An Instrumental Value for Data Production and its Application to Data Pricing

Data Distribution Valuation

Data valuation is a class of techniques for quantitatively assessing the value of data for applications like pricing in data marketplaces. Existing data valuation methods define a value for a discrete dataset. However, in many use cases, users are interested in not only the value of the dataset, but that of the distribution from which the dataset was sampled. For example, consider a buyer trying to evaluate whether to purchase data from different vendors. The buyer may observe (and compare) only a small preview sample from each vendor, to decide which vendor's data distribution is most useful to the buyer and purchase. The core question is how should we compare the values of data distributions from their samples? Under a Huber characterization of the data heterogeneity across vendors, we propose a maximum mean discrepancy (MMD)-based valuation method which enables theoretically principled and actionable policies for comparing data distributions from samples. We empirically demonstrate that our method is sample-efficient and effective in identifying valuable data distributions against several existing baselines, on multiple real-world datasets (e.g., network intrusion detection, credit card fraud detection) and downstream applications (classification, regression).

Towards Efficient Data Valuation Based on the Shapley Value

{\em “How much is my data worth?”} is an increasingly common question posed by organizations and individuals alike. An answer to this question could allow, for instance, fairly distributing profits among multiple data contributors and determining prospective compensation when data breaches happen. In this paper, we study the problem of \emph{data valuation} by utilizing the Shapley value, a popular notion of value which originated in coopoerative game theory. The Shapley value defines a unique payoff scheme that satisfies many desiderata for the notion of data value. However, the Shapley value often requires \emph{exponential} time to compute. To meet this challenge, we propose a repertoire of efficient algorithms for approximating the Shapley value. We also demonstrate the value of each training instance for various benchmark datasets.

Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data

(September 2020) - Data is nonrival: a person's location history, medical records, and driving data can be used by many firms simultaneously. Nonrivalry leads to increasing returns. As a result, there may be social gains to data being used broadly across firms, even in the presence of privacy considerations. Fearing creative destruction, firms may choose to hoard their data, leading to the inefficient use of nonrival data. Giving data property rights to consumers can generate allocations that are close to optimal. Consumers balance their concerns for privacy against the economic gains that come from selling data broadly.

Semivalue-based data valuation is arbitrary and gameable

The game-theoretic notion of the semivalue offers a popular framework for credit attribution and data valuation in machine learning. Semivalues have been proposed for a variety of high-stakes...

Collaborative Causal Inference with Fair Incentives

Collaborative causal inference (CCI) aims to improve the estimation of the causal effect of treatment variables by utilizing data aggregated from multiple self-interested parties. Since their source data are valuable proprietary assets that can be costly or tedious to obtain, every party has to be incentivized to be willing to contribute to the collaboration, such as with a guaranteed fair and sufficiently valuable reward (than performing causal inference on its own). This paper presents a reward scheme designed using the unique statistical properties that are required by causal inference to guarantee certain desirable incentive criteria (e.g., fairness, benefit) for the parties based on their contributions. To achieve this, we propose a data valuation function to value parties’ data for CCI based on the distributional closeness of its resulting treatment effect estimate to that utilizing the aggregated data from all parties. Then, we show how to value the parties’ rewards fairly based on a modified variant of the Shapley value arising from our proposed data valuation for CCI. Finally, the Shapley fair rewards to the parties are realized in the form of improved, stochastically perturbed treatment effect estimates. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our reward scheme using simulated and real-world datasets.

LAVA: Data Valuation without Pre-Specified Learning Algorithms

Traditionally, data valuation is posed as a problem of equitably splitting the validation performance of a learning algorithm among the training data. As a result, the calculated data values depend on many design choices of the underlying learning algorithm. However, this dependence is undesirable for many use cases of data valuation, such as setting priorities over different data sources in a data acquisition process and informing pricing mechanisms in a data marketplace. In these scenarios, data needs to be valued before the actual analysis and the choice of the learning algorithm is still undetermined then. Another side-effect of the dependence is that to assess the value of individual points, one needs to re-run the learning algorithm with and without a point, which incurs a large computation burden. This work leapfrogs over the current limits of data valuation methods by introducing a new framework that can value training data in a way that is oblivious to the downstream learning algorithm. Our main results are as follows. $\textbf{(1)}$ We develop a proxy for the validation performance associated with a training set based on a non-conventional $\textit{class-wise}$ $\textit{Wasserstein distance}$ between the training and the validation set. We show that the distance characterizes the upper bound of the validation performance for any given model under certain Lipschitz conditions. $\textbf{(2)}$ We develop a novel method to value individual data based on the sensitivity analysis of the $\textit{class-wise}$ Wasserstein distance. Importantly, these values can be directly obtained $\textit{for free}$ from the output of off-the-shelf optimization solvers once the Wasserstein distance is computed. $\textbf{(3) }$We evaluate our new data valuation framework over various use cases related to detecting low-quality data and show that, surprisingly, the learning-agnostic feature of our framework enables a $\textit{significant improvement}$ over the state-of-the-art performance while being $\textit{orders of magnitude faster.}$

Data Appraisal Without Data Sharing

One of the most effective approaches to improving the performance of a machine learning model is to procure additional training data. A model owner seeking relevant training data from a data owner needs to appraise the data before acquiring it. However, without a formal agreement, the data owner does not want to share data. The resulting Catch-22 prevents efficient data markets from forming. This paper proposes adding a data appraisal stage that requires no data sharing between data owners and model owners. Specifically, we use multi-party computation to implement an appraisal function computed on private data. The appraised value serves as a guide to facilitate data selection and transaction. We propose an efficient data appraisal method based on forward influence functions that approximates data value through its first-order loss reduction on the current model. The method requires no additional hyper-parameters or re-training. We show that in private, forward influence functions provide an appealing trade-off between high quality appraisal and required computation, in spite of label noise, class imbalance, and missing data. Our work seeks to inspire an open market that incentivizes efficient, equitable exchange of domain-specific training data.

Promoting User Data Autonomy During the Dissolution of a Monopolistic Firm

The deployment of AI in consumer products is currently focused on the use of so-called foundation models, large neural networks pre-trained on massive corpora of digital records. This emphasis on scaling up datasets and pre-training computation raises the risk of further consolidating the industry, and enabling monopolistic (or oligopolistic) behavior. Judges and regulators seeking to improve market competition may employ various remedies. This paper explores dissolution -- the breaking up of a monopolistic entity into smaller firms -- as one such remedy, focusing in particular on the technical challenges and opportunities involved in the breaking up of large models and datasets. We show how the framework of Conscious Data Contribution can enable user autonomy during under dissolution. Through a simulation study, we explore how fine-tuning and the phenomenon of "catastrophic forgetting" could actually prove beneficial as a type of machine unlearning that allows users to specify which data they want used for what purposes.

On the Impact of the Utility in Semivalue-based Data Valuation

Semivalue–based data valuation uses cooperative‐game theory intuitions to assign each data point a value reflecting its contribution to a downstream task. Still, those values depend on the...

A Distributional Framework For Data Valuation

Shapley value is a classic notion from game theory, historically used to quantify the contributions of individuals within groups, and more recently applied to assign values to data points when training machine learning models. Despite its foundational role, a key limitation of the data Shapley framework is that it only provides valuations for points within a fixed data set. It does not account for statistical aspects of the data and does not give a way to reason about points outside the data set. To address these limitations, we propose a novel framework – distributional Shapley– where the value of a point is defined in the context of an underlying data distribution. We prove that distributional Shapley has several desirable statistical properties; for example, the values are stable under perturbations to the data points themselves and to the underlying data distribution. We leverage these properties to develop a new algorithm for estimating values from data, which comes with formal guarantees and runs two orders of magnitude faster than state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the (non distributional) data Shapley values. We apply distributional Shapley to diverse data sets and demonstrate its utility in a data market setting.

Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion

Increasingly, algorithms are supplanting human decision-makers in pricing goods and services. To analyze the possible consequences, we study experimentally the behavior of algorithms powered by Artificial Intelligence (Q-learning) in a workhorse oligopoly model of repeated price competition. We find that the algorithms consistently learn to charge supracompetitive prices, without communicating with one another. The high prices are sustained by collusive strategies with a finite phase of punishment followed by a gradual return to cooperation. This finding is robust to asymmetries in cost or demand, changes in the number of players, and various forms of uncertainty.

Data Banzhaf: A Robust Data Valuation Framework for Machine Learning

Data valuation has wide use cases in machine learning, including improving data quality and creating economic incentives for data sharing. This paper studies the robustness of data valuation to noisy model performance scores. Particularly, we find that the inherent randomness of the widely used stochastic gradient descent can cause existing data value notions (e.g., the Shapley value and the Leave-one-out error) to produce inconsistent data value rankings across different runs. To address this challenge, we introduce the concept of safety margin, which measures the robustness of a data value notion. We show that the Banzhaf value, a famous value notion that originated from cooperative game theory literature, achieves the largest safety margin among all semivalues (a class of value notions that satisfy crucial properties entailed by ML applications and include the famous Shapley value and Leave-one-out error). We propose an algorithm to efficiently estimate the Banzhaf value based on the Maximum Sample Reuse (MSR) principle. Our evaluation demonstrates that the Banzhaf value outperforms the existing semivalue-based data value notions on several ML tasks such as learning with weighted samples and noisy label detection. Overall, our study suggests that when the underlying ML algorithm is stochastic, the Banzhaf value is a promising alternative to the other semivalue-based data value schemes given its computational advantage and ability to robustly differentiate data quality.

Data Banzhaf: A Robust Data Valuation Framework for Machine Learning

Data valuation has wide use cases in machine learning, including improving data quality and creating economic incentives for data sharing. This paper studies the robustness of data valuation to noisy model performance scores. Particularly, we find that the inherent randomness of the widely used stochastic gradient descent can cause existing data value notions (e.g., the Shapley value and the Leave-one-out error) to produce inconsistent data value rankings across different runs. To address this challenge, we introduce the concept of safety margin, which measures the robustness of a data value notion. We show that the Banzhaf value, a famous value notion that originated from cooperative game theory literature, achieves the largest safety margin among all semivalues (a class of value notions that satisfy crucial properties entailed by ML applications and include the famous Shapley value and Leave-one-out error). We propose an algorithm to efficiently estimate the Banzhaf value based on the Maximum Sample Reuse (MSR) principle. Our evaluation demonstrates that the Banzhaf value outperforms the existing semivalue-based data value notions on several ML tasks such as learning with weighted samples and noisy label detection. Overall, our study suggests that when the underlying ML algorithm is stochastic, the Banzhaf value is a promising alternative to the other semivalue-based data value schemes given its computational advantage and ability to robustly differentiate data quality.

“You Will:” A Macroeconomic Analysis of Digital Advertising

Abstract. An information-based model is developed where traditional and digital advertising finance the provision of free media goods and affect price comp

2D-Shapley: A Framework for Fragmented Data Valuation

Data valuation—quantifying the contribution of individual data sources to certain predictive behaviors of a model—is of great importance to enhancing the transparency of machine learning and designing incentive systems for data sharing. Existing work has focused on evaluating data sources with the shared feature or sample space. How to valuate fragmented data sources of which each only contains partial features and samples remains an open question. We start by presenting a method to calculate the counterfactual of removing a fragment from the aggregated data matrix. Based on the counterfactual calculation, we further propose 2D-Shapley, a theoretical framework for fragmented data valuation that uniquely satisfies some appealing axioms in the fragmented data context. 2D-Shapley empowers a range of new use cases, such as selecting useful data fragments, providing interpretation for sample-wise data values, and fine-grained data issue diagnosis.

Online Learning in a Creator Economy

The creator economy is revolutionizing the way in which individuals can profit from their engagement with online platforms. In this paper, we initiate the formal study of online learning in a creator economy by modeling it as a three-party game between users, a platform, and content creators. The platform interacts with creators through contracts under a principal-agent framework and with users via a recommender system. We study how the platform can jointly optimize contracts and recommendation policies in an online learning setting. We analyze return-based and feature-based contracts. Under smoothness assumptions, return-based contracts achieve regret \Theta(T^2/3). For feature-based contracts, we introduce an intrinsic dimension d and prove a regret bound \mathcalO(T^(d+1)/(d+2)), which is tight for linear families.