Towards Post-Interaction Computing: Addressing Immediacy, (un)Intentionality, Instability and Interaction Effects

The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness

Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view fundamentally mischaracterizes how physics relates to information. We call this mistake the Abstraction Fallacy. Tracing the causal origins of abstraction reveals that symbolic computation is not an intrinsic physical process. Instead, it is a mapmaker-dependent description. It requires an active, experiencing cognitive agent to alphabetize continuous physics into a finite set of meaningful states. Consequently, we do not need a complete, finalized theory of consciousness to assess AI sentience—a demand that simply pushes the question beyond near-term resolution and deepens the AI welfare trap. What we actually need is a rigorous ontology of computation. The framework proposed here explicitly separates simulation (behavioral mimicry driven by vehicle causality) from instantiation (intrinsic physical constitution driven by content causality). Establishing this ontological boundary shows why algorithmic symbol manipulation is structurally incapable of instantiating experience. Crucially, this argument does not rely on biological exclusivity. If an artificial system were ever conscious, it would be because of its specific physical constitution, never its syntactic architecture. Ultimately, this framework offers a physically grounded refutation of computational functionalism to resolve the current uncertainty surrounding AI consciousness.

Verbalizable Representations Form a Global Workspace in Language Models

If the mind is an ocean, we spend our lives floating at the surface. Beneath us, an enormous amount of processing takes place without our knowledge: our visual systems parsing the contours of a face, our motor circuits maintaining our posture. At any given moment, only a small fraction of this neural activity is accessible to us. Yet it is this privileged sliver of activity that we rely on to reason deliberately: to plan what ingredients to buy for a recipe, or to puzzle out why an engine won’t start. Such thoughts can be articulated out loud, deliberately held in mind, and brought to bear on whatever task the moment demands. This distinction, between our accessible thoughts and our unconscious processing, is perhaps the most striking feature of human cognition.

Verbalizable Representations Form a Global Workspace in Language Models

If the mind is an ocean, we spend our lives floating at the surface. Beneath us, an enormous amount of processing takes place without our knowledge: our visual systems parsing the contours of a face, our motor circuits maintaining our posture. At any given moment, only a small fraction of this neural activity is accessible to us. Yet it is this privileged sliver of activity that we rely on to reason deliberately: to plan what ingredients to buy for a recipe, or to puzzle out why an engine won’t start. Such thoughts can be articulated out loud, deliberately held in mind, and brought to bear on whatever task the moment demands. This distinction, between our accessible thoughts and our unconscious processing, is perhaps the most striking feature of human cognition.

Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilPapers

Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...

Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilArchive

Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...

The brain is a computer is a brain: neuroscience's internal debate and the social significance of the Computational Metaphor

The Computational Metaphor, comparing the brain to the computer and vice versa, is the most prominent metaphor in neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI). Its appropriateness is highly debated in both fields, particularly with regards to whether it is useful for the advancement of science and technology. Considerably less attention, however, has been devoted to how the Computational Metaphor is used outside of the lab, and particularly how it may shape society's interactions with AI. As such, recently publicized concerns over AI's role in perpetuating racism, genderism, and ableism suggest that the term "artificial intelligence" is misplaced, and that a new lexicon is needed to describe these computational systems. Thus, there is an essential question about the Computational Metaphor that is rarely asked by neuroscientists: whom does it help and whom does it harm? This essay invites the neuroscience community to consider the social implications of the field's most controversial metaphor.

Design Frictions for Mindful Interactions: The Case for Microboundaries

Design frictions, a term found in popular media articles about user experience design, refer to points of difficulty occurring during interaction with technology. Such articles often argue that these frictions should be removed from interaction flows in order to reduce the risk of user frustration and disengagement. In this paper we argue that, in many scenarios, designing friction into interactions through the introduction of microboundaries, can, in fact, have positive effects. Design frictions can disrupt "mindless" automatic interactions, prompting moments of reflection and more "mindful" interaction. The potential advantages of intentionally introduced frictions are numerous: from reducing the likelihood of errors in data-entry tasks, to supporting health-behaviour change.

Metacognitive Design

What does this moment need?

Revisiting creative behaviour as an epistemic process: lessons from 12 computational artists and designers | Proceedings of the 35th Australian Computer-Human Interaction Conference

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Thinking modes

Floating in linguistic space.

Why sycophantic LLMs may imperil interactive norms between humans

Interactions with conversational AI are effortless by design—instant, compliant, and largely consequence-free. Human communication norms, by contrast, evolved under conditions of reciprocity and social accountability. We propose that repeated engagement with conversational AI systems may produce norm leakage: the cross-context carryover of instrumental communicative habits acquired in human–AI exchanges into subsequent human–human interaction. Emerging experimental evidence suggests short-term spillover effects on social judgment and behavior, including harsher evaluations, reduced cooperation, and diminished perceived humanness. Preliminary longitudinal findings are consistent with the possibility that such exposure may shape communicative habits over time, although the durability and real-world magnitude of these effects remain unclear. We further propose that sycophantic alignment may amplify norm leakage by reinforcing instrumental interaction styles. At stake, then, is the possibility that repeated engagement with highly compliant artificial agents could subtly influence users’ communicative expectations and interpersonal judgments.