The levers of political persuasion with conversational artificial intelligence
There are widespread fears that conversational artificial intelligence (AI) could soon exert unprecedented influence over human beliefs. In this work, in three large-scale experiments ( N = 76,977 participants), we deployed 19 large language models (LLMs)—including some post-trained explicitly for persuasion—to evaluate their persuasiveness on 707 political issues. We then checked the factual accuracy of 466,769 resulting LLM claims. We show that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem more from post-training and prompting methods—which boosted persuasiveness by as much as 51 and 27%, respectively—than from personalization or increasing model scale, which had smaller effects. We further show that these methods increased persuasion by exploiting LLMs’ ability to rapidly access and strategically deploy information and that, notably, where they increased AI persuasiveness, they also systematically decreased factual accuracy. , Editor’s summary Many fear that we are on the precipice of unprecedented manipulation by large language models (LLMs), but techniques driving their persuasiveness are poorly understood. In the initial “pretrained” phase, LLMs may exhibit flawed reasoning. Their power unlocks during vital “posttraining,” when developers refine pretrained LLMs to sharpen their reasoning and align with users’ needs. Posttraining also enables LLMs to maintain logical, sophisticated conversations. Hackenburg et al . examined which techniques made diverse, conversational LLMs most persuasive across 707 British political issues (see the Perspective by Argyle). LLMs were most persuasive after posttraining, especially when prompted to use facts and evidence (information) to argue. However, information-dense LLMs produced the most inaccurate claims, raising concerns about the spread of misinformation during rollouts of future models. —Ekeoma Uzogara , INTRODUCTION Rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked widespread concerns about its potential to influence human beliefs. One possibility is that conversational AI could be used to manipulate public opinion on political issues through interactive dialogue. Despite extensive speculation, however, fundamental questions about the actual mechanisms, or “levers,” responsible for driving advances in AI persuasiveness—e.g., computational power or sophisticated training techniques—remain largely unanswered. In this work, we systematically investigate these levers and chart the horizon of persuasiveness with conversational AI. RATIONALE We considered multiple factors that could enhance the persuasiveness of conversational AI: raw computational power (model scale), specialized post-training methods for persuasion, personalization to individual users, and instructed rhetorical strategies. Across three large-scale experiments with 76,977 total UK participants, we deployed 19 large language models (LLMs) to persuade on 707 political issues while varying these factors independently. We also analyzed more than 466,000 AI-generated claims, examining the relationship between persuasiveness and truthfulness. RESULTS We found that the most powerful levers of AI persuasion were methods for post-training and rhetorical strategy (prompting), which increased persuasiveness by as much as 51 and 27%, respectively. These gains were often larger than those obtained from substantially increasing model scale. Personalizing arguments on the basis of user data had a comparatively small effect on persuasion. We observe that a primary mechanism driving AI persuasiveness was information density: Models were most persuasive when they packed their arguments with a high volume of factual claims. Notably, however, we documented a concerning trade-off between persuasion and accuracy: The same levers that made AI more persuasive—including persuasion post-training and information-focused prompting—also systematically caused the AI to produce information that was less factually accurate. CONCLUSION Our findings suggest that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem less from model scale or personalization and more from post-training and prompting techniques that mobilize an LLM’s ability to rapidly generate information during conversation. Further, we reveal a troubling trade-off: When AI systems are optimized for persuasion, they may increasingly deploy misleading or false information. This research provides an empirical foundation for policy-makers and technologists to anticipate and address the challenges of AI-driven persuasion, and it highlights the need for safeguards that balance AI’s legitimate uses in political discourse with protections against manipulation and misinformation. Persuasiveness of conversational AI increases with model scale. The persuasive impact in percentage points on the y axis is plotted against effective pretraining compute [floating-point operations (FLOPs)] on the x axis. Point estimates are persuasive effects of different AI models. Colored lines show trends for models that we uniformly chat-tuned for open-ended conversation (purple) versus those that were post-trained using heterogeneous, opaque methods by AI developers (green). pp, percentage points; CI, confidence interval.
Persuasion: Empirical Evidence
We provide a selective survey of empirical evidence on the effects as well as the drivers of persuasive communication. We consider persuasion directed at consumers, voters, donors, and investors. We organize our review around four questions. First, to what extent does persuasion affect the behavior of each of these groups? Second, what models best capture the response to persuasive communication? Third, what are persuaders' incentives, and what limits their ability to distort communications? Finally, what evidence exists on the way persuasion affects equilibrium outcomes in economics and politics?
A meta-analysis of the persuasive power of large language models
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for persuasion, such as in political communication and marketing, where they affect how people think, choose, and act. Yet, empirical findings on the effectiveness of LLMs in persuasion compared to humans remain inconsistent. The aim of this study was to systematically review and meta-analytically assess whether LLMs differ from humans in persuasive effectiveness, and under which contextual conditions LLMs are particularly effective. We identified 7 studies with 17,422 participants primarily recruited from English-speaking countries and 12 effect size estimates. Egger’s test indicated potential small-study effects ($$p =.018$$), but the trim-and-fill analysis did not impute any missing studies, suggesting a low risk of publication bias. We then compute the standardized effect sizes based on Hedges’ g. The results show no significant overall difference in persuasive performance between LLMs and humans ($$g = 0.02$$, $$p =.530$$). However, we observe substantial heterogeneity across studies ($$I^2 = 75.97\%$$), suggesting that persuasiveness strongly depends on contextual factors. In separate exploratory moderator analyses, no individual factor (e.g., LLM model, conversation design, or domain) reached statistical significance, which may be due to the limited number of studies. When considered jointly in a combined model, these factors explained a large proportion of the between-study variance ($$R^2 = 81.93\%$$), and residual heterogeneity is low ($$I^2 = 35.51\%$$). Although based on a small number of studies, this suggests that differences in LLM model, conversation design, and domain are important contextual factors in shaping persuasive performance, and that single-factor tests may understate their influence. Our results highlight that LLMs can match human performance in persuasion, but their success depends strongly on how they are implemented and embedded in communication contexts.
Persuasion: Empirical Evidence
We provide a selective survey of empirical evidence on the effects as well as the drivers of persuasive communication. We consider persuasion directed at consumers, voters, donors, and investors. We organize our review around four questions. First, to what extent does persuasion affect the behavior of each of these groups? Second, what models best capture the response to persuasive communication? Third, what are persuaders' incentives, and what limits their ability to distort communications? Finally, what evidence exists on the way persuasion affects equilibrium outcomes in economics and politics?
Ethan Landes, Kathryn B. Francis & Jim A. C. Everett, People defer to AI moral advice, but not blindly - PhilArchive
As AI large language models (LLMs) become increasingly embedded in everyday technologies, should we be concerned about their capacity to influence human beliefs - particularly in the moral domain? Being persuaded ...
Generative Ethics: How AI Model Choice Shapes Social and Financial Performance
This paper estimates potential effects of AI adoption on firms' ethical decision making. Here I focus on variation in models' partiality, defined as the weight
AI language model rivals expert ethicist in perceived moral expertise
People view AI as possessing expertise across various fields, but the perceived quality of AI-generated moral expertise remains uncertain. Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) perform well on tasks designed to assess moral alignment, reflecting moral judgments with relatively high accuracy. As LLMs are increasingly employed in decision-making roles, there is a growing expectation for them to offer not just aligned judgments but also demonstrate sound moral reasoning. Here, we advance work on the Moral Turing Test and find that Americans rate ethical advice from GPT-4o as slightly more moral, trustworthy, thoughtful, and correct than that of the popular New York Times advice column, The Ethicist. Participants perceived GPT models as surpassing both a representative sample of Americans and a renowned ethicist in delivering moral justifications and advice, suggesting that people may increasingly view LLM outputs as viable sources of moral expertise. This work suggests that people might see LLMs as valuable complements to human expertise in moral guidance and decision-making. It also underscores the importance of carefully programming ethical guidelines in LLMs, considering their potential to influence users’ moral reasoning.
Generative Ethics: How AI Model Choice Shapes Social and Financial Performance
This paper estimates potential effects of AI adoption on firms' ethical decision making. Here I focus on variation in models' partiality, defined as the weight
Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide *
Abstract This article investigates the role of mass media in times of conflict and state-sponsored mass violence against civilians. We use a unique village-level data set from the Rwandan genocide to estimate the impact of a popular radio station that encouraged violence against the Tutsi minority population. The results show that the broadcasts had a significant effect on participation in killings by both militia groups and ordinary civilians. An estimated 51,000 perpetrators, or approximately 10% of the overall violence, can be attributed to the station. The broadcasts increased militia violence not only directly by influencing behavior in villages with radio reception but also indirectly by increasing participation in neighboring villages. In fact, spillovers are estimated to have caused more militia violence than the direct effects. Thus, the article provides evidence that mass media can affect participation in violence directly due to exposure and indirectly due to social interactions.
Deference, Dissent, and Dispute Resolution: An Experimental Intervention Using Mass Media to Change Norms and Behavior in Rwanda
Deference and dissent strike a delicate balance in any polity. Insufficient deference to authority may incapacitate government, whereas too much may allow leaders to orchestrate mass violence. Although cross-national and cross-temporal variation in deference to authority and willingness to express dissent has long been studied in political science, rarely have scholars studied programs designed to change these aspects of political culture. This study, situated in post-genocide Rwanda, reports a qualitative and quantitative assessment of one such attempt, a radio program aimed at discouraging blind obedience and reliance on direction from authorities and promoting independent thought and collective action in problem solving. Over the course of one year, this radio program or a comparable program dealing with HIV was randomly presented to pairs of communities, including communities of genocide survivors, Twa people, and imprisoned génocidaires. Changes in individual attitudes, perceived community norms, and deliberative behaviors were assessed using closed-ended interviews, focus group discussions, role-play exercises, and unobtrusive measures of collective decision making. Although the radio program had little effect on many kinds of beliefs and attitudes, it had a substantial impact on listeners' willingness to express dissent and the ways they resolved communal problems.
Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide *
Abstract This article investigates the role of mass media in times of conflict and state-sponsored mass violence against civilians. We use a unique village-level data set from the Rwandan genocide to estimate the impact of a popular radio station that encouraged violence against the Tutsi minority population. The results show that the broadcasts had a significant effect on participation in killings by both militia groups and ordinary civilians. An estimated 51,000 perpetrators, or approximately 10% of the overall violence, can be attributed to the station. The broadcasts increased militia violence not only directly by influencing behavior in villages with radio reception but also indirectly by increasing participation in neighboring villages. In fact, spillovers are estimated to have caused more militia violence than the direct effects. Thus, the article provides evidence that mass media can affect participation in violence directly due to exposure and indirectly due to social interactions.
How Radio Affects Violent Conflict: New Evidence from Rwanda
Researchers have long debated how radio broadcasts affected the dynamics of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, with some arguing that the radio was highly consequential, and others suggesting such effects have been overstated. This article contributes to these debates—as well as to debates regarding the role of old and new media in collective action—by examining whether and how Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Radio RTLM) coverage was associated with two core aspects of the violence: (1) subnational onset of genocidal violence and (2) participation in genocidal violence across subnational spaces. Drawing on new data on Radio RTLM coverage, we find that areas with coverage were more likely to experience immediate onset of violence. However, our analysis of participation in the genocide—which uses more accurate measures of participation and of radio coverage than prior studies—finds no significant association between Radio RTLM coverage and subnational levels of participation. After illustrating that these results are robust to numerous model specifications, we theorize that information broadcast over the radio’s airways contributed to the creation of a critical mass that initiated genocide in localized spaces. We conclude by considering the importance of understanding the role of media in the subnational onset of violence.
The AI Cognitive Trojan Horse: How Large Language Models May...
Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address....
A Rational Analysis of the Effects of Sycophantic AI
People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.
The AI Cognitive Trojan Horse: How Large Language Models May...
Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address....
Epistemic Vigilance
Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remain...
Training language models to be warm can reduce accuracy and increase sycophancy
Artificial intelligence developers are increasingly building language models with warm and friendly personas that millions of people now use for advice, therapy and companionship1. Here we show how this can create a significant trade-off: optimizing language models for warmth can undermine their performance, especially when users express vulnerability. We conducted controlled experiments on five different language models, training them to produce warmer responses, then evaluating them on consequential tasks. Warm models showed substantially higher error rates (+10 to +30 percentage points) than their original counterparts, promoting conspiracy theories, providing inaccurate factual information and offering incorrect medical advice. They were also significantly more likely to validate incorrect user beliefs, particularly when user messages expressed feelings of sadness. Importantly, these effects were consistent across different model architectures, and occurred despite preserved performance on standard tests, revealing systematic risks that standard testing practices may fail to detect. Our findings suggest that training artificial intelligence systems to be warm may come at a cost to accuracy, and that warmth and accuracy may not be independent by default. As these systems are deployed at an unprecedented scale and take on intimate roles in people’s lives, this trade-off warrants attention from developers, policymakers and users alike.
A Rational Analysis of the Effects of Sycophantic AI
People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.
Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models
Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a popular technique for training high-quality AI assistants. However, RLHF may also encourage model responses that match user beliefs over truthful responses, a behavior known as sycophancy. We investigate the prevalence of sycophancy in RLHF-trained models and whether human preference judgments are responsible. We first demonstrate that five state-of-the-art AI assistants consistently exhibit sycophancy behavior across four varied free-form text-generation tasks. To understand if human preferences drive this broadly observed behavior of RLHF models, we analyze existing human preference data. We find that when a response matches a user's views, it is more likely to be preferred. Moreover, both humans and preference models (PMs) prefer convincingly-written sycophantic responses over correct ones a non-negligible fraction of the time. Optimizing model outputs against PMs also sometimes sacrifices truthfulness in favor of sycophancy. Overall, our results indicate that sycophancy is a general behavior of RLHF models, likely driven in part by human preference judgments favoring sycophantic responses.
Training language models to be warm can reduce accuracy and increase sycophancy
Artificial intelligence developers are increasingly building language models with warm and friendly personas that millions of people now use for advice, therapy and companionship1. Here we show how this can create a significant trade-off: optimizing language models for warmth can undermine their performance, especially when users express vulnerability. We conducted controlled experiments on five different language models, training them to produce warmer responses, then evaluating them on consequential tasks. Warm models showed substantially higher error rates (+10 to +30 percentage points) than their original counterparts, promoting conspiracy theories, providing inaccurate factual information and offering incorrect medical advice. They were also significantly more likely to validate incorrect user beliefs, particularly when user messages expressed feelings of sadness. Importantly, these effects were consistent across different model architectures, and occurred despite preserved performance on standard tests, revealing systematic risks that standard testing practices may fail to detect. Our findings suggest that training artificial intelligence systems to be warm may come at a cost to accuracy, and that warmth and accuracy may not be independent by default. As these systems are deployed at an unprecedented scale and take on intimate roles in people’s lives, this trade-off warrants attention from developers, policymakers and users alike.
Which Economic Tasks are Performed with AI? Evidence from Millions of Claude Conversations
Despite widespread speculation about artificial intelligence's impact on the future of work, we lack systematic empirical evidence about how these systems are actually being used for different tasks. Here, we present a novel framework for measuring AI usage patterns across the economy. We leverage a recent privacy-preserving system to analyze over four million Claude.ai conversations through the lens of tasks and occupations in the U.S. Department of Labor's O*NET Database. Our analysis reveals that AI usage primarily concentrates in software development and writing tasks, which together account for nearly half of all total usage. However, usage of AI extends more broadly across the economy, with approximately 36% of occupations using AI for at least a quarter of their associated tasks. We also analyze how AI is being used for tasks, finding 57% of usage suggests augmentation of human capabilities (e.g., learning or iterating on an output) while 43% suggests automation (e.g., fulfilling a request with minimal human involvement). While our data and methods face important limitations and only paint a picture of AI usage on a single platform, they provide an automated, granular approach for tracking AI's evolving role in the economy and identifying leading indicators of future impact as these technologies continue to advance.
How People Use ChatGPT
Despite the rapid adoption of LLM chatbots, little is known about how they are used. We document the growth of ChatGPT’s consumer product from its launch in November 2022 through July 2025, when it had been adopted by around 10% of the world’s adult population. Early adopters were disproportionately male but the gender gap has narrowed dramatically, and we find higher growth rates in lower-income countries. Using a privacy-preserving automated pipeline, we classify usage patterns within a representative sample of ChatGPT conversations. We find steady growth in work-related messages but even faster growth in non-work-related messages, which have grown from 53% to more than 70% of all usage. Work usage is more common for educated users in highly-paid professional occupations. We classify messages by conversation topic and find that “Practical Guidance,” “Seeking Information,” and “Writing” are the three most common topics and collectively account for nearly 80% of all conversations. Writing dominates work-related tasks, highlighting chatbots’ unique ability to generate digital outputs compared to traditional search engines. Computer programming and self-expression both represent relatively small shares of use. Overall, we find that ChatGPT provides economic value through decision support, which is especially important in knowledge-intensive jobs.
Biased AI writing assistants shift users’ attitudes on societal issues
Artificial intelligence (AI) writing assistants powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to make autocomplete suggestions to people as they write text. Can these AI writing assistants affect people’s attitudes in this process? In two large-scale preregistered experiments ( N = 2582), we exposed participants writing about important societal issues to an AI writing assistant that provided biased autocomplete suggestions. When using the AI assistant, the attitudes participants expressed in a posttask survey converged toward the AI’s position. However, a majority of participants were unaware of the AI suggestions’ bias and their influence. Further, the influence of the AI writing assistant was stronger than the influence of similar suggestions presented as static text, showing that the influence is not fully explained by these suggestions, increasing accessibility of the biased information. Last, warning participants about assistants’ bias before or after exposure does not mitigate the attitude-shift effect. , Biased AI writing assistants shift people’s attitudes about societal issues; common interventions do not prevent this influence.
Mor Naaman (@informor.bsky.social)
Cornell Tech professor (information science, AI-mediated Communication, trustworthiness of our information ecosystem). New York City. Taller in person. Opinions my own. mornaaman.com
Generative AI enhances individual creativity but reduces the collective diversity of novel content
Creativity is core to being human. Generative artificial intelligence (AI)—including powerful large language models (LLMs)—holds promise for humans to be more creative by offering new ideas, or less creative by anchoring on generative AI ideas. We study the causal impact of generative AI ideas on the production of short stories in an online experiment where some writers obtained story ideas from an LLM. We find that access to generative AI ideas causes stories to be evaluated as more creative, better written, and more enjoyable, especially among less creative writers. However, generative AI–enabled stories are more similar to each other than stories by humans alone. These results point to an increase in individual creativity at the risk of losing collective novelty. This dynamic resembles a social dilemma: With generative AI, writers are individually better off, but collectively a narrower scope of novel content is produced. Our results have implications for researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners interested in bolstering creativity. , Generative AI can enhance the creativity of short stories but may limit the variation in diverse outputs.
Biased AI writing assistants shift users’ attitudes on societal issues
Artificial intelligence (AI) writing assistants powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to make autocomplete suggestions to people as they write text. Can these AI writing assistants affect people’s attitudes in this process? In two large-scale preregistered experiments ( N = 2582), we exposed participants writing about important societal issues to an AI writing assistant that provided biased autocomplete suggestions. When using the AI assistant, the attitudes participants expressed in a posttask survey converged toward the AI’s position. However, a majority of participants were unaware of the AI suggestions’ bias and their influence. Further, the influence of the AI writing assistant was stronger than the influence of similar suggestions presented as static text, showing that the influence is not fully explained by these suggestions, increasing accessibility of the biased information. Last, warning participants about assistants’ bias before or after exposure does not mitigate the attitude-shift effect. , Biased AI writing assistants shift people’s attitudes about societal issues; common interventions do not prevent this influence.
Generative AI enhances individual creativity but reduces the collective diversity of novel content
Creativity is core to being human. Generative artificial intelligence (AI)—including powerful large language models (LLMs)—holds promise for humans to be more creative by offering new ideas, or less creative by anchoring on generative AI ideas. We study the causal impact of generative AI ideas on the production of short stories in an online experiment where some writers obtained story ideas from an LLM. We find that access to generative AI ideas causes stories to be evaluated as more creative, better written, and more enjoyable, especially among less creative writers. However, generative AI–enabled stories are more similar to each other than stories by humans alone. These results point to an increase in individual creativity at the risk of losing collective novelty. This dynamic resembles a social dilemma: With generative AI, writers are individually better off, but collectively a narrower scope of novel content is produced. Our results have implications for researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners interested in bolstering creativity. , Generative AI can enhance the creativity of short stories but may limit the variation in diverse outputs.
Generative AI enhances individual creativity but reduces the collective diversity of novel content
Creativity is core to being human. Generative artificial intelligence (AI)—including powerful large language models (LLMs)—holds promise for humans to be more creative by offering new ideas, or less creative by anchoring on generative AI ideas. We study the causal impact of generative AI ideas on the production of short stories in an online experiment where some writers obtained story ideas from an LLM. We find that access to generative AI ideas causes stories to be evaluated as more creative, better written, and more enjoyable, especially among less creative writers. However, generative AI–enabled stories are more similar to each other than stories by humans alone. These results point to an increase in individual creativity at the risk of losing collective novelty. This dynamic resembles a social dilemma: With generative AI, writers are individually better off, but collectively a narrower scope of novel content is produced. Our results have implications for researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners interested in bolstering creativity. , Generative AI can enhance the creativity of short stories but may limit the variation in diverse outputs.
Jim Prosser on Twitter / X
Ask: "I spend $250 a week on groceries at Safeway. Can you get that under $200 without changing what we eat?"Agent: Reviews receipt photos, compares local prices and coupons, finds cheaper equivalents, builds a shopping cart, and tracks weekly savings.— Jim Prosser (@jimprosser) October 8, 2026
Jim Prosser on Twitter / X
Ask: "I've got $12,000 spread across three credit cards racking up interest. What can I do?"Agent: Calculates interest costs, checks hardship options/balance transfer offers, drafts requests to issuers, and builds a realistic repayment schedule.— Jim Prosser (@jimprosser) October 8, 2026
Jim Prosser on Twitter / X
Ask: "I just got a $2,800 bill for an ER visit I thought insurance covered. What happened?"Agent: Matches the bill to the insurer's explanation of benefits, flags discrepancies, checks coverage and financial aid, prepares a dispute, and follows up until it's resolved.— Jim Prosser (@jimprosser) October 8, 2026
Jim Prosser on Twitter / X
Ask: "I spend $250 a week on groceries at Safeway. Can you get that under $200 without changing what we eat?"Agent: Reviews receipt photos, compares local prices and coupons, finds cheaper equivalents, builds a shopping cart, and tracks weekly savings.— Jim Prosser (@jimprosser) October 8, 2026
