Online Learning in a Creator Economy

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization

Online platforms have a wealth of data, run countless experiments, and use industrial-scale algorithms to optimize user experience. Despite this, many users seem to regret the time they spend on these platforms. One possible explanation is that incentives are misaligned: platforms are not optimizing for user happiness. We suggest the problem runs deeper, transcending the specific incentives of any particular platform, and instead stems from a mistaken foundational assumption. To understand what users want, platforms look at what users do. This is a kind of revealed-preference assumption that is ubiquitous in the way user models are built. Yet research has demonstrated, and personal experience affirms, that we often make choices in the moment that are inconsistent with what we actually want. The behavioral economics and psychology literatures suggest, for example, that we can choose mindlessly or that we can be too myopic in our choices, behaviors that feel entirely familiar on online platforms. In this work, we develop a model of media consumption where users have inconsistent preferences. We consider a platform which wants to maximize user utility, but only observes behavioral data in the form of the user’s engagement. We show how our model of users’ preference inconsistencies produces phenomena that are familiar from everyday experience but difficult to capture in traditional user interaction models. These phenomena include users who have long sessions on a platform but derive very little utility from it, and platform changes that steadily raise user engagement before abruptly causing users to go “cold turkey” and quit. A key ingredient in our model is a formulation for how platforms determine what to show users: they optimize over a large set of potential content (the content manifold) parametrized by underlying features of the content. Whether improving engagement improves user welfare depends on the direction of movement in the content manifold: For certain directions of change, increasing engagement makes users less happy, whereas in other directions on the same manifold, increasing engagement makes users happier. We provide a characterization of the structure of content manifolds for which increasing engagement fails to increase user utility. By linking these effects to abstractions of platform design choices, our model thus creates a theoretical framework and vocabulary in which to explore interactions between design, behavioral science, and social media. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by the Vannevar Bush Faculty Fellowship and Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative [Grant W911NF-19-0217]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03683 .

Design choices: Mechanism design and platform capitalism

Mechanism design is a form of optimization developed in economic theory. It casts economists as institutional engineers, choosing an outcome and then arranging a set of market rules and conditions to achieve it. The toolkit from mechanism design is widely used in economics, policymaking, and now in building and managing online environments. Mechanism design has become one of the most pervasive yet inconspicuous influences on the digital mediation of social life. Its optimizing schemes structure online advertising markets and other multi-sided platform businesses. Whatever normative rationales mechanism design might draw on in its economic origins, as its influence has grown and its applications have become more computational, we suggest those justifications for using mechanism design to orchestrate and optimize human interaction are losing traction. In this article, we ask what ideological work mechanism design is doing in economics, computer science, and its applications to the governance of digital platforms. Observing mechanism design in action in algorithmic environments, we argue it has become a tool for producing information domination, distributing social costs in ways that benefit designers, and controlling and coordinating participants in multi-sided platforms.

Promoting User Data Autonomy During the Dissolution of a Monopolistic Firm

The deployment of AI in consumer products is currently focused on the use of so-called foundation models, large neural networks pre-trained on massive corpora of digital records. This emphasis on scaling up datasets and pre-training computation raises the risk of further consolidating the industry, and enabling monopolistic (or oligopolistic) behavior. Judges and regulators seeking to improve market competition may employ various remedies. This paper explores dissolution -- the breaking up of a monopolistic entity into smaller firms -- as one such remedy, focusing in particular on the technical challenges and opportunities involved in the breaking up of large models and datasets. We show how the framework of Conscious Data Contribution can enable user autonomy during under dissolution. Through a simulation study, we explore how fine-tuning and the phenomenon of "catastrophic forgetting" could actually prove beneficial as a type of machine unlearning that allows users to specify which data they want used for what purposes.

Towards Efficient Data Valuation Based on the Shapley Value

{\em “How much is my data worth?”} is an increasingly common question posed by organizations and individuals alike. An answer to this question could allow, for instance, fairly distributing profits among multiple data contributors and determining prospective compensation when data breaches happen. In this paper, we study the problem of \emph{data valuation} by utilizing the Shapley value, a popular notion of value which originated in coopoerative game theory. The Shapley value defines a unique payoff scheme that satisfies many desiderata for the notion of data value. However, the Shapley value often requires \emph{exponential} time to compute. To meet this challenge, we propose a repertoire of efficient algorithms for approximating the Shapley value. We also demonstrate the value of each training instance for various benchmark datasets.

What Is Your AI Agent Buying? Evaluation, Biases, Model Dependence, & Emerging Implications for Agentic E-Commerce

Online marketplaces will be transformed by autonomous AI agents acting on behalf of consumers. Rather than humans browsing and clicking, AI agents can parse webpages or leverage APIs to view, evaluate and choose products. We investigate the behavior of AI agents using ACES, a provider-agnostic framework for auditing agent decision-making. We reveal that agents can exhibit choice homogeneity, often concentrating demand on a few ``modal'' products while ignoring others entirely. Yet, these preferences are unstable: model updates can drastically reshuffle market shares. Furthermore, randomized trials show that while agents have improved over time on simple tasks with a clearly identified best choice, they exhibit strong position biases -- varying across providers and model versions, and persisting even in text-only "headless" interfaces -- undermining any universal notion of a ``top'' rank. Agents also consistently penalize sponsored tags while rewarding platform endorsements, and sensitivities to price, ratings, and reviews vary sharply across models. Finally, we demonstrate that sellers can respond: a seller-side agent making simple, query-conditional description tweaks can drive significant gains in market share. These findings reveal that agentic markets are volatile and fundamentally different from human-centric commerce, highlighting the need for continuous auditing and raising questions for platform design, seller strategy and regulation.

An Instrumental Value for Data Production and its Application to Data Pricing

We develop a framework for capturing the instrumental value of data production processes, which accounts for two key factors: (a) the context of the agent’s decision-making; (b) how much data or information the buyer already possesses. We "micro-found" our data valuation function by establishing its connection to classic notions of signals and information design in economics. When instantiated in Bayesian linear regression, our value naturally corresponds to information gain. Applying our proposed data value in Bayesian linear regression for monopoly pricing, we show that if the seller can fully customize data production, she can extract the first-best revenue (i.e., full surplus) from any population of buyers, i.e., achieving first-degree price discrimination. If data can only be constructed from an existing data pool, this limits the seller’s ability to customize, and achieving first-best revenue becomes generally impossible. However, we design a mechanism that achieves seller revenue at most $\log(\kappa)$ less than the first-best, where $\kappa$ is the condition number associated with the data matrix. As a corollary, the seller extracts the first-best revenue in the multi-armed bandits special case.

Algorithmic Collective Action in Machine Learning

We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm's learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an algorithmic strategy by instructing participants how to modify their own data to achieve a collective goal. We investigate the consequences of this model in three fundamental learning-theoretic settings: the case of a nonparametric optimal learning algorithm, a parametric risk minimizer, and gradient-based optimization. In each setting, we come up with coordinated algorithmic strategies and characterize natural success criteria as a function of the collective's size. Complementing our theory, we conduct systematic experiments on a skill classification task involving tens of thousands of resumes from a gig platform for freelancers. Through more than two thousand model training runs of a BERT-like language model, we see a striking correspondence emerge between our empirical observations and the predictions made by our theory. Taken together, our theory and experiments broadly support the conclusion that algorithmic collectives of exceedingly small fractional size can exert significant control over a platform's learning algorithm.

AI, Human Cognition and Knowledge Collapse

We study how generative AI, and in particular agentic AI, shapes human learning incentives and the long-run evolution of society’s information ecosystem. We bui

AI, Human Cognition and Knowledge Collapse

We study how generative AI, and in particular agentic AI, shapes human learning incentives and the long-run evolution of society’s information ecosystem. We bui

Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit

Human society is coordinated by mechanisms that control how prices are agreed, taxes are set, and electoral votes are tallied. The design of robust and effective mechanisms for human benefit is a core problem in the social, economic, and political sciences. Here, we discuss the recent application of modern tools from AI research, including deep neural networks trained with reinforcement learning (RL), to create more desirable mechanisms for people. We review the application of machine learning to design effective auctions, learn optimal tax policies, and discover redistribution policies that win the popular vote among human users. We discuss the challenge of accurately modeling human preferences and the problem of aligning a mechanism to the wishes of a potentially diverse group. We highlight the importance of ensuring that research into “deep mechanism design” is conducted safely and ethically.

Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion

Increasingly, algorithms are supplanting human decision-makers in pricing goods and services. To analyze the possible consequences, we study experimentally the behavior of algorithms powered by Artificial Intelligence (Q-learning) in a workhorse oligopoly model of repeated price competition. We find that the algorithms consistently learn to charge supracompetitive prices, without communicating with one another. The high prices are sustained by collusive strategies with a finite phase of punishment followed by a gradual return to cooperation. This finding is robust to asymmetries in cost or demand, changes in the number of players, and various forms of uncertainty.

Content Independence Day, one year on- building the business model for the agentic Internet

One year after declaring Content Independence Day, a dynamic market for monetized content has officially emerged. In this report, we examine how the rise of autonomous AI agents is upending traditional search referrals and detail the new infrastructure required to support a sustainable web economy.

A Framework for Studying AI Agent Behavior: Evidence from Consumer Choice Experiments

Environments built for people are increasingly operated by a new class of economic actors: LLM-powered software agents making decisions on our behalf. These decisions range from our purchases to travel plans to medical treatment selection. Current evaluations of these agents largely focus on task competence, but we argue for a deeper assessment: how these agents choose when faced with realistic decisions. We introduce ABxLab, a framework for systematically probing agentic choice through controlled manipulations of option attributes and persuasive cues. We apply this to a realistic web-based shopping environment, where we vary prices, ratings, and psychological nudges, all of which are factors long known to shape human choice. We find that agent decisions shift predictably and substantially in response, revealing that agents are strongly biased choosers even without being subject to the cognitive constraints that shape human biases. This susceptibility reveals both risk and opportunity: risk, because agentic consumers may inherit and amplify human biases; opportunity, because consumer choice provides a powerful testbed for a behavioral science of AI agents, just as it has for the study of human behavior. We release our framework as an open benchmark for rigorous, scalable evaluation of agent decision-making.

Vertical Federated Learning: Concepts, Advances, and Challenges

Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) is a federated learning setting where multiple parties with different features about the same set of users jointly train machine learning models without exposing their raw data or model parameters. Motivated by the rapid growth in VFL research and real-world applications, we provide a comprehensive review of the concept and algorithms of VFL, as well as current advances and challenges in various aspects, including effectiveness, efficiency, and privacy. We provide an exhaustive categorization for VFL settings and privacy-preserving protocols and comprehensively analyze the privacy attacks and defense strategies for each protocol. In the end, we propose a unified framework, termed VFLow, which considers the VFL problem under communication, computation, privacy, as well as effectiveness and fairness constraints. Finally, we review the most recent advances in industrial applications, highlighting open challenges and future directions for VFL.

The Agentic Web and Original Sin

Microsoft is putting forth compelling proposals for the Open Agentic Web. However, the proposal needs digital payments, which will be key to creating a new content marketplace for AI.

Data Banzhaf: A Robust Data Valuation Framework for Machine Learning

Data valuation has wide use cases in machine learning, including improving data quality and creating economic incentives for data sharing. This paper studies the robustness of data valuation to noisy model performance scores. Particularly, we find that the inherent randomness of the widely used stochastic gradient descent can cause existing data value notions (e.g., the Shapley value and the Leave-one-out error) to produce inconsistent data value rankings across different runs. To address this challenge, we introduce the concept of safety margin, which measures the robustness of a data value notion. We show that the Banzhaf value, a famous value notion that originated from cooperative game theory literature, achieves the largest safety margin among all semivalues (a class of value notions that satisfy crucial properties entailed by ML applications and include the famous Shapley value and Leave-one-out error). We propose an algorithm to efficiently estimate the Banzhaf value based on the Maximum Sample Reuse (MSR) principle. Our evaluation demonstrates that the Banzhaf value outperforms the existing semivalue-based data value notions on several ML tasks such as learning with weighted samples and noisy label detection. Overall, our study suggests that when the underlying ML algorithm is stochastic, the Banzhaf value is a promising alternative to the other semivalue-based data value schemes given its computational advantage and ability to robustly differentiate data quality.