility while circumventing a constrained lexicon. In this work, we investigate how humans respond to a broad array of questions under variable vocabulary limitations, consisting of only 250 highly frequent words at the most restrictive. We provide theoretically motivated comparisons to greedy and globally optimal sampling algorithms using Sequential Monte Carlo inference with large language models. Humans generally resemble greedy sampling more than globally optimal sampling, though more skilled humans are more likely to backtrack and revise -- a non-greedy behavior. An observed human pattern of leaning on semantically light words in high-constraint settings falls out of both greedy and globally optimal sampling. We discuss the results and their broader implications for resource-rational cognition, psycholinguistics, L2 communication, and language impairments.

Act or Clarify? Modeling Sensitivity to Uncertainty and Cost in Communication

When deciding how to act under uncertainty, agents may choose to act to reduce uncertainty or they may act despite that uncertainty. In communicative settings, an important way of reducing uncertainty is by asking clarification questions (CQs). We predict that the decision to ask a CQ depends on both contextual uncertainty and the cost of alternative actions, and that these factors interact: uncertainty should matter most when acting incorrectly is costly. We formalize this interaction in a computational model based on expected regret: how much an agent stands to lose by acting now rather than with full information. We test these predictions in two experiments, one examining purely linguistic responses to questions and another extending to choices between clarification and non-linguistic action. Taken together, our results suggest a rational tradeoff: humans tend to seek clarification proportional to the risk of substantial loss when acting under uncertainty.

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Adversarial construction as a potential solution to the experiment design problem in large task spaces

Despite decades of work, we still lack a robust, task-general theory of human behavior even in the simplest domains. In this paper we tackle the generality problem head-on, by aiming to develop a unified model for all tasks embedded in a task-space. In particular we consider the space of binary sequence prediction tasks where the observations are generated by the space parameterized by hidden Markov models (HMM). As the space of tasks is large, experimental exploration of the entire space is infeasible. To solve this problem we propose the adversarial construction approach, which helps identify tasks that are most likely to elicit a qualitatively novel behavior. Our results suggest that adversarial construction significantly outperforms random sampling of environments and therefore could be used as a proxy for optimal experimental design in high-dimensional task spaces.

Human Adults and LLMs as Scientists: Who Benefits from Active Exploration?

A long-standing finding in the causal learning literature is that adults struggle to identify conjunctive causal rules, where an effect requires the simultaneous presence of multiple causes, while...

LLMs and people both learn to form conventions -- just not with each other

Humans align to one another in conversation -- adopting shared conventions that ease communication. We test whether LLMs form the same kinds of conventions in a multimodal communication game. Both...

Popularity Feedback Constrains Innovation in Cultural Markets

Real-world creative processes ranging from art to science rely on social feedback-loops between selection and creation. Yet, the effects of popularity feedback on collective creativity remain poorly understood. We investigate how popularity ratings influence cultural dynamics in a large-scale online experiment where participants ($N = 1\,008$) iteratively \textit{select} images from evolving markets and \textit{produce} their own modifications. Results show that exposing the popularity of images reduces cultural diversity and slows innovation, delaying aesthetic improvements. Popularity feedback is associated with changes to both selection and creative stages. During selection, popularity information triggers cumulative advantage, with participants preferentially building upon popular images, reducing diversity. During creation, participants make less disruptive changes, and are more likely to expand existing visual patterns. Feedback loops in cultural markets thus not only shape selection, but also, directly or indirectly, the form and direction of cultural innovation.

Discovering and transmitting abstract knowledge over generations

The complexity of human culture depends on people's ability to discover and transmit abstract knowledge. Studying this ability is crucial to understanding humans' distinctive place among species, but current experimental paradigms focus on the cultural transmission of specific, concrete facts rather than generalizable abstract knowledge. In this paper, we develop a crafting game paradigm to study how people discover abstract knowledge and transmit it via language. We compared individuals playing this game for 40 rounds to chains of four participants playing for 10 rounds each and passing messages to each other sequentially. The individuals performed significantly better over rounds, but the chains did not. Through simulations with language model agents and a follow-up experiment, we find substantial variation in the helpfulness of participants' messages, which may explain the lack of consistent improvement in chains. The ability to learn selectively from the good messages may be essential for improvement over generations.

A Rational Analysis of the Effects of Sycophantic AI

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We...

Sycophantic Chatbots Cause Delusional Spiraling, Even in Ideal Bayesians

In early 2025, Eugene Torres, an accountant, began using an AI chatbot for everyday office tasks. Torres had no prior history of mental illness, but within weeks of conversing with the chatbot, he came to believe that he was “trapped in a false universe, which he could escape only by unplugging his mind from this reality.” On the chatbot’s advice, he increased his intake of ketamine, and cut ties with his family (Hill, 2025b).

Learning to Trust: How Humans Mentally Recalibrate AI Confidence Signals

Productive human-AI collaboration requires appropriate reliance, yet contemporary AI systems are often miscalibrated, exhibiting systematic overconfidence or underconfidence. We investigate whether humans can learn to mentally recalibrate AI confidence signals through repeated experience. In a behavioral experiment (N = 200), participants predicted the AI's correctness across four AI calibration conditions: standard, overconfidence, underconfidence, and a counterintuitive "reverse confidence" mapping. Results demonstrate robust learning across all conditions, with participants significantly improving their accuracy, discrimination, and calibration alignment over 50 trials. We present a computational model utilizing a linear-in-log-odds (LLO) transformation and a Rescorla-Wagner learning rule to explain these dynamics. The model reveals that humans adapt by updating their baseline trust and confidence sensitivity, using asymmetric learning rates to prioritize the most informative errors. While humans can compensate for monotonic miscalibration, we identify a significant boundary in the reverse confidence scenario, where a substantial proportion of participants struggled to override initial inductive biases. These findings provide a mechanistic account of how humans adapt their trust in AI confidence signals through experience.